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Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc.
09-152
Ruling Below: Bruesewitz v. Wyeth, Inc., 561 F.3d 233 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 2010 U.S.
LEXIS 2266 (2010).
This case arose because the parents alleged that their child suffered injury after she received a
diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT) vaccine made by the manufacturer. The suit alleged design
and manufacturing defects and failure to warn claims. The district court concluded that all claims
were preempted by the Vaccine Act. On appeal, the court considered the following three
questions: (1) whether the Vaccine Act preempted all design defect claims against the
manufacturer of a vaccine; (2) whether the parents demonstrated that the manufacturer failed to
adequately warn of the risks associated with the vaccine; and (3) whether the parents provided
sufficient evidence of a manufacturing defect to survive summary judgment. While the court
found that the Vaccine Act contained an express preemption provision, ambiguities required
analysis of the language, structure, and purpose of the Act. As a result of that analysis, the court
concluded that Congress intended to preempt some design defect claims, and particularly the
DPT-related claim here. The court also concluded that the parents failed to establish either a
manufacturing defect or a warning defect claim under the Vaccine Act.
Question Presented: Whether the Third Circuit erred in holding that, contrary to its plain text
and the decisions of this Court and others, Section 22(b)(1) preempts all vaccine design defect
claims, whether the vaccine's side effects were unavoidable or not?
Russell BRUESEWITZ; Robalee Bruesewitz, parents and natural guardians of Hannah
Bruesewitz, a minor child and in their own right, Appellants,
V.
WYETH INC. f/k/a Wyeth Laboratories, Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Wyeth Lederle,
Wyeth Lederle Vaccines, and Lederle Laboratories.
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed March 27, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
SMITH, Circuit Judge: adequately warn the plaintiffs of the risks
This appeal presents three questions related associated with the vaccine; and (3) whether
to the National Childhood Vaccine Injury the plaintiffs provided sufficient evidence of
Act: (1) whether the Act preempts all design a manufacturing defect to survive the
defect claims against the manufacturer of a defendant's motion for summary judgment.
vaccine; (2) whether the plaintiffs The District Court held that the Act
demonstrated that the manufacturer failed to preempted all design defect claims and
concluded that the plaintiffs failed to
provide sufficient evidence to support the
other two claims. For the reasons that
follow, we will affirm.
I.
A.
Historically, the states have possessed "great
latitude under their police powers to
legislate as to the protection of the lives,
limbs, health, comfort, and quiet" of their
citizens. This has been true with regard to
drugs, as the Supreme Court has declared it
"well settled that the State has broad police
powers in regulating the administration of
drugs by the health professions." And the
police powers extend to immunization, as
state and local authorities have responded to
illnesses like smallpox and sought to
inoculate members of the populous. Despite
calls in the late nineteenth-century for the
federal regulation of vaccines to promote
uniform safety regulations, Congress did not
act until 1902, when thirteen children died
after being vaccinated with contaminated
diphtheria antitoxin. Over the past century,
however, the federal government has taken a
predominate role in approving, regulating,
and promoting vaccines-from the passage
of the Biologics Control Act in 1902, which
authorized a federal agency to issue
regulations related to vaccines, to the Public
Health Service Act, which required federal
authorities to license vaccines and vaccine
manufacturers, to the Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act for
Recovery from and Response to Terrorist
Attacks on the United States, which
appropriated money for the acquisition of a
sufficient quantity of the smallpox vaccine
to inoculate the country.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
("Vaccine Act") is one such effort. Enacted
in 1986, the Vaccine Act established a
national vaccine program to "achieve
optimal prevention of human infectious
diseases through immunization and to
achieve optimal prevention against adverse
reactions to vaccines." It sought to
accomplish this primarily through the
creation of the National Vaccine Injury
Compensation Program ("NVICP") for
claims against drug manufacturers for
vaccine-related injuries and deaths.
The NVICP has two parts. Part A creates a
mandatory forum for the administration of
claims-it requires a petitioner seeking
compensation, including the injured party's
legal representative, to file a petition in the
"Vaccine Court," which is part of the United
States Court of Federal Claims. The
petitioner is entitled to receive compensation
if: (1) the affected person received a vaccine
covered by the Vaccine Act; (2) the affected
person suffered a "Table injury"; and (3) it
cannot be shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that the injuries or death were not
caused by the vaccine. Alternatively, a
petitioner who suffers a non-Table injury
may still obtain compensation by proving
affirmatively that the vaccine caused the
injury. Part B of the NVICP permits a
petitioner, after the Vaccine Court has
issued a final judgment, to either accept or
reject that judgment. If the petitioner rejects
the judgment, she may pursue certain
limited claims in state or federal court.
B.
Hannah Bruesewitz was born on October 20,
1991. At the time, the federal Advisory
Committee on Immunization Practices
recommended that children receive five
doses of the diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus
("DPT") vaccine during the course of their
childhood, one dose at each of the following
ages: (1) 2 months; (2) 4 months; (3) 6
months; (4) 15-18 months; and (5) 4-6 years.
Hannah received her first three shots of the
DPT vaccine according to this schedule.
After the third DPT shot, marketed under the
trade name TRI-IMMUNOL and
administered on April 1, 1992, she suffered
a series of seizures. Doctors subsequently
diagnosed Hannah as having residual seizure
disorder and developmental delay. Hannah,
who is now seventeen, will likely require
some medical care related to that condition
for the remainder of her life.
Defendant Wyeth, Inc. and its predecessors
("Wyeth") manufactured TRI-IMMUNOL
until 1998. Approved in 1948, this vaccine
contains the "whole-cell" pertussis
vaccine-it is prepared using whole,
inactivated pertussis bacterial cells.
Although the whole-cell vaccine effectively
reduced pertussis infections and deaths
associated with these infections, it was also
linked to a variety of adverse events. This
led to interest in and efforts to develop a
safer, acellular pertussis vaccine.
In December 1991, the Food and Drug
Administration ("FDA") approved the
defendant's application for an alternate DPT
vaccine, which was known as ACEL-
IMJNE. ACEL-IMUNE contains an
acellular pertussis component. While the
acellular vaccine contains parts of pertussis
bacterial cells, because it does not contain a
complete cell, it has less endotoxin and is
less likely to cause adverse events. The FDA
initially approved ACEL-IMUNE, however,
for administration as the fourth and/or fifth
DPT dose in the series of five. The FDA did
not approve an acellular pertussis vaccine
for the first three shots in the series until
July 1996 when it approved the license of
Connaught Laboratories, Inc. Defendant's
ACEL-IMUNE did not receive approval for
these same doses until December 1996.
Nonetheless, at the time of vaccination in
April 1992, Hannah's doctor administered
the TRI-IMMUNOL vaccine because there
were no acellular pertussis vaccines
commercially available for the third dose.
Hannah's particular vaccine came from a lot
that generated sixty-five reports of adverse
reactions with the FDA and Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, including
thirty-nine emergency room visits, six
hospitalizations, and two deaths. Hannah's
physician later indicated, as part of this
litigation, that she would not have
immunized Hannah had she known of the
adverse event reports associated with this lot
of the vaccine.
In 1998, Wyeth voluntarily discontinued
manufacturing TRI-IMMUNOL.
C.
Hannah's parents ("plaintiffs") filed a
petition in the Vaccine Court in April 1995,
alleging that Hannah suffered an on-Table
residual seizure disorder and
encephalopathy. The Court held a hearing in
July 2002 and concluded in December of
that year that Hannah's injuries were non-
Table injuries and that the petitioners had
not proven causation in fact. [New
regulations deleted residual seizure disorder
as a Table injury for DPT vaccine
approximately one month before the
plaintiffs filed their petition.] Accordingly, it
dismissed the claim with prejudice.
Hannah's parents rejected the Court's
judgment on February 14, 2003.
Having exhausted their administrative
remedies, the plaintiffs filed a Complaint in
the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas in
October 2005. The complaint sought
recovery on four claims: (I) negligent failure
to produce a safer vaccine; (II) negligent
failure to warn; (III) strict liability for design
defect; and (IV) strict liability for
manufacturing defect. Wyeth removed the
action on the basis of diversity to the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania and filed a motion
for summary judgment....
Although the District Court did not accept
all of Wyeth's theories, it granted summary
judgment in Wyeth's favor on all counts on
August 24, 2007. The District Court
concluded that Section 22(b)(1) of the
Vaccine Act, preempts all design defect
claims arising from a vaccine-related injury
or death and dismissed Counts I and III on
that basis. Regarding Count II, which
alleged negligent failure to warn, the District
Court concluded that the plaintiffs had not
rebuffed the statutory presumption created
by Section 22(b)(2) of the Vaccine Act, that
Wyeth's FDA-compliant warnings were
proper. As to Count IV, which alleged that
the particular lot from which Hannah's dose
originated was especially prone to adverse
reactions due to a manufacturing defect, the
District Court concluded that the plaintiffs
had failed to present sufficient evidence that
the lot was defective or that it caused
Hannah's injuries.
The District Court's ruling on the first and
third claims warrants further examination.
Both counts alleged a design defect--Count
I alleged that Hannah's vaccine was
negligently designed because the defendant
knew of a safer alternative and failed to
produce it, while Count III alleged strict
liability design defect. The District Court
ruled that both claims were preempted by
the Vaccine Act. It rested this decision on
four points. First, it stated that a case-by-
case consideration of whether a vaccine was
unavoidably safe would not protect vaccine
manufacturers from suit. Second, it reasoned
that Congress passed the Vaccine Act to
"provide an umbrella under which
manufacturers would improve the safety of
their products while remaining immune
from design defect claims." Third, the Court
found that Congress achieved an appropriate
balance by offsetting the effect of the
preemption of design defect claims with
creation of a compensation program for
individuals injured by vaccines. Finally, it
concluded that the Vaccine Act preempts
both strict liability and negligent design
defect claims against FDA-approved
vaccines. Accordingly, it dismissed
plaintiffs' first and third claims.
The plaintiffs appealed. Their appeal
presents this Court with three questions: (1)
does § 300aa-22(b)(1) act as a complete bar
to design defect claims; (2) have the
plaintiffs in this case met their burden under
§ 22(b)(2) of the Vaccine Act to show that
defendants failed to provide an adequate
warning of the alleged dangers of the
vaccine; and (3) have the plaintiffs provided
sufficient evidence of a manufacturing
defect to survive the defendant's motion for
summary judgment.
II.
IM.
Preemption doctrine is rooted in the
Supremacy Clause of the United States
Constitution. . . . Over the years, the
Supreme Court has recognized three types of
preemption: express preemption, implied
conflict preemption, and field preemption.
A federal enactment expressly preempts
state law if it contains language so requiring.
Thus, when construing an express
preemption clause, a reviewing court must
necessarily begin by examining the "plain
wording of the clause," as this "necessarily
contains the best evidence of Congress' pre-
emptive intent." Though the language of the
provision offers a starting point, courts are
often called upon to "identify the domain
expressly pre-empted by that language." ...
Implied conflict preemption arises when
state law conflicts with a federal statute in
one of two situations. First, it arises when it
is "impossible for a private party to comply
with both state and federal requirements." It
is also present when state law "stands as an
obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives
of Congress." Furthermore, implied
preemption may exist even in the face of an
express preemption clause. As the Supreme
Court observed. . . "Congress' enactment of
a provision defining the preemptive reach of
a statute implies that matters beyond that
reach are not pre-empted," but that "does not
mean that the express clause entirely
forecloses any possibility of implied pre-
emption."
When confronting arguments that a law
stands as an obstacle to Congressional
objectives, a court must use its judgment:
"What is a sufficient obstacle is a matter of
judgment, to be informed by examining the
federal statute as a whole and identifying its
purpose and intended effects." In fact, we
must look to "the entire scheme of the
statute"' and determine "[i]f the purpose of
the [federal] act cannot otherwise be
accomplished-if its operation with its
chosen field [would] be frustrated and its
provisions be refused their natural effect."
Once again, this requires an examination of
the "whole law, and to its object and
policy."'
Field preemption arises by implication when
state law occupies a "field reserved for
federal regulation." This occurs when
"Congress [ ] left no room for state
regulation of these matters."
Nonetheless, because field preemption
typically arises in areas traditionally
regulated by states under their police
powers, "congressional intent to supersede
state laws must be 'clear and manifest."'
Yet despite the development of the
foregoing preemption jurisprudence, courts
must begin their analysis of these questions
by applying a presumption against
preemption. "In areas of traditional state
regulation, we assume that a federal statute
has not supplanted state law unless Congress
has made such an intention 'clear and
manifest."' When faced with two equally
plausible readings of statutory text, we
"have a duty to accept the reading that
disfavors preemption." This is true even in
the event of an express preemption clause.
That issues of health and safety have
traditionally fallen within the province of
state regulation is beyond refute. That safety
of vaccines is an issue of health and safety is
equally clear. Nonetheless, in the face of
clear evidence, the presumption against
preemption can be overcome.
We must decide here whether the plaintiffs'
design defect claims are preempted. As we
have noted, the District Court reasoned that
four points counseled in favor of finding that
both claims were preempted by the Vaccine
Act: (1) if the Vaccine Act permitted case-
by-case consideration of design defect
claims, the Act would do little to protect
manufacturers from suit; (2) Congress
intended the Vaccine Act to encourage
vaccine improvements while providing
immunity for design defect claims; (3)
Congress achieved a balance between
manufacturers and patients by creating the
compensation system to offset design defect
immunity; and (4) the Vaccine Act is
broader than comment k of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A such that the Act
encompasses both strict liability and
negligence claims. At the same time, the
District Court did not explicitly lay out a
framework for coming to these conclusions,
nor did it state whether they were predicated
on express, implied, or field preemption
grounds.
Plaintiffs now seek to turn such ambiguity to
their advantage by arguing that the District
Court's decision was "based on some kind
of implied or field preemption" when the
defendant's motion for summary judgment
raised only express preemption. This, they
maintain, violated "well-settled summary
judgment principles." Accordingly, we must
consider four questions related to the
preemption of the design defect claim: (1)
whether § 300aa-22(b) constitutes an
express preemption provision; (2) whether
we may use traditional tools of statutory
interpretation, including legislative history,
when construing such a provision; (3)
whether this provision preempts plaintiffs'
design defect claims; and (4) whether the
District Court's decision is consistent with
this analysis.
A.
Part B of the Vaccine Act establishes the
circumstances under which individuals who
have rejected the judgment of the Vaccine
Court may subsequently file suit in state or
federal court. Section 300aa-22, entitled
"Standards of Responsibility," sets forth
both a general rule and several exceptions to
that rule.
We are guided by two cases interpreting
language similar to that which appears in §
300aa-22. In Lorillard Tobacco Co., the
Supreme Court interpreted the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act,
which stated that "[n]o statement relating to
smoking and health other than the statement
required by section 1333 of this title, shall
be required on any cigarette package." This
language is analogous to subsection 22(b)(1)
of the Vaccine Act, which states that "[n]o
vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a
civil action for damages arising from a
vaccine-related injury or death . .. if the
injury or death resulted from side effects
that were unavoidable." In both provisions,
without using language such as "no state
shall" or "state law is preempted," Congress
has set forth an area in which state law may
not operate. In CSX Transportation, Inc., the
Supreme Court construed the following
provision: "A state may adopt or continue in
force any law ...until such time as the
Secretary has adopted a rule... covering the
subject matter of such State requirement. A
state may adopt or continue in force an
additional or more stringent law . . .when
not incompatible with any Federal law ... "
Similarly, Section 22(a) of the Vaccine Act
establishes a general rule permitting states to
regulate vaccines subject to several
exceptions set forth in subsections (b), (c),
and (e).
In both Lorillard Tobacco Co. and CSX
Transportation, Inc., the Supreme Court
characterized the language at issue as an
express preemption provision. In the former
case, the Court declared that "Congress
unequivocally preclude[d] the requirement
of any additional statements on cigarette
packages beyond those provided in § 1333."
In the latter case, the Court characterized the
quoted language as containing "express
saving and preemption clauses."
Accordingly, we conclude that § 22(a) and §
22(b)(1) of the Vaccine Act also contain
express preemption clauses.
Our conclusion is consistent with prior
jurisprudence from this Court, stating that
express preemption "arises when there is an
explicit statutory command that state law be
displaced." Section 22(a) clearly states
Congress's intent to displace state law in
several enumerated instances, including as
provided for in subsection (b). Subsection
(b) then declares that manufacturers are
immune from liability for claims arising
from "unavoidable" injuries and deaths
related to vaccine administration, thereby
prohibiting states from regulating in this
area. The scope of a preemption provision
stating that "no state shall pass laws with the
following exceptions" may well be broader
than a provision stating "state law applies
with the following exceptions." Yet the
breadth of a provision does not alter the
import of the underlying language, and here
that language conveys a clear intent to
override state law civil action claims in
particular, defined circumstances.
Yet we must still determine the scope and
reach of the express preemption provision.
The plaintiffs here concede that the statute
"expressly precludes only those state tort
claims involving vaccines with side effects
first shown to be 'unavoidable,' "but they
argue that avoidability must first be
determined "on a case-by-basis" as part of a
court's examination of a design defect
claim. In response, Wyeth argues that this
language "preempts all claims arising from
allegations of design defect." Accordingly,
"we must [ ] 'identify the domain expressly
pre-empted' by [the] language" of the
Vaccine Act.
B.
Again, we are mindful that courts seeking to
identify the scope of an express preemption
provision are compelled to consider
"Congressional purpose [ ] the 'ultimate
touchstone' of our inquiry." (quoting
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc). The
Supreme Court has declared on numerous
occasions that reviewing courts have several
tools to aid them in their interpretation of
congressional purpose. Courts may be
guided by the "structure and purpose of the
statute as a whole, as revealed not only in
the text, but through the reviewing court's
reasoned understanding of the way in which
Congress intended the statute and its
surrounding regulatory scheme to affect
business, consumers, and the law." Beyond
structure and purpose, the Court has also
stated "that '[i]n expounding a statute, we
must not be guided by a single sentence or
member of a sentence, but look to the
provisions of the whole law, and to its object
and policy."'
We have recognized that legislative history
is not without its shortcomings as a tool of
interpretation. "As a point of fact, there can
be multiple legislative intents because
hundreds of men and women must vote in
favor of a bill in order for it to become a
law." Yet, resort to legislative history is
appropriate "when necessary to interpret
ambiguous statutory text."...
It is, therefore, appropriate to consider
legislative history to resolve ambiguity in
the scope of an express preemption
provision....
We cannot resolve from statutory text alone
the scope of the express preemption
provision before us. Accordingly, we will
look at the language, structure, and purpose
of the Vaccine Act to ascertain whether it
preempts all design defect claims, and we
will resort-as we must-to legislative
history to aid our interpretation.
C.
We are left to construe the scope of
preemption created by the phrase "if the
injury or death resulted from side effects
that were unavoidable. . . ." [from § 300aa-
22(b)] The phrase hinges on the word
"unavoidable," yet the term is not defined in
the Vaccine Act. Nor does the surrounding
language answer questions such as whether
all design defect claims are preempted or
whether state courts may determine
avoidability on a case-by-case basis. . ..
Yet, the structure of the provision as a whole
provides necessary context, and we can
conceive of two possible interpretations of
this language.
1.
The first construction would result in the
preemption of some design defect claims.
Subsection (a) expressly preempts state law
to the degree indicated in subsection (b).
Subsection (b), in turn, primarily relates to
design defect claims, as evidenced by the
use of a subordinate clause introduced by
"even though" to reference claims that might
arise from a manufacturing defect or
warning defect. That structure makes it clear
that we must consider design defects in the
first instance. Clearly, then, subsection (a)
and (b) work in concert to preempt state law
and exempt manufacturers from liability for
some design defect claims.
Section 300aa-22, taken as a whole, further
clarifies Congress's intent with regard to
design defect claims. Subsection (a)
displaces state law only as defined in
subsections (b), (c), and (e). Subsections (b)
and (c) employ identical introductory
language, stating that "[n]o vaccine
manufacturer shall be liable in a civil action
for damages arising from a vaccine-related
injury or death associated with the
administration of a vaccine.... ." Subsection
(e) prohibits states from foreclosing civil
actions that are otherwise "not barred by this
part," thereby stating that other parts of §
300aa-22 are designed to not only limit
liability but bar some claims entirely. Thus,
by reading these three provisions together, it
becomes clear that Congress intended that
subsections (b) and (c) should be an outright
bar to some claims.
In [Am. Home Prods. Corp. v. Ferrari,] a
case presenting design defect claims similar
to those in the present case, the Georgia
Supreme Court reached a different
conclusion regarding the meaning of §
22(b). It focused on the clause "if the injury
or death resulted from side effects that were
unavoidable." That Court first noted that this
language is conditional and implies that
some vaccine-related injuries and deaths
may be avoided. The Ferrari Court also
reasoned that reading the preemption
provision to exclude all design defect claims
would render the clause superfluous. That
Court concluded that if Congress intended to
preempt all design defect claims, it could
have achieved that result by omitting the
"unavoidable" clause such that the provision
would prevent liability "if the vaccine was
properly prepared and was accompanied by
proper directions and warnings."
We do not consider the Ferrari Court's
reading to be compelling. First, while we
recognize that the language is conditional,
such a reading does not foreclose the
preemption of some claims. Furthermore, it
is always possible to construct through
hindsight an alternate structure for a statute
with alternative wording that would render it
more clear....
More importantly, we think the Ferrari
Court's construction is contrary to the
structure of the Act because it does not bar
any design defect claims. If we interpret the
Vaccine Act to allow case-by-case analysis
of whether particular vaccine side effects are
avoidable, every design defect claim is
subject to evaluation by a court.
Furthermore, in 1986 when Congress
enacted the Vaccine Act, several courts had
already barred strict liability design defect
claims against prescription drug
manufacturers under state law. The Ferrari
Court's construction of § 300aa-22 could
create an awkward dichotomy in the case
law of these states-their courts would be
required to engage in case-by-case analysis
of all strict liability and negligent design
defect claims brought under the Vaccine
Act, while barring strict liability design
defect claims against prescription drug
manufacturers. As discussed above,
Congress could not have intended such a
result, as § 300aa-22 makes clear that
Congress intended to preempt and bar
certain claims.
Though there are two possible
interpretations of subsection (b), we
conclude that a "clear and manifest"
expression of congressional intent supports
the first interpretation. Our construction,
however, does not indicate whether
subsection (b) preempts all design defect
claims or only strict liability design defect
claims.
2.
There is no language in the statute indicating
whether the Vaccine Act preempts only
strict liability design defect claims or also
those based in negligence, and the structure
and purpose of the Act are of little assistance
in resolving that question. As a result, there
remains some inherent ambiguity in the
statute, and we must resort to legislative
history to resolve that ambiguity. The parties
in this case cite to different congressional
reports to support their claims. Each
argument will be addressed in turn.
a.
Wyeth cites to a report ("Commerce
Report") from the House Committee on
Energy and Commerce ("Energy and
Commerce Committee"), which had
jurisdiction over the Vaccine Act and guided
the legislation through passage. The
Commerce Report declared that childhood
vaccinations have been "one of the most
spectacularly effective public health
initiatives this country has ever undertaken,"
preventing countless deaths and saving
billions of dollars. The Report stated,
however, that "the Nation's ability to
maintain this level of success has come into
question" as a result of tort claims by
individuals gravely injured by vaccines.
This, in turn, caused an increase in the cost
of vaccines, the withdrawal of some
manufacturers from the market, and a
decreased rate of immunization. The Report
noted that these conditions prompted the
Energy and Commerce Committee to
reevaluate the federal regulation of vaccines.
Though the Committee was concerned with
compensating individuals injured by
vaccines, it also sought to reduce the cost of
such claims in order to safeguard the
development and availability of such
vaccines.... The Report demonstrates that
the Vaccine Act was motivated in great
measure by Congress's belief that an
alternate compensation system would reduce
awards and create a stable, predictable basis
for estimating liability: "[T]he Committee
believes that once this system is in place and
manufacturers have a better sense of their
potential litigation obligations, a more stable
childhood vaccine market will evolve."
Importantly, the Commerce Report
specifically addressed § 300aa-22, the
section at issue here. First, it noted that some
provisions of the Vaccine Act would
"change most State laws" related to vaccine
injuries and deaths. Yet, it deemed this an
appropriate change "in light of the
availability of a comprehensive and fair
compensation system." Then, the Commerce
Report stated that the Vaccine Act reflected
the principle of Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A comment k, which states that
sellers of certain products, including
vaccines, should not be strictly liable for
harm caused by their products when it is not
possible to make these products entirely
safe. The Report described the type of
vaccine cases in which comment k would
have import-cases in which innocent
children would be "badly injured or killed"
by a vaccine, but in which a jury would
likely impose liability on the manufacturer
"even if the defendant manufacturer may
have made as safe a vaccine as anyone
reasonably could expect." Finally, it stated
in precise and certain terms that its reference
to comment k and the language of 22(b)
results in immunity for liability for all
design defects, whether liability rests on
theories of strict liability or negligence....
Though we acknowledge that a majority of
states permit some design defect claims
under comment k, we disagree with the
Georgia Supreme Court on the relevance of
this fact .... [W]e believe Congress made it
clear what it intended when it invoked
comment k.
In our view, the Commerce Report supports
the conclusion that the Vaccine Act
preempts all design defect claims, including
those based in negligence....
[The court dismisses the
interpretation.]
plaintiff alternate
3.
Even if Congress did not intend to prohibit
all design defect claims against vaccine
manufacturers, the legislative history
indicates that it intended to preempt the
specific claim at issue here. In the days prior
to passage of the Vaccine Act, the Energy
and Commerce Committee issued a report
containing "background information on the
various issues concerning childhood
vaccines. .. ." ("Background Report"). This
report stated that the pertussis vaccine "is
considered the most reactive of all the
commonly used vaccines and has been the
one of most concern in debates over adverse
effects of vaccines." It recounted the risks
and side effects associated with the pertussis
vaccine, including neurological problems
and even death, and the efforts of parent
groups to raise awareness of these serious
consequences. The Background Report also
stated that "research is proceeding on the
effort to develop an acellular vaccine that
would cause fewer side effects." Namely, it
explained that researchers were attempting
to isolate the reactive components of the
pertussis bacterial cell so that these
components could be excluded from the
vaccine. The Background Report also
explained that Japan had used such a
vaccine, but it indicated that the safety and
efficacy of this vaccine had not been
reported. It then warned that "conducting
clinical trials to test any new pertussis
vaccine will pose major logistic, legal, and
ethical problems."
The Commerce Report on the Vaccine Act
also contained numerous references to the
DPT vaccine. It noted the "serious-and
sometimes deadly-consequences" of
vaccines and that this was "particularly true
with regard to the pertussis" component of
the DPT vaccine. Before warning of the
ramifications of the withdrawal of "even a
single manufacturer," the Report also
highlighted the increasing number of
lawsuits related to the DPT vaccine and
recognized that there were only two
manufacturers of the DPT vaccine at that
time.
Whereas the plaintiffs contend that Wyeth
and its predecessors knew "for more than 25
years that the acellular vaccine was less
reactogenic and, therefore, safer for the
children who receive it" and seek to
establish liability by virtue of that
knowledge, the two reports discussed
immediately above, taken together, establish
that Congress intended to preempt such
claims. The Background Report indicates
that Congress was well aware of the state of
the art concerning development of an
acellular DPT vaccine. It also evidences that
Congress believed there were hurdles before
such a vaccine could undergo clinical testing
in the United States. The Commerce Report
stresses the particular problems faced by
DPT vaccine manufacturers, including the
high number of lawsuits and existence of
only two producers. The Commerce Report
then concludes that the "withdrawal of even
a single manufacturer would present the
very real possibility of vaccine shortages...
[and] a resurgence of preventable diseases"
and that the vaccine market will stabilize
once "manufacturers have a better sense of
their potential litigation obligations." This
evidence indicates that Congress weighed
the various concerns related to the pertussis
vaccine and concluded that DPT
manufacturers should be shielded from
liability for injuries arising from the whole-
cell pertussis vaccine.
4.
As we stated at the beginning of this part,
"Congressional purpose is the 'ultimate
touchstone' of our inquiry." Section 22(a)
and 22(b)(1) of the Vaccine Act contain
express preemption clauses. Further, the
structure and purpose of § 300aa-22 of the
Act make clear that Congress intended to
preempt some design defect claims. The
legislative history identifies the scope of this
preemption, which encompasses both strict
liability and negligent design defect claims.
D.
.The District Court did not clearly explain
the basis of its summary judgment decision.
It neither discussed the three types of
preemption nor mentioned that the motion
for summary judgment raised only express
preemption. Nevertheless, the District Court
decision is consistent with an express
preemption analysis, and we take it to have
intended application of that doctrine. The
four points discussed in the District Court's
opinion were grounded in the purpose of the
Vaccine Act. As discussed in Part 11J.B
above, such an analysis is permitted when
construing an express preemption clause.
Furthermore, in response to the motion for
summary judgment, the plaintiffs cited to
the Vaccine Act's legislative history and
purpose to support their argument that
design defect claims were not preempted. As
a result, we reject plaintiffs' argument that
the District Court's decision was based on
implied or field preemption grounds or that
it violated well-settled principles of
summary judgment.
IV-
Plaintiffs also allege that Wyeth is liable for
failing to warn Hannah's doctor, Jane M.
Breck, M.D., that the vaccine administered
to Hannah came from a lot of TRI-
IMMUNOL associated with at least two
deaths and more than thirty injuries prior to
April 1992. Dr. Breck testified that had she
known that the vaccine came from this lot,
she would not have administered the dose.
Although § 22(c) of the Vaccine Act
expressly preempts failure-to-warn claims
based on "the manufacturer's failure to
provide direct warnings to the injured party
(or the injured party's legal representative),"
nothing in the Vaccine Act expressly bars
claims based on failure to warn "doctors and
other medical intermediaries."
As discussed above, § 22(b)(1) states that
manufacturers shall not be liable for injuries
caused by "side effects that were
unavoidable even though the vaccine . . .
was accompanied by proper directions and
warnings." Section 22(b)(2) states that
proper directions and warnings will be
presumed when the manufacturer "complied
in all material respects with all requirements
under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act ... and section 262 of this title. -.."
Nevertheless, the Vaccine Act provides two
circumstances in which this presumption can
be overridden: (1) when the manufacturer
engages in conduct that would subject it to
punitive damages under the Vaccine Act;
and (2) when the manufacturer "failed to
exercise due care." As the District Court
correctly noted, this creates a shifting
burden-once the manufacturer establishes
that it complied with federal law, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to establish that either §
22(b)(2)(A) or § 22(b)(2)(B) has been met.
The District Court dismissed this claim on
the ground that Wyeth was entitled to the
statutory presumption of proper warning and
that the plaintiffs had failed to rebut the
presumption. Noting that Wyeth had
presented uncontested evidence that TRI-
IMMUNOL and its warnings had been
approved by the FDA, the District Court
found that Wyeth was entitled to §
22(b)(2)'s presumption of proper warning.
Next, the District Court noted that the
Amended Complaint did not allege fraud or
wrongful withholding of information within
the meaning of § 22(b)(2)(A). Thus, the only
relevant question was whether plaintiffs had
presented clear and convincing evidence that
Wyeth had not exercised due care.
Plaintiffs presented a report of the Vaccine
Adverse Event Reporting System
("VAERS") confirming that the lot of TRI-
IMMUNOL that included the dose
administered to Hannah Bruesewitz was
associated with two deaths and more than
thirty injuries. They also presented the
affidavit of Dr. Donald H. Marks, who
claimed that such a lot is sometimes called a
"hot lot." Dr. Marks relied on a 1984
memorandum by an epidemiologist at the
Department of Health and Human Services
("HHS") regarding the "Investigation of
Potential Hot Lots," which said that
"potential hot fill lots of DTP vaccine" are
"fill lots that exceeded a threshold of >2
deaths or >2 convulsions or >10 total
reports." The District Court, however, found
it significant that this memorandum
identified such lots merely as "potential" hot
lots.
The memorandum also stated that "[i]n
order to proceed with an investigation by
which we could differentiate reporting bias
from a higher rate of reactivity in specific
fill lots we needed information on the
number of doses distributed and which
percent went to the public sector." Thus, in
order to differentiate between a "hot lot" and
a "potential hot lot," investigators must
know not only the total number of incidents
but also the rate at which the incidents
occurred. Because the "[p]laintiffs have
produced no evidence from which a trier of
fact could infer that the dose in question
originated" in such a lot, the District Court
concluded that the plaintiffs had not proven
that Wyeth failed to exercise due care by
distributing doses from this lot.
Before this Court, the plaintiffs argue that
the District Court's reasoning is flawed on
two grounds: (1) Wyeth is not entitled to a
presumption of proper warning unless the
side effects of the vaccine are first shown to
be unavoidable; because they allege a safer
vaccine design was available, they argue
that § 22(b)(2) should not apply; and (2) Dr.
Mark's opinion raises an issue of fact as to
whether Hannah's dose came from a "hot
lot." We dismiss both arguments. The first
argument must be dismissed for the reasons
discussed in Part III-the Vaccine Act
preempts design defect claims premised on
the notion that the manufacturer could have
created a safer vaccine. The second requires
more discussion.
As stated above, a court may not grant
summary judgment so long as there exists a
genuine issue of material fact. ...
Dr. Marks identified the HHS memorandum
as the basis on which he drew his
conclusions: "This memorandum provides
what I understood to be the official
definition of a 'Hot Lot."' As the District
Court correctly noted, the memorandum
clearly states that the incident statistics,
cited above, only establish "potential hot
lots." It further states that investigators must
identify the number of doses administered to
determine whether a particular vaccine lot
qualifies as a "hot lot." Because plaintiffs
have not offered any evidence on this point,
Dr. Marks' assertions and conclusions are
unsupported by the very memorandum upon
which he relies.
The plaintiffs also contend that the sheer
number of adverse events associated with
this vaccine lot is sufficient to establish
"some evidence of a serious health problem
no [matter] how many doses, circumscribed
by the concept of a batch, it contains."
While this may be true, the plaintiffs'
burden is not to produce "some evidence"-
a mere scintilla-but evidence sufficient for
a reasonable jury to find in their favor. The
HHS memorandum states that investigators
cannot conclude whether a vaccine lot is a
"hot lot" without evidence on the number of
doses administered. Thus, even drawing all
inferences and doubts in favor of the
plaintiffs, there is insufficient evidence on
which a jury could conclude that Hannah's
vaccine came from a "hot lot." Accordingly,
the District Court did not err in granting
summary judgment on the failure to warn
claim.
V.
[The District Court correctly held that the
plaintiffs failed to provide enough evidence
of a manufacturing defect to meet their
burden for summary judgment.]
VI.
We hold that the plaintiffs design defect
claims are expressly preempted by the
Vaccine Act. We also conclude that the
plaintiffs have failed to establish either a
manufacturing defect or a warning defect
claim under the Vaccine Act. For the
reasons discussed above, we will affirm the
District Court's grant of summary judgment
in favor of Wyeth.
"Supreme Court Accepts Appeal
over Vaccine Safety"
CNA. com
March 8, 2010
Bill Mears
Parents who say that a range of preventive
vaccines given their young children can
cause serious health problems will have their
appeal heard by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The justices Monday agreed to decide
whether drug makers can be sued outside a
special judicial forum set up by Congress in
1986 to address specific claims about safety.
The so-called vaccine court has handled
such disputes and was designed to ensure a
reliable, steady supply of the drugs by
reducing the threat of lawsuits against
pharmaceutical firms.
The questions in the latest case are whether
such liability claims can proceed, if the
vaccine-related injuries could have been
avoided by better product design, and if
federal officials had approved another,
allegedly safer drug. Oral arguments in the
dispute will be held in the fall.
The lawsuit was brought by the parents of
Hannah Bruesewitz, a girl from the
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, area. They said
she was in fine health as an infant in 1992
when given a series of DPT shots-a
combination of vaccines to prevent
diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough) and
tetanus. After the third series, according to
court briefs, the child began having seizures
and became disabled. Now a teenager,
Hannah continues to suffer what is described
as "residual seizure disorder."
The Bruesewitzes alleged Wyeth
Laboratories failed to adequately warn them
and other parents of the risks associated with
the vaccine. The vaccine court rejected the
initial claim, so the family tried to revive the
lawsuit in the federal courts. Their lawyers
said the 24-year-old law does not ban all
lawsuits, especially those filed when the
harmful side effects were avoidable.
A federal appeals court eventually ruled for
Wyeth, now owned by Pfizer Inc.,
concluding that all design-defect claims
were barred under statute. Despite that
victory, the company urged the high court to
hear the case, saying it seeks final resolution
on broader legal questions. The Obama
administration also urged review and is
supporting the company and the federal law
in question.
Wyeth and other drug manufacturers say
their products are generally safe, but side
effects can occur in very rare cases. They
also say that the vaccine industry is
generally not profitable, but that the health
benefits for society in general have kept
them in the business. For that, they say,
legal protection provided by Congress is
essential to ensure such drugs are widely
available and affordable.
The high court did not act immediately on
another related, pending appeal. The
Georgia Supreme Court last year became the
first appeals court in the U.S. to allow
families to sue outside the special vaccine
court. That case involved Atlanta-area
parents who said their son Stefan Ferrari
suffered severe neurological damage 12
years ago from booster shots, by Wyeth and
GlaxoSmithKline, containing the mercury-
based preservative thimerosal. Now 12, the
boy is unable to speak, say his parents,
Stefano and Carolyn Ferran. The
preservative has since been taken out of
nearly all standard vaccines.
Despite winning at the state level, the family
has since withdrawn its case, but the liability
on drug companies resulting from that
decision remains in force in Georgia.
The National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Compensation Act was passed to establish a
nationwide strategy to ensure a secure
vaccine supply, promote safety and future
research, and compensate innocent victims.
Those goals were listed at the time as a "top
public health priority."
Lawmakers acknowledged the vaccine
supply was suffering under rising company
costs from potential liability claims. Despite
Food and Drug Administration approval for
the vaccines, companies said they were
being driven out of the market. The special
federal court created under the legislation
was a liability shield, designed to be a
reliable, relatively quick, no-fault solution to
various claims. Unresolved over the years is
whether and when certain exceptions to
liability should be in play in specific cases.
The case accepted is Bruesewitz v. Wyeth
(09-152). The pending case is American
Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari (08-1120).
"3rd Circuit: Kids Hurt by Vaccines Can't
Pursue Design Defect Claims"
Law. corn
April 2, 2009
Shannon P. Duffy
Pre-emption is the buzz word at the U.S.
Supreme Court this year, and the 3rd U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals may just have done
its part to pump up the volume of that buzz.
In a ruling that could prompt the justices to
take up yet another significant pre-emption
case in the area of drug products liability,
the 3rd Circuit ruled that children allegedly
injured by vaccines are barred from pursuing
any design defect claims because Congress
expressly prohibited such suits in an effort
to guarantee immunity to manufacturers.
By rejecting the analysis of a recent ruling
from the Georgia Supreme Court, the 3rd
Circuit's Friday ruling in Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth Inc. creates a direct split between the
federal courts and a state's highest court on
the question of how broadly courts should
read the pre-emption clause in the National
Childhood Vaccine Injury Act.
In its October 2008 decision in American
Home Products Corp. v. Ferrari, the
Georgia justices held that alleged victims of
vaccine side effects have a right to court
review of whether those side effects were
truly "unavoidable."
But the 3rd Circuit has now held that
allowing such court battles would defeat the
purpose of the Vaccine Act's pre-emption
clause.
The U.S. Supreme Court already has a
pending petition for certiorari in the Georgia
case, and the 3rd Circuit's ruling, by
creating a split in authority, could prompt
the justices to take a closer look.
In Ferrari, the Georgia Supreme Court held
that the Vaccine Act "clearly does not pre-
empt all design defect claims against
vaccine manufacturers, but rather provides
that such a manufacturer cannot be held
liable for defective design if it is determined,
on a case-by-case basis, that a particular
vaccine was unavoidably unsafe."
Before Ferrari, vaccine manufacturers had
prevailed in a string of rulings in both state
and federal courts. Every court to address
the issue of vaccine design defect pre-
emption-including federal judges in
Pennsylvania and Texas and state court
judges in New York-found the Vaccine
Act provides blanket pre-emption of any
state law defective design claims.
Now, in the first ruling to respond to
Ferrari, the 3rd Circuit has declared that the
Georgia justices got it wrong.
"We do not consider the Ferrari court's
reading to be compelling," 3rd Circuit Judge
D. Brooks Smith wrote.
"If we interpret the Vaccine Act to allow
case-by-case analysis of whether particular
vaccine side effects are avoidable, every
design defect claim is subject to evaluation
by a court," Smith wrote in an opinion
joined by Judges Theodore A. McKee and
Joseph F. Weis.
In a footnote, Smith said the pre-emption
question at issue in the vaccine cases is very
different from the issue decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court March 4 in Wyeth v. Levine,
which examined whether federal law pre-
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empted state tort claims alleging that a drug
manufacturer failed to adequately warn of
the dangers associated with a drug.
"Though we recognize that the Supreme
Court concluded that state tort law claims
were not pre-empted in that case, Levine is
readily distinguishable on several grounds,"
Smith wrote.
Most notably, Smith said, the Levine case
was a question of whether there was implied
pre-emption, while in the Vaccine Act, the
question is the scope of an express pre-
emption clause.
"In this case," Smith wrote, "Congress
included an express pre-emption provision
that was prompted ... by the prevalence of
state tort litigation."
The Levine court also noted that drug
manufacturers have the power to strengthen
warnings on an FDA-approved drug label,
Smith said. But by contrast, he said, in a
design defect case, there is no analogous
power to defy or ignore the Food and Drug
Administration's "far-more extensive
control and oversight of the approval of a
drug's design and alteration."
Under the Vaccine Act's pre-emption
clause, manufacturers cannot be held liable
for an injury or death that resulted from
"side effects that were unavoidable even
though the vaccine was properly prepared
and was accompanied by proper directions
and warnings." Smith found that the phrase
"hinges on the word 'unavoidable,' yet the
term is not defined in the Vaccine Act."
In Ferrari, Smith said, the Georgia justices
noted that the language of the pre-emption
clause is conditional and implies that some
vaccine-related injuries and deaths may be
avoided.
From that inference, Smith said, the Ferrari
court reasoned that a reading of the pre-
emption provision that excluded all design
defect claims would render the clause
superfluous, and that, if Congress intended
to pre-empt all design defect claims, it could
have achieved that result by omitting the
"unavoidable" clause so that the provision
would prevent liability "if the vaccine was
properly prepared and was accompanied by
proper directions and warnings."
Smith disagreed, saying, "While we
recognize that the language is conditional,
such a reading does not foreclose the pre-
emption of some claims."
Instead, Smith said, "it is always possible to
construct through hindsight an alternate
structure for a statute with alternative
wording that would render it more clear."
The Ferrari court's reading of the law
would also "create an awkward dichotomy"
in the caselaw of many states, Smith noted,
as trial judges would be required to engage
in case-by-case analysis of all strict liability
and negligent design defect claims brought
under the Vaccine Act, while barring strict
liability design defect claims against
prescription drug manufacturers.
"Congress could not have intended such a
result," Smith wrote.
The 3rd Circuit's decision upholds a ruling
by U.S. District Judge Michael M. Baylson
that dismissed all claims against Wyeth in a
suit brought by the parents of a 17-year-old
girl who allegedly suffered serious side
effects as a result of receiving the third of
five shots in a DPT (diphtheria-pertussis-
tetanus) vaccine.
Hannah Bruesewitz was born in October
1991 and was given doses of the DPT
vaccine at 2 months, 4 months and 6
months.
After the third DPT shot, she suffered a
series of seizures and doctors later
diagnosed her as having residual seizure
disorder and developmental delay.
In the suit, Bruesewitz's parents claim that,
before their daughter received the vaccine,
the reporting system created by Congress
had uncovered two child deaths and 66
serious injuries associated with the same
vaccine lot administered to Hannah.
But the suit alleges that Wyeth never warned
either Hannah's parents or her doctor about
the serious problems with the vaccine.
In dismissing the suit, Baylson concluded
that Congress explicitly intended to prohibit
any suits against vaccine manufacturers for
design defect claims. In passing the Vaccine
Act, Baylson said, Congress intended to
apply the immunity for unavoidably unsafe
products outlined in comment k of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A
across the board to bar all design defect
claims, whether sounding in negligence or
strict liability, against vaccines covered by
the law.
"An FDA-approved vaccine design includes
the side-effects of that vaccine, and is
therefore, by statutory definition, the
unavoidably unsafe product subject to
comment k immunity," Baylson wrote.
As a result, Baylson said, the Vaccine Act
"represents part of a comprehensive
statutory scheme which pre-empts all design
defect claims brought under state tort law."
Baylson concluded that Congress "did not
intend to allow a case-by-case determination
as to whether a vaccine is unavoidably
unsafe."
Doing otherwise, Baylson said, "would
allow state common law to impose
additional requirements on vaccine
manufacturers wishing to avoid liability,
rather than merely providing additional
remedies for violating federal law."
"Vaccine Court Finds No Link to Autism"
CNN.com
March 12, 2010
CA.com
A federal court ruled Friday that the
evidence supporting an alleged causal link
between autism and a mercury-containing
preservative in vaccines is unpersuasive, and
that the families of children diagnosed with
autism are not entitled to compensation.
Special masters of the U.S. Court of Federal
Claims released more than 600 pages of
findings after reviewing three test cases and
finding all the claims wanting.
"Petitioners' theory of vaccine-related
causation is scientifically unsupportable,"
wrote Special Master Patricia Campbell-
Smith in her conclusion about William P.
Mead, whose parents, George and Victoria
Mead, had brought one of the suits.
"In the absence of a sound medical theory
causally connecting William's received
vaccines to his autistic condition, the
undersigned cannot find the proposed
sequence of cause and effect to be logical or
temporally appropriate. Having failed to
satisfy their burden of proof under the
articulated legal standard, petitioners cannot
prevail on their claim of vaccine-related
causation."
In the second test case, Special Master
George L. Hastings Jr. wrote, "The record of
this case demonstrates plainly that Jordan
King and his family have been though a
tragic ordeal," referring to the minor, whose
parents, Fred and Mylinda King, had
brought suit.
"After studying the extensive evidence in
this case for many months, I am convinced
that the opinions provided by the petitioners'
experts in this case, advising the King
family that there is a causal connection
between thimerosal-containing vaccines and
Jordan's autism, have been quite wrong."
The special master italicized the last two
words.
"Nevertheless, I can understand why
Jordan's parents found such opinions to be
believable under the circumstances."
"In this case, the evidence advanced by the
petitioners has fallen far short of
demonstrating such a link," he said.
In the final test case, Special Master Denise
K. Vowell wrote of Colin R. Dwyer, a
minor, that his parents, Timothy and Maria
Dwyer, "have not demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that Colin's
condition was either caused or significantly
aggravated by his vaccinations. Thus, they
have failed to establish entitlement to
compensation and the petition for
compensation is therefore denied."
Congress set up the special judicial forum,
sometimes called the "vaccine court," in
1986 to address claims over vaccine safety.
Rebecca Estepp, who attended the hearings
and said her 12-year-old son, Eric, has been
diagnosed with autism she blames on
vaccine, described herself as "devastated"
with the rulings, but not surprised.
"The deck is stacked against families in
vaccine court," she said in a telephone
interview from her home in Poway,
California, about 20 miles north of San
Diego. "You have government attorneys
defending a government program using
government-funded science before
government judges. Where's the justice in
that?"
Tom Powers, a Portland, Oregon-based
lawyer for the families involved, said his
clients were disappointed.
"All three families are committed to
following the appeals process, and pursuing
that avenue to get justice and compensation
for their kids," he said.
The special masters' decisions are subject to
review by judges in the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims. Within the next 30 days,
attorneys for the families will ask the claims
court judges to review the decisions and rule
that the children are, in fact, entitled to
compensation.
After government lawyers have a chance to
respond to the motions for review, the
judges will schedule oral argument and
hearings, probably in the summer, Powers
said.
Though Fridafs decisions do not end the
legal battle, Dr. Paul Offit, chief of
infectious diseases and the director of the
Vaccine Education Center at the Children's
Hospital of Philadelphia, was optimistic.
"Parents should take heart in this decision
and continue to immunize their children
with the confidence that they are the safest,
most effective way to protect against
dangerous diseases," the pediatrician said.
"It's time to move forward and look for the
real causes of autism," said Alison Singer,
president of the Autism Science Foundation.
"Our children deserve real answers and at
this point doing more and more studies of
vaccines, when the science is so clear,
would be allowing politics to triumph over
science."
The three test cases represented thousands of
children who have autism and whose parents
contend their disorder was triggered by an
early childhood vaccination.
The vaccines contained thimerosal, a
mercury-derived compound the parents say
helped bring on regressive autism, in which
normally developing children suddenly
exhibit learning disorders and behavioral
problems, typically between ages 1 and 2.
The theory that vaccines or thimerosal can
cause autism is rejected by most medical
experts, including the Institute of Medicine,
the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention and the American Academy of
Pediatrics. Multiple scientific studies also
have failed to prove a link.
Thimerosal was removed
vaccines in 1999.
from infant
In February 2009, the court's special
masters concluded that the evidence
supporting a link between measles-mumps-
rubella vaccine, or MMR, combined with
thimerosal-containing vaccines, was also
unpersuasive.
This week, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
to hear the appeal of parents who say that a
range of vaccines administered to their child
caused serious health problems.
The justices on Monday agreed to decide
whether drug makers can be sued outside the
vaccine court.
The lawsuit was brought by the parents of
Hannah Bruesewitz, a girl from the
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, area. The
parents said she was healthy as an infant in
1992 when given a series of DPT shots-a
combination of vaccines to prevent
diphtheria, pertussis (whooping cough), and
tetanus.
After the third series, according to court
briefs, the child began having seizures and
became disabled. Now a teenager, Hannah
continues to suffer what is described as
"residual seizure disorder."
The Bruesewitzes alleged Wyeth
Laboratories failed to adequately warn them
and other parents of the risks associated with
the vaccine. The vaccine court rejected the
initial claim, so the family tried to revive the
lawsuit in other federal courts.
A federal appeals court eventually ruled for
Wyeth, now owned by Pfizer Inc.,
concluding all design-defect claims were
barred under statute. Despite that victory,
the company urged the high court to hear the
case, saying it seeks final resolution on the
broader legal questions.
The Obama administration also urged
review and is supporting the company and
the federal law in question.
Wyeth and other drug manufacturers say
their products are generally safe, but side
effects can occur in rare cases.
127
"Suit Says Mt. Lebanon Girl Suffered
Severe Brain Damage"
Pittsburgh Tribune Review
March 9, 2010
Brian Bowling
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide
whether the parents of a Mt. Lebanon teen
can continue a 15-year legal battle against a
drug manufacturer for health problems they
say a vaccine caused.
Robalee and Russell Bruesewitz say Wyeth
Inc., now a subsidiary of Pfizer Inc., kept a
dangerous but profitable version of a
diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine on the
market for years.
Hannah Bruesewitz, 18, started having
seizures two hours after she received her
third vaccination in 1992, according to their
lawsuit. Russell Bruesewitz said the
vaccination caused severe neurological
damage that changed their daughter from a
normal, active infant to someone who can't
communicate and will need a lifetime of
medical attention.
"She requires 100 percent care," he said
Monday.
Wyeth took the version of the vaccine she
received off the market in 1998, according
to the lawsuit.
The 3rd U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals last
year upheld a Philadelphia federal court
ruling that a 1986 law blocks the
Bruesewitzes' claims. That law set up a
"vaccination court" and a trust fund to
compensate people who have adverse
reactions to vaccines.
Even though the company won the 3rd
Circuit decision, it joined the Bruesewitzes
in asking the Supreme Court to hear the case
because the Georgia Supreme Court, in a
separate case, ruled the 1986 law doesn't
block all "design defect" claims against
companies that produce vaccines.
The company hopes the Supreme Court will
settle the issue, said Pfizer spokesman Chris
Loder.
The Obama administration has asked the
Supreme Court to hear the case and to
uphold the 3rd Circuit ruling.
Congress passed the National Childhood
Vaccine Injury Act in 1986 and set up the
fund after several juries awarded damages to
people suing over adverse reactions to the
diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine.
The Bruesewitzes filed their claim with the
Federal Claims Court in April 1995. A
month earlier, the Department of Health and
Human Services removed "residual seizure
disorder" from the list of adverse effects
linked to the vaccine. If they had filed their
claim a month earlier, the Bruesewitzes
would have received compensation without
having to sue Wyeth.
"It would have been long over," Russell
Bruesewitz said.
Instead, they had to try to convince the
government that their daughter's ailments
are the result of the vaccine. After the
government denied their claim, they sued
Wyeth.
If the Supreme Court overturns the appeals
court decision, the Bruesewitzes still face
going back to court and pursuing a 15-year-
old case against Wyeth. The main things
they want are the compensation the 1986
law seems to promise and some reform in
the system, so that other parents don't have
to go through the same ordeal, he said.
"We're not
Bruesewitz said.
against vaccinations,"
They've handled the stress of the protracted
battle by learning not to dwell on it, he said.
"You kind of put it off to the side and go on
with your day-to-day living," Bruesewitz
said.
The Supreme Court plans to hear the case in
the term that starts in October.
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Ruling Below: McCoy v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, 559 F.3d 963 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 5136 (2010).
Plaintiff consumer sued defendant bank alleging violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA),
15 U.S.C.S. § 1601 et seq., and various state law claims in connection with a retroactive raise of
an interest fee on a credit card account. The consumer claimed that the bank increased his
interest rates retroactively to the beginning of his payment cycle after his account was closed to
new transactions as a result of a late payment to the bank or another creditor. The district court
dismissed the complaint and the consumer appealed. The appellate court found that under 12
C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1) the consumer stated a TILA claim if the bank failed to give him notice of an
interest rate increase because of the consumer's delinquency or default, or if his contract with the
bank allowed it to increase the rate at its discretion but did not include the specific terms for an
increase.
Question Presented: When a creditor increases the periodic rate on a credit card account in
response to a cardholder default, pursuant to a default rate term that was disclosed in the contract
governing the account, does Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c), require the creditor to provide
the cardholder with a change-in-terms notice even though the contractual terms governing the
account have not changed?
James A. MCCOY, on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-
Appellant,
V.
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, USA, National Association, Defendant-Appellee.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed March 16, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
HAWKINS, Circuit Judge: occur because of consumer default. We hold
that Regulation Z requires a creditor to
This case presents the question of whether provide contemporaneous notice of such rate
the notice requirements of the Truth in increases.
Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-
1615 and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226, as FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
interpreted by the Federal Reserve Board's BACKGROUND
Official Staff Commentary, apply to
discretionary interest rate increases that James A. McCoy ("McCoy") brought this
action on behalf of himself and others
similarly situated against Chase Manhattan
Bank, USA, N.A. ("Chase"), a national bank
located in Delaware. McCoy alleges that
Chase increased his interest rates
retroactively to the beginning of his payment
cycle after his account was closed to new
transactions as a result of a late payment to
Chase or another creditor. McCoy claims
that the rate increase violated TILA and
Delaware law because Chase gave no notice
of the increase until the following periodic
statement, after it had already taken effect.
The district court dismissed McCoy's
complaint with prejudice, holding that
because Chase discloses the highest rate that
could apply due to McCoy's default in its
cardmember agreement with McCoy
("Cardmember Agreement"), no notice was
required.
JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF
REVIEW
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and review dismissals for
failure to state a claim de novo.
DISCUSSION
Federal TILA Claim
Congress enacted TILA to "assure a
meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that
the consumer will be able to compare more
readily the various credit terms available to
him and avoid the uninformed use of credit,
and to protect the consumer against
inaccurate and unfair credit billing and
credit card practices." 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a).
Regulation Z, adopted by the Federal
Reserve Board to implement TILA,
addresses when and how notice of changes
in terms must be given:
Written notice required. Whenever
any term required to be disclosed
under § 226.6 is changed or the
required minimum periodic payment
is increased, the creditor shall mail
or deliver written notice of the
change to each consumer who may
be affected. The notice shall be
mailed or delivered at least 15 days
prior to the effective date of the
change. The 15-day timing
requirement does not apply if the
change has been agreed to by the
consumer, or if a periodic rate or
other finance charge is increased
because of the consumer's
delinquency or default; the notice
shall be given, however, before the
effective date of the change.
12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c)(1). Section 226.6
requires that a creditor disclose inter alia
"each periodic rate that may be used to
compute the finance charge." 12 C.F.R. §
226.9(a)(2).
The parties dispute the meaning of the
phrase "any term required to be disclosed
under § 226.6." Chase argues that the phrase
applies only to the contractual terms of
Chase's Cardmember Agreement. McCoy
suggests the phrase also applies to the list of
specific "items" § 226.6(a)(2) requires be
disclosed, which includes the interest rate
that may be used. Although we find
McCoy's interpretation more natural, we
acknowledge that the text of Regulation Z is
ambiguous.
We defer to an agency interpretation of its
own ambiguous regulation provided it is not
"plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation." We do not "permit the agency,
under the guise of interpreting a regulation,
to create de facto a new regulation."
Chase argues that the Federal Reserve Board
("FRB")'s Official Staff Commentary
interprets Regulation Z to require no notice
in this case. We disagree.
Comment 3 is the most salient Official Staff
Commentary to § 226.9(c)(1) and, when
describing the amount of notice required for
different kinds of changes, provides that "a
notice of change in terms is required, but
may be mailed or delivered as late as the
effective date of the change ... [i]f there is
an increased periodic rate or any other
finance charge attributable to the
consumer's delinquency or default." §
226.9(c)(1), cmt. 3. The plain-meaning of
Comment 3 is to require notice when a
cardholder's interest rates increase because
of a default, but to specify that the notice
may be contemporaneous, rather than fifteen
days in advance of the change. Under
Comment 3, McCoy has stated a claim.
Chase argues that because Comment 3
repeats language from Regulation Z, a
different portion of the Official Staff
Commentary, Comment 1, should govern
instead. Comment 3's specific reference to
interest rate increases attributable to the
consumer's delinquency or default is
directly on point and therefore governs.
Even if we decided that Comment 1, despite
preceding Comment 3, could somehow be
interpreted as an exception to it, we would
still hold that Comment 1 does not dispel
Chase's obligation to notify its account
holders of discretionary rate increases.
Comment 1 to § 226.9(c)(1) describes the
circumstances in which Regulation Z
requires no notice of a change in terms:
"Changes" initially disclosed. No
notice of a change in terms need be
given if the specific change is set
forth initially, such as: Rate increases
under a properly disclosed variable-
rate plan, a rate increase that occurs
when an employee has been under a
preferential rate agreement and
terminates employment, or an
increase that occurs when the
consumer has been under an
agreement to maintain a certain
balance in a savings account in order
to keep a particular rate and the
account balance falls below the
specified minimum. In contrast,
notice must be given if the contract
allows the creditor to increase the
rate at its discretion but does not
include specific terms for an
increase (for example, when an
increase may occur under the
creditor's contract reservation right
to increase the periodic rate).
12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c), cmt. 1 (emphasis
added).
The effect of Comment 1, assuming
arguendo it applies, depends on how the
phrase "specific" is defined. McCoy argues
that the "specific change is set forth
initially" and the "specific terms for an
increase" are included in a contract when the
contract gives consumers the information
they need in order to know what interest rate
they will be charged and under what
conditions. Chase argues that any agreement
that specifies the possibility of an interest
rate increase if the cardholder defaults and
establishes any boundaries on the potential
amount of the increase adequately "sets
forth" a "specific change."
McCoy's reading of Comment l's use of the
word "specific" is reinforced by the three
examples Comment 1 includes of rate
increases for which notice is not required.
The first example is "rate increases under a
properly disclosed variable-rate plan."
Variable rate plans specify that the interest
rate will fluctuate in direct correspondence
with an externally determined variable rate
such as, for example, the Federal Prime rate.
Providing additional notice of the interest
rate charged under a variable rate plan
would be redundant because variations in
the interest rate are not discretionary, and
the method for computing the interest rate
based on the Federal Prime rate is fully
specified in advance. Creditors in that
circumstance need not provide additional
notice because consumers can predict their
precise interest rate according to a formula.
The second example in Comment 1 is "a rate
increase that occurs when an employee has
been under a preferential rate agreement and
terminates employment." Again, the notice
of such a rate increase would be redundant
because it "occurs" whenever the employee
terminates employment. Nothing suggests
the creditor possesses any discretion over
whether to increase the rates or by how
much to do so once the event triggering a
higher rate occurs.
The third example is "an increase that
occurs when the consumer has been under
an agreement to maintain a certain balance
in a savings account in order to keep a
particular rate and the account balance falls
below the specified minimum." Again, the
use of the word "occurs" rather than the
phrase "may occur" suggests that additional
notice would be redundant because the
increase is non-discretionary. All three
examples pertain to rate increases that are
spelled out in cardmember agreements and
ascertainable by the consumer without
additional notice.
In contrast to these examples, the increase
here occurs at Chase's discretion and the
most pertinent "specific terms for an
increase"-the actual amount of the increase
and whether it will occur-are not disclosed
in advance. The Cardmember Agreement
states that Chase "may" change McCoy's
interest rate and impose a non-preferred rate
''up to" the maximum rate described in the
pricing schedule. The agreement further
states that McCoy's account "may" lose its
preferred rates if he defaults. Although the
agreement defines what constitutes a
"default" triggering Chase's ability to
exercise this discretion, a default is only one
of the conditions required for an increase; it
may be necessary, but apparently it is not
sufficient.
Chase outlines several other criteria it "may"
obtain and use to review McCoy's account
"for the purposes of determining its
eligibility for Preferred rates," including
McCoy's consumer credit reports, his
payment history and level of utilization over
the life of his account, and his other
relationships with Chase and its affiliates.
Chase does not disclose to McCoy how it
may use this information and provides
McCoy with no basis for predicting in
advance what retroactive interest rate Chase
will choose to charge him if he defaults.
Under the agreement, when McCoy defaults,
he will not know whether his rate will stay
the same, increase slightly, or rise to the
maximum default rate until he receives his
next periodic statement listing the new rate.
Worse yet, this new rate would then apply
retroactively.
Chase argues that the terms for an increase
are adequately specified because the concept
of a "default" is defined and because
consumers are aware of the maximum rate
they might pay in the "worst case scenario."
It further argues that the discretionary
increase that may occur when a consumer
defaults can be reconceptualized as an
automatic increase, followed by a
discretionary reduction in rates. The district
court accepted this line of reasoning,
concluding that a "decision not to increase a
rate is analytically indistinct from a decision
to lower a rate."
This argument proves too much because it
would apply equally to Comment l's
example of when contemporaneous notice is
required. Comment 1 specifically explains
that notice must be given "when an increase
may occur under the creditor's contract
reservation right to increase the periodic
rate." 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(c), cmt. 1. Like a
"reservation right to increase the periodic
rate," the contract provision authorizing
Chase to increase a defaulted consumer's
interest rate up to the maximum default rate
at its discretion does not give the cardholder
sufficient information to know what rate will
apply and therefore requires the creditor to
provide notice. Chase's "contract allows the
creditor to increase the rate at its discretion,"
§ 226.9(c), cmt. 1, and does not specify the
relevant terms, including the conditions that
are necessary and sufficient for an increase
to occur and the actual amount of the
increase that will occur. Chase's agreement
not to increase the interest rate higher than a
preset, double-digit maximum does not
materially distinguish its Cardmember
Agreement from a contract reservation right
to increase the periodic rate. An
interpretation of Comment 1 as eliminating
Regulation Z's notice requirement even
where consumers do not have sufficient
information to determine whether their
interest rate will be raised, or by how much,
dilutes the meaning of the word "specific"
beyond recognition.
Chase argues that we must nevertheless
interpret Regulation Z to require no notice in
this case because we must defer to a now-
superceded Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, promulgated for public
comment by the Federal Reserve in 2007,
which briefly characterizes existing law in
the process of explaining a proposal to
amend Regulation Z to increase the amount
of notice for interest rate increases to forty-
five days in most cases. Truth in Lending,
72 Fed. Reg. 32948-01, 33009 (proposed
June 14, 2007) ("2007 ANPR").
Consideration of the 2007 ANPR does not
lead us to change our interpretation of the
FRB's Official Staff Commentary....
• ..[W]hile language scattered throughout
the 2007 ANPR offers some support for
each view of the Official Commentary, the
ANPR does not clearly weigh in favor of
either interpretation of Regulation Z. This
ambiguity is not surprising because the
primary purpose of the 2007 ANPR (and the
2004 ANPR that preceded it) was to
announce proposed amendments to
Regulation Z and solicit comment, not to
offer additional staff commentary on
Regulation Z's current requirements.
As the dissent notes, although no binding
authority has addressed this question,
several district court opinions and one
unpublished memorandum disposition in
this circuit have accepted Chase's view.
Most of these decisions cite the district
court's analysis in Evans [v. Chase Bank
USA, N.A.], which held that Chase set out
the "specific terms for an increase" because
"Chase gives the reasons for its rate
changes." In Evans, the district court
apparently labored under the misconception
that Comment 3 precedes Comment 1 and
therefore did not apply where the conditions
specified in Comment 1 are met. Possibly
for the same reason, most of these courts did
not even discuss Comment 3 and none
attended to the 2007 ANPR's internal
ambiguities or considered what kind of
deference, if any, is owed to an agency's
characterizations of existing law when they
are incidental to the purpose of an agency
publication. Our own consideration of the
FRB's Official Staff Commentary,
unofficial ANPRs, and the Supplementary
Information accompanying its recent
amendment of Regulation Z leaves us firmly
convinced of the FRB's intent to require
contemporaneous notice when rates are
raised because of a consumer's delinquency
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or default, as McCoy alleges occurred in this
case.
Auer [v. Robbins] would not require any
greater showing of deference. In Auer, the
court deferred to an interpretation of a rule
contained in an agency's legal brief that was
directed specifically to the "matter in
question."
Here, the 2007 ANPR's tersely worded
"interpretations" of existing law are
incidental to the purpose of the agency
action, are stated in conclusory fashion, are
themselves ambiguous, and have now been
superceded. Therefore, unlike in Auer, we
do have "reason to suspect that the
interpretation does not reflect the agency's
fair and considered judgment on the matter
in question." Consequently, we interpret the
FRB's Official Staff Commentary directly.
State Law Claims
In his second, third, and fourth causes of
action, McCoy claims that Chase's practice
of retroactively raising interest rates after a
consumer defaults is unconscionable and
that he is therefore entitled to declaratory
relief, reformation, and damages for
imposing an illegal penalty. The district
court correctly noted that these causes of
action are foreclosed if Delaware law
specifically authorizes the practice because,
pursuant to the National Bank Act, 12
U.S.C. § 85, Delaware law governs what
interest Chase may charge and the
methodology used to determine that interest
rate.
We reverse the dismissal of these claims,
however, because the Delaware Banking Act
authorizes rates of interest that "vary in
accordance with a schedule or formula." 5
Del. C. § 944. As the district court noted, a
permissible schedule or formula may
include a provision for a change in the "rates
of interest applicable to all or any part of
outstanding unpaid indebtedness
contingent upon the happening of any event
or circumstance specified in the plan,"
including a default. Section 944 therefore
would clearly authorize a "schedule or
formula" that specified a higher interest rate
that would automatically apply in the event
of default. However, the language of § 944
does not appear to authorize rate increases
that are discretionary and vary according to
criteria in addition to the consumer's default
where those criteria are not specified in a
schedule or formula contained in the
agreement.
Absent binding Delaware court decisions
construing the terms "schedule," "formula,"
or "contingent upon" in § 944, our task is to
"predict how the highest state court would
decide the issue using intermediate appellate
court decisions, decisions from other
jurisdictions, statutes, treatises, and
restatements as guidance." In this case,
however, only federal district courts have
construed § 944 and not one has adequately
addressed the importance of the
discretionary nature of the increases or
whether such increases are really "in
accordance with a schedule or formula."
These interpretations of § 944 neglect to
consider fully whether rate increases truly
are "contingent upon" a default and in
"accordance with a schedule or formula"
where they are discretionary and can result
in a range of interest rates depending on
undisclosed criteria beyond the occurrence
of a default. A close analysis of the
Cardmember Agreement reveals that it does
not describe the specific events that "will
cause default rates to go into effect," but
only those that may do so. It also fails to
disclose how much Chase will actually
increase rates should it choose to do so. As a
result, we hold that the rate increases
McCoy faced under the Cardmember
Agreement were not authorized by § 944
because no "schedule or formula" contained
in the agreement revealed whether the
increases would occur or how large they
would actually be.
Having held that the contract provision
authorizing discretionary interest rate
increases is not authorized by § 944, we
conclude that McCoy has made out a
colorable claim that the provision may also
be "unconscionable" under Delaware law
and he should "be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to
aid the court in making its determination."
Any increased interest charge stemming
from a default that occurs retroactively
functions as "damages paid in the event of a
breach," not compensation for the increased
risk of noncollection, because McCoy would
still owe that retroactively imposed
additional charge even if he paid Chase his
entire balance the moment after he
defaulted. For these reasons, we reverse the
dismissal of McCoy's second, third, and
fourth causes of action.
McCoy's fifth cause of action alleges Chase
committed consumer fraud by failing to
provide notice of an increase in interest.
Delaware's consumer fraud statute, 6 Del.
C. § 2513(a), prohibits:
The act, use or employment by any
person of any deception, fraud, false
pretense, false promise,
misrepresentation, or the
concealment, suppression, or
omission of any material fact with
intent that others rely upon such
concealment, suppression or
omission, in connection with the
sale, lease or advertisement of any
merchandise, whether or not any
person has in fact been misled,
deceived or damaged thereby, is an
unlawful practice.
This allegation fails to state a claim for
consumer fraud under § 2513(a) because
Chase openly and expressly notifies
cardholders of the actions it reserves the
right to take in the event of a default.
Although Chase may have failed to fulfill its
obligations under federal and Delaware law,
McCoy has not alleged facts to support a
finding that it concealed or misrepresented
the possibility that it might raise rates
without notice when a consumer defaulted.
We affirm the dismissal of McCoy's fifth
claim for relief.
McCoy's sixth and seventh causes of action
allege claims for breach of contract and
tortious breach of the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. The
Cardmember Agreement states that Chase
would "notify [McCoy] of any change if
required by applicable law." Given the
requirements under TILA and Delaware law
discussed above, while McCoy clearly has
stated a claim that Chase breached this
explicit contractual provision, he cannot
state an implied duty of good faith claim
because "where the subject at issue is
expressly covered by the contract, or where
the contract is intentionally silent as to that
subject, the implied duty to perform in good
faith does not come into play."
Consequently, we reverse the dismissal of
the sixth cause of action and affirm the
dismissal of the seventh.
CONCLUSION
Under Regulation Z as interpreted by its
Official Staff Commentary, McCoy has
stated a TILA claim if Chase failed to give
him notice of an interest rate increase
"because of the consumer's delinquency or
default" or if his contract with Chase
"allows the creditor to increase the rate at its
discretion but does not include the specific
terms for an increase." 12 C.F.R. §
226.9(c)(1); Id., cmt. 3; Id., cmt. 1. Having
concluded that McCoy has stated a claim
under either standard, we reverse and
remand to the district court. We affirm the
dismissal of McCoy's fifth and seventh
causes of action, but reverse the dismissal of
McCoy's other state law claims.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED
IN PART. Costs on appeal to Appellant.
DISSENT
CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Before addressing the myriad arguments
made by the majority, I think it would be
helpful to put matters in context-view the
"big picture." The claims made by Mr.
McCoy have been raised in many other
forums, usually by the same attorneys who
represent him here. In all of those cases the
result was the opposite of the one reached
here. In one case the court did at first
indicate that it was inclined to rule in favor
of the plaintiffs but reversed course when it
was made aware of the Advance Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) issued by the
expert agency, the Federal Reserve Board
(FRB or the Board), which quite clearly
showed that the Board disagreed with their
interpretation. The majority concedes, as it
must given the unanimity of results on the
other side, that the regulation is ambiguous.
But the majority then departs from those
holdings, and from established Supreme
Court precedent, by refusing to defer to the
Board's interpretation in the face of that
ambiguity, and by suggesting, somewhat
misleadingly, that the Board's interpretation
is less than clear.
The provision of Regulation Z at issue here
provides that "Whenever any term required
to be disclosed under § 226.6 is changed or
the required minimum periodic payment is
increased, the creditor shall mail or deliver
written notice of the change to each
consumer who may be affected." 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.9(c)(1) (emphasis added). This refers
back to Section 226.6(a)(2), which says,
"[t]he creditor shall disclose to the consumer
... each of the following items, to the extent
applicable: . . . each periodic rate that may
be used to compute the finance charge...
and the corresponding annual percentage
rate." 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(a)(2) (emphasis
added). So the question becomes the
following: did Section 226.9(c)(1) require
Chase to provide contemporaneous notice to
McCoy of an increase in his interest rate due
to his default when that increase was an
implementation of the existing terms of his
agreement with Chase? The majority says
that although the regulation is ambiguous,
the FRB's Official Staff Commentary to §
226.9(c)(1) makes the answer a clear "yes."
The majority feels no need to give any
deference to the Board's views expressed in
its ANPRs, which lead to the opposite
conclusion and which are reinforced by
every other court that has considered the
question.
The Supreme Court has instructed us to give
respect and deference to the Board when
interpreting the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. ("TILA"). I would
find that the Supreme Court requires
deference to Board interpretations found in
ANPRs. This required deference, of course,
reflects universally applicable Supreme
Court jurisprudence in keying statutory and
regulatory interpretation on deference to the
views of the responsible executive agencies.
The majority says that the relevance of the
Board's statements is limited and we need
not defer to them because they are not
official comments, but merely "incidental
descriptions of current law contained in an
ANPR." Despite the majority's assertion to
the contrary, its position conflicts starkly
with that of the Supreme Court, which in
Anderson Bros. Ford [v. Valencia] gave
significant weight to a nearly identical
publication. In Anderson Bros. Ford, the
Board published for comment an Official
Staff Interpretation that was directly
contrary to the view taken by three out of
four courts of appeals. The Board said that
while a "technical reading" of Regulation Z
might support the three courts of appeals, it
was the Board's opinion that the disclosure
was not the type of thing "meant to be"
required by Regulation Z (and was therefore
not in fact required). The Court said that the
Board's interpretation did not conclusively
establish the meaning of the words used in
TILA, but that "absent some obvious
repugnance to the statute, the Board's
regulation implementing this legislation
should be accepted by the courts, as should
the Board's interpretation of its own
regulation."...
The Court noted that it "has frequently
relied on the principle that 'a thing may be
within the letter of the statute and yet not
within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers."'
An ANPR does not meaningfully differ from
a "proposed official staff interpretation" for
purposes of the deference we ought to
accord it. The Supreme Court's decision in
[Ford Motor Credit Co. v.] Milhollin also
supports this view. Although, as the majority
points out, Milhollin distinguishes between
"official" and "unofficial" staff
interpretations in specifying which of the
FRB's views may be relied on for a good-
faith defense under 15 U.S.C. § 1640(f),
Milhollin's description of what makes an
official interpretation "official" would apply
equally to an ANPR: "[o]fficial
interpretations are published in the Federal
Register, and opportunity for public
comment may be requested." The same is
true of ANPRs. Moreover, the Court in
Milhollin did not restrict itself to
consideration of "official interpretations." It
also considered FRB Public Information
Letters and CCH Consumer Credit Guides in
divining the agency's views on the matter in
question. Nothing in Milhollin suggests that
similar deference would not be appropriate
here. To the contrary, Milhollin emphasized
that the "traditional acquiescence in
administrative expertise is particularly apt
under TILA, because the Federal Reserve
Board has played a pivotal role in 'setting
[the statutory] machinery in motion."' In
short, Milhollin encourages more deference,
not less, to the Board's stated views.
The majority also marshals Auer v. Robbins
in support of its argument that ANPRs
deserve no deference, but Auer, too, cuts the
other way. Auer accords "controlling"
deference to an agency interpretation found
in a legal brief. Briefs drafted in litigation
necessarily carry less weight than proposed
rules subject to notice and comment, yet the
Auer Court deferred because there was "no
reason to suspect that the interpretation does
not reflect the agency's fair and considered
judgment on the matter in question."
It follows that, even if we somehow owe
less deference to statements of the Board
contained in an ANPR than we would to an
official comment, that does not mean we
owe no deference at all, or less than
controlling deference in the present case. As
a practical matter, the Board has made its
opinion regarding the correct interpretation
of its own regulation more than clear, and
for the various reasons explained by the
Supreme Court on many occasions, we owe
that opinion deference. Therefore, it is
abundantly clear that the Supreme Court
would not countenance disregard for the
Board's opinion regarding the correct
interpretation of Regulation Z, even if that
opinion appears in an ANPR rather than
Official Staff Commentary.
The majority, however, provides its own
analysis based on its own interpretation of
the FRB's Official Staff Commentary
regarding Regulation Z, brushing aside the
Board's views found in ANPRs....
The majority concludes that "Comment 3's
specific reference to interest rate increases
attributable to the consumer's delinquency
or default is directly on point and therefore
governs." But these two comments are not a
case of the specific versus the general or of
one being an exception to the other. Instead,
they are independent and each governs a
distinct issue: Comment 1, whether a
change-in-terms notice is required, and
Comment 3, in cases where a change-in-
terms notice is required, whether it must be
issued 15 days in advance or not. Comment
3 does not purport to govern the question
whether notice is required. Neither does it
specifically govern default situations.
Instead, it is entitled "Timing," and it
specifically governs timing issues. In
contrast, as the majority generally
recognizes, "Comment 1 . . . describes the
circumstances in which Regulation Z
requires no notice of a change in terms."
The majority does not recognize this
distinction and therefore fails to account for
the fact that, because Comment 3 assumes
situations where notice is required and
controls only timing, it does not address the
question at issue here.
The majority says
applies, Chase
requirements and
excuse Chase
contemporaneous
that even if Comment I
did not satisfy its
Comment 1 does not
from providing
notice of discretionary
rate increases to account holders. The
majority interprets Comment l's use of the
word "specific" to cover only circumstances
in which the creditor has disclosed the exact
change and the precise terms, so that
additional notice would be redundant. I
cannot interpret the comment so narrowly. It
is certainly more than reasonable to find that
Chase has satisfied it here.
In the Cardmember Agreement, Chase
disclosed the three conditions that McCoy
had to comply with in order to remain
eligible for his Preferred rate. Violation of
these conditions was necessary (even if not
sufficient) for Chase to take away McCoy's
Preferred rate. The Agreement disclosed the
maximum interest rate that could apply: the
maximum Non-Preferred rate described in
the Pricing Schedule. It also disclosed the
time at which the new rate would become
effective: it would "apply to existing as well
as new balances and [would] be effective
with the billing cycle ending on the review
date." Finally, Chase disclosed that it might
take certain steps to investigate McCoy's
compliance with the required conditions,
including obtaining credit reports on him
from consumer credit bureaus. Semantic
contortions aside, I believe that these
statements set forth a specific change and
disclosed the specific terms for that change.
Chase's disclosure thus fulfills the obvious
purposes of Comment 1.
The majority buttresses its conclusion to the
contrary by reference to Comment 1's
examples, saying that "[a]ll three examples
pertain to rate increases that are spelled out
in cardmember agreements and ascertainable
by the consumer without additional notice."
In contrast, it says, "the increase here occurs
at Chase's discretion and the most pertinent
'specific terms for an increase'-the actual
amount of the increase and whether it will
occur-are not disclosed in advance."
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At the outset, the majority is wrong in
assuming that the three examples do not
involve any discretion on the creditor's part
regarding whether to apply an increase and
if so, how much of one. For instance, when
analyzing the third example, the majority
reads much into the Board's use of the
phrase "an increase that occurs" instead of
one that "may occur," concluding that the
Board thereby meant that the increase would
be automatic and non-discretionary. The
Board does not specify in any of the
examples that the increase must be of a
definite amount that is ascertainable by the
consumer without additional notice. This
might be a valid assumption with regard to
the first example (the variable-rate plan), but
such ascertainability is not an essential
element of the second and third examples.
Neither states one way or the other whether
they involve a precise and automatic
increase.
Further, I am not persuaded, as the majority
is, that the Board had in mind a standard of
complete redundancy when specifying
examples of situations where additional
notice would not be required. To the
contrary, the Board specifically recognized
that there may be situations in which the
creditor retains some discretion (as long as
"specific terms for an increase" are
disclosed and additional notice is not
required). If discretion is sometimes
permissible, then precise rates certainly may
not always be ascertainable by the consumer
before the fact.
As a final matter, I would just note that the
interpretation of Regulation Z shared by
Chase and the Board seems to me to be
consistent with the purpose of TILA.
McCoy had all the information he needed in
order to enjoy the informed use of his credit.
He knew the conditions in which Chase
could increase his interest rate and those
conditions were under his control. He also
knew the highest possible interest rate that
could apply in the event of his default. I find
it difficult to believe that McCoy, or any
other cardmember, would have been better
off had he known the precise formula that
Chase uses to determine whether or how
much to raise his interest rate. It seems
extremely doubtful that in deciding whether
to pay his bills on time, McCoy might have
attempted to use that formula to determine
what his chances were of keeping the same
interest rate. Unlimited discretion to increase
consumers' interest rates is something that
TILA was intended to protect them against. I
do not believe that discretion to decline to
increase a consumer's rate all the way up to
the permissible maximum, such as Chase
had in this case, poses a similar danger.
There is nothing irrational or oppressive in
allowing a creditor a degree of discretion in
dispensing mercy.
Because I would find that McCoy has not
stated a claim for a violation of TILA, I
would not reach his state law claims.
For all of these reasons, I respectfully
dissent.
"Supreme Court to Hear JPMorgan
Appeal in Card Case"
Reuters
June 21, 2010
James Vicini
The Supreme Court said on Monday it
would hear JPMorgan Chase & Co's appeal
over a lawsuit accusing the bank of violating
federal law by failing to notify credit card
holders before raising interest rates due to
late payments or defaults.
The lead plaintiff in the class-action lawsuit,
James McCoy, had accused Chase
Manhattan Bank of violating the Truth in
Lending Act by raising interest rates
retroactively to the beginning of his payment
cycle after his account was closed after a
late payment to Chase or another creditor.
Chase said that in its card member
agreement, it disclosed the conditions that
McCoy had to comply with to remain
eligible for the lower interest rate, as well as
the maximum interest rate that could apply
if he violated those terms.
At issue is whether a federal regulation
required notice when a creditor increased the
rate on a credit card in response to a
cardholder default and in accord with a
contract.
A federal judge in California dismissed the
lawsuit, which was filed in 2006, but a
federal appeals court reinstated it last year.
The appeals court ruled that McCoy can
proceed with the lawsuit if Chase failed to
notify him of the rate increase because of a
delinquency or default, or if his card
member contract did not spell out specific
terms for an increase.
The appeals court said a Federal Reserve
Board regulation required contemporaneous
notice in cases of discretionary rate
increases that occur because of a
cardholder's default.
The Fed amended the regulation last year to
require advance notice of 45 days for higher
interest rates.
The Supreme Court will hear arguments in
the case during its upcoming term that
begins in October.
"7th Circuit Rules Bank Can Raise Interest
Rate Without Notice"
Wisconsin Law Journal
March 30, 2009
David Ziemer
A bank's retroactive amendment of a credit
card customer's interest rate does not violate
the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).
However, while the Seventh Circuit's Mar.
19 opinion purports to be consistent with
every other court to have considered the
issue, it actually creates a circuit conflict, as
the Ninth Circuit held to the contrary just
three days earlier.
In the Seventh Circuit case, Laura M.
Swanson filed a class action against Bank of
America, N.A., after it raised the interest
rate on her credit card.
The original contract provided that, if she
exceeded her balance at the end of two
months in any 12-month period it could
increase her interest rate from 18 to 32
percent.
A subsequent notice said that the higher rate
would take effect at the beginning of the
billing cycle to which it applied. It was
undisputed that, by continuing to use her
credit card, Swanson agreed to this contract
term.
However, she later sued, alleging that TILA
forbids rate changes that apply retroactively.
The district court ruled in favor of Bank of
America. Swanson v. Bank of Am., 566
F.Supp.2d 821 (N.D.Ill. 2008).
Swanson appealed, but the Seventh Circuit
affirmed, in an opinion by Judge Frank H.
Easterbrook.
At issue was a regulation issued by the
Federal Reserve and the Board's Official
Commentary to that regulation, both of
which the court found ambiguous.
That regulation-12 C.F.R. 226.9(c)-
provides that whenever any term required to
be disclosed (which includes the interest
rate) is changed, the creditor must provide
prior notice.
However, it provides an exception for over-
the-limit charges.
The court found that this regulation did not
clearly prohibit or allow the retroactive rate
in increase at question, so it turned to the
Board's Commentary.
The first sentence of Comment I states that
no notice is required for, among other
things, pre-authorized rate increases.
However, the second sentence of the
Comment states that prior notice must be
given if the rate increase is discretionary
with the lender.
The court did not resolve the ambiguities
either way.
Instead, the court wrote, with the regulation
and the comment both ambiguous, there is
no good reason to override the contract
between Swanson and the Bank-a contract
that unambiguously authorizes the Bank to
act as it did.
Despite not resolving the ambiguity, the
court did defend the result on policy
grounds. The court noted that the purpose of
requiring prior notice of a rate change is to
permit the customer to shop around for a
better rate.
But, it was undisputed that the bank could
have accomplished the same result by
imposing an over-the-limit fee equal to or
greater than what was generated by the
higher interest rate, and then increased the
interest rate only for successive months.
Thus, the court concluded, structuring
penalty interest to have the same effect as a
penalty fee in the initial month therefore
does not undermine the goal of advance-
notice requirements. Swanson and others in
her position still can shop for better rates for
future months.
Finally, the court noted that, effective July 1,
2010, an amendment to sec. 226.9 will take
effect that will explicitly prevent retroactive
changes to interest rates.
Finding that the reason for the amendment
was that the regulation, as it exists now,
does not prohibit penalty rates, the court
concluded that interpreting the regulation in
favor of Swanson would give her the benefit
of a law not yet in force.
Accordingly, the court affirmed.
Analysis
The court explicitly noted that, by ruling as
it did, it was avoiding a conflict with any
other circuits, in that one circuit court and at
least six district courts had all held that
banks may apply higher rates of interest to
the entire billing cycle in which a default
occurs.
The court of appeals opinion that it cited
was from the Ninth Circuit, but was
unpublished.
Evans. v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 267
Fed.App's 692 (9th Cir. 2008). Also
included in the string-cite was an
unpublished district court opinion from
California, McCoy v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, USA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 97257
(C.D.Cal., Aug. 10, 2006).
However, three days before the Seventh
Circuit issued its opinion, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the lower court in McCoy. McCoy
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, USA, No. 06-
56278 (9th Cir., Mar. 16, 2009).
At first blush, it would seem unlikely that
this circuit split would warrant the U.S.
Supreme Court getting involved, inasmuch
as the issue will become moot on July 1,
2010.
Discussing the amendment, the Seventh
Circuit wrote, the reason the Federal
Reserve added sec. 226.9(g) was precisely
that it recognized that the existing regulation
did NOT prohibit penalty rates that begin at
the start of the billing cycle in which the
consumer's default occurs.
The Federal Register has an extensive
commentary on sec. 226.9(g) in which the
agency recognizes that sec. 226.9(g) will
change the way penalty-default interest rates
are applied. See 74 Fed. Reg. at 5350-56
(emphasis in original).
However, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges
the same amendment, but disagrees.
That court wrote, while language scattered
throughout the 2007 ANPR offers some
support for each view of the Official
Commentary, the ANPR does not clearly
weigh in favor of either interpretation of
Regulation Z. This ambiguity is not
surprising because the primary purpose of
the 2007 ANPR (and the 2004 ANPR that
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preceded it) was to announce proposed
amendments to Regulation Z and solicit
comment, not to offer additional staff
commentary on Regulation Z's current
requirements.
So, despite the Seventh Circuit's view that
time will resolve any ambiguity, there will
remain a split in the circuits, with the Ninth
Circuit taking the view that the regulation
remains as ambiguous as ever. So, review in
the U.S. Supreme Court would not be as
irrelevant as it would seem from reading the
Seventh Circuit's discussion.
"Bank of America Wins Credit
Card Fee Lawsuit"
Reuters
March 19, 2009
Jonathan Stempel
In a defeat for credit card users who
maintain large balances, an influential U.S.
federal appeals court said Bank of America
Corp may impose a penalty interest rate
retroactive to the start of the billing cycle in
which it is imposed.
In a ruling by Judge Frank Easterbrook, the
7th Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago
rejected cardholder Laura Swanson's
argument that a Federal Reserve regulation
under the Truth in Lending Act barred Bank
of America from imposing a 32 percent
interest rate after she exceeded her credit
limit too often.
Swanson's lawyer did not immediately
return a call seeking comment on the
decision in the class-action case, which let
stand a lower court ruling.
Thursday's decision may make it harder for
consumers to gain relief from fees they
consider unfairly burdensome, in advance of
a July 2010 rule by the Fed to delay the
effectiveness of penalty rate increases.
The appeals court also declined to apply
Illinois law, saying that because Bank of
America is a national bank, it can assess
rates that are lawful in its home state of
Delaware.
Many states have lamented their inability to
impose rules on nationally chartered lenders,
especially in the mortgage area, that are
more stringent than federal rules.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a case brought
by New York Attorney General Andrew
Cuomo, is expected by June to rule on the
extent to which states may regulate national
banks such as Bank of America, Citigroup
Inc, JPMorgan Chase & Co and Wells Fargo
& Co.
According to the 7th Circuit opinion,
Swanson's interest rate rose to 32 percent
from 18 percent after she exceeded her
credit limit in at least two of the prior 12
months, and then continued to use her card.
Bank of America notified her of the increase
in December, and then applied the higher
rate for the entire December 2007-January
2008 billing cycle. Swanson contended that
this was insufficient notice, and that she
deserved a refund of $60 plus statutory
penalties, but the court disagreed.
"The point of advance-notice requirements
is to allow customers to shop for better
rates," Easterbrook wrote. "But customers
are not entitled to avoid fees for completed
defaults, such as late (or skipped) payments,
or over-limit charges."
Easterbrook said his ruling follows similar
rulings by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals,
which includes western states such as
California, and several district courts.
The case is Swanson v. Bank of America,
U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals (Chicago),
No. 08-3322.
"Credit Card Companies Add
to Economic Woes"
Mortgage News Daily
December 11, 2008
Jann Swanson
Millions of Americans are being sandbagged
yet again by consequences arising from the
banking crisis.
For the last six months or so, lenders have
been wrecking havoc on many of their
customers by reducing credit limits,
increasing prevailing interest rates, or both.
These unilateral moves have been made by
credit card companies, which are virtually
unregulated, and by lenders who have
extended other revolving credit such as
home equity lines (HELOCs.)
To a certain extent this is not new. Credit
card companies have long had a policy of
increasing interest rates on customers who
are late with several payments or who go
over their credit limits and some have even
gone so far as to increase interest rates on
customers who miss payments on unrelated
debt. But now the parameters on good
behavior are getting tighter and consumers
report that their interest rates have increased,
sometimes by more than 100 percent, when
they have been even one day late with a
scheduled payment.
The downsizing of credit limits or lines has
been even more capricious as lenders have
scrambled to reduce exposure to possible
defaults as the economy declines and
unemployment increases. Even the best
customers have been hit and most are given
very little advance notice of these changes.
Some, in fact, claim there was no notice, just
embarrassment when a store clerk told them
their purchase had been declined.
The effect of these actions on consumers is
threefold and one may come as a bit of a
shock when one applies for other credit such
as a car loan or a mortgage.
First of all, the increase in interest rates is
obviously going to cost the consumer
money. Many surveys have concluded that
the average household carries around $8,000
in credit card debt. An increase in a rate
from 11.99 percent to 24.99 percent (a
common pattern) will raise the yearly cost of
that unpaid balance by $800. All of this
increase may or may not be reflected in an
increase in the minimum monthly payment
but certainly some of it will be and it will
take a lot longer to pay off a credit card.
Unfortunately for many individuals already
struggling to make payments on time and
any increase in required credit card
payments may be the final push over the
edge.
The lowering of credit limits will impact
spending at a time when the government is
taking all sorts of measures to stimulate the
economy. While limiting credit card usage is
an excellent plan for most people even when
it is involuntary, there are people who need
to temporarily rely on their cards to meet
basic living expenses. Then there are those
consumers who are suddenly unable to carry
out planned expenditures; the parent who
was opting to use the Visa to cover a child's
second semester tuition instead of selling
stock in a down market or a planned medical
or dental procedure which will have to be
cancelled since there is no longer a way to
pay for it.
And what about the homeowner who has
signed a contract for a major home
improvement or is midway through a
construction project and relying on their
HELOC to pay the suppliers and
contractors? With credit everywhere at such
a premium these people have a real problem.
What many people may not expect is the
impact these changes will have should they
need to buy a car or apply for a mortgage.
Credit decisions are generally made based
on a borrower's uncommitted funds and
credit score. Any increase in the minimum
monthly payment because of rate increases
will quickly be reflected on a credit report
where it will reduce discretionary income
and, in the case of mortgage underwriting,
increase the percentage debt load. But even
worse, one component of Fair Isaac
Corporation's credit scoring (FICO score) is
the percentage open credit a borrower has
but has not used. When credit limits are
reduced there is a smaller window of unused
credit; perhaps open credit even disappears
entirely and with this change in utilization
the FICO score is also reduced. 10 percent
of a FICO score is based on the amount of
this unused credit, and since a credit score
partially determines the interest a consumer
must pay for new credit we have the
makings here of a circular problem.
In the midst of all of this, one can hope that
once Congress and the regulators have the
time to take a real hard look at the credit
system in this country they will put credit
card lenders at the very top of their
regulation list. These companies with their
over limit fees, late fees, usurious rates,
unsolicited credit offers and extension of
credit to minors without parental permission
have run roughshod over their customers for
far too long.
"Consumers Are Dealt a New
Hand in Credit Cards"
The New York Times
May 19, 2009
Ron Lieber
At first glance, the sweeping credit card
legislation that passed the Senate on
Tuesday looks like a huge victory for
consumers. The bill, after all, contains relief
from penalty fees and certain interest rate
spikes.
But for people who pay off their bills each
month, and milk the card rewards programs
for everything they're worth, there is some
cause for concern.
For months now, the card companies have
been threatening to cut rewards programs
sharply to make up for revenue lost because
of the new restrictions.
My guess, however, is that this talk is just so
much saber-rattling.
Card companies want to make money, and
big spenders help them do it, even if those
cardholders do not go into debt.
First, let's lay out the things we know will
change because of the new legislation. The
bill is chock-full of new rules, which will
take effect at various points in the year after
President Obama signs the final legislation.
There are new restrictions on when card
companies can increase the interest rate on
balances you've already run up. The bill
says that banks generally must wait until
you're 60 days late in making the minimum
payment before applying a penalty interest
rate to your existing debt.
While an earlier bill in the House of
Representatives suggested less strict rules,
House members have agreed to adopt the
Senate version and intend to vote on it on
Wednesday. On Tuesday, senators voted 90-
5 in favor of the measure.
Card companies will have to give 45 days'
notice before raising their interest rates.
There's also a notice requirement for any
significant change to a card's terms, which
may keep companies from surprising
customers who have been saving their
loyalty points for years with huge alterations
in rewards programs.
Banks must send out your bill no later than
21 days before the due date. They cannot
send it with, say, 14 days to go, hoping that
you won't get a check to the bank in time to
avoid a late fee.
If the card company gets your payment by 5
p.m. on the due date, it's on time, according
to the new rules. No more of this early
morning deadline nonsense, which led to
late fees for payments that arrived with the
afternoon mail. Also, no more late fees if the
due date is a Sunday or holiday and your
payment doesn't arrive until a day later.
Let's say you're paying different interest
rates on the debt on a single card-one for a
cash advance, another for a balance transfer
and a third for new purchases. Now, when
you make a payment over the minimum
balance, banks will have to apply it to the
highest-interest debt first. I bet you can
guess how some banks used to handle this
sort of situation.
Banks will need your permission before
allowing you the "privilege" of spending
more than your credit limit and paying a fat
$39 fee for that privilege. The card
companies should be ashamed that they
needed a law to make this "opt in"
requirement a reality.
If you're a student, it will become harder to
get a credit card. No one under 21 can have
a card unless a parent, legal guardian or
spouse is the primary cardholder. Students
with their own income can submit proof and
ask for an exception to the co-signer
requirement.
The senators, in an apparent endorsement of
helicopter parenting, also require written
permission from the parent, guardian or
spousal co-signer for any increase in a
card's credit line. You can read all the gory
details through links to the Senate bill.
Hate gift cards? Me, too. There will be some
helpful new rules regarding those absurd
dormancy fees, which punish people who let
the cards sit around before using them.
Under the Senate's rule, retailers and others
that issue Visa, MasterCard, American
Express or Discover gift cards or certificates
will have to print explicit dormancy fee
information on the card. Sellers of the cards
will also have to inform the buyer of the fee.
That's a smart twist, since the gift giver can
then become aware of the noxious nature of
the fee-and elect to give cash or some
other gift.
The bill also bans expiration dates on gift
cards and certificates any sooner than five
years after the card's original issue date.
And the retailer or card issuer will have to
print the terms of any expiration date in
capital letters in at least 10-point type. Call
it the fine print rule.
It will be fascinating to see which retailer or
card issuer has the nerve, after having free
use of your money for five years, to tell you
it will lose the money altogether if you don't
use up their gift card. I dare them to try.
So will credit card companies kill reward
programs or drastically scale most of them
back? Of course not.
"If you strip away the reward component of
a credit card, it's essentially a commodity,"
said Rick Ferguson, editorial director at the
loyalty marketing company LoyaltyOne.
"The reward is what gives it its personality.
It works from a branding perspective as well
as a mechanism to influence customer
behavior and consolidate spending on a
particular card."
That last part is crucial. People who spend a
ton generate fees galore from merchants,
and that money helps the card company stay
in business. So you may soon see card
companies giving away more goodies or
lowering annual fees for people who hit
certain spending thresholds each year.
American Express already does this on a
number of cards.
Also, keep in mind that you may have more
control over what the card companies do to
you than you may think ....
"Work your way up the chain," said Dennis
C. Moroney, research director for bank cards
at TowerGroup, a MasterCard-owned
financial services consultant. After all, it
may cost less to appease you than it would
to replace you.
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Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A.
08-1423
Ruling Below: Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), cert.
granted, Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A., 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3424 (2010).
Omega produced watches in Switzerland and sold them globally through a network of authorized
distributors and retailers. Costco obtained Omega's watches from the "gray market" and resold
them within the United States. Omega filed suit against Costco alleging that Costco violated 17
U.S.C.S. §§ 106(3) and 602(a). These provisions prohibit the importation and distribution of
copyrighted works within the United States without the copyright owner's permission. Costco
asserted the first sale doctrine established by U.S.C.S. § 109(a) and argued that Omega's initial
foreign sale of the watches precluded the claims of infringement of distribution and importation.
The appellate court followed Ninth Circuit precedent and found that the first sale doctrine
provides no defense against claims under § 602(a). The first sale doctrine only applies to copies
legally made in the United States and there was no genuine dispute that Omega made the
watches in Switzerland. Additionally, the court found that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L 'anza Research was not irreconcilable with the
circuit precedent.
Question Presented: Whether the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the first-sale doctrine does
not apply to imported goods manufactured abroad.
OMEGA S.A., Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
COSTCO WHOLESALE CORPORATION, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed September 3, 2008
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
MILAN D. SMITH, JR., Circuit Judge:
In this opinion, we address whether the
Supreme Court's decision in Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L 'anza Research
International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998),
requires us to overrule our precedents that
allow a defendant in a copyright
infringement action to claim the "first sale
doctrine" of 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) as a defense
only where the disputed copies of a
copyrighted work were either made or
previously sold in the United States with the
authority of the copyright owner. Plaintiff-
Appellant Omega, S.A. (Omega) filed
claims for infringing distribution and
importation under 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3) and
602(a) in response to Defendant-Appellee
Costco Wholesale Corporation's (Costco)
unauthorized sale of authentic, imported
Omega watches bearing a design registered
at the U.S. Copyright Office. The district
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court granted summary judgment to Costco
on the basis of the first sale doctrine, and
awarded attorney's fees. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
and we reverse.
This circuit has construed 17 U.S.C. §
109(a) to provide no defense to an
infringement action under §§ 106(3) and
602(a) that involves (1) foreign-made,
nonpiratical copies of a U.S.-copyrighted
work, (2) unless those same copies have
already been sold in the United States with
the copyright owner's authority. We hold
that the first portion of this construction is
not "clearly irreconcilable" with Quality
King, and that it remains the law of this
circuit. Because there is no genuine dispute
that Omega made the copies of the Omega
Globe Design in Switzerland, and that
Costco sold them in the United States
without Omega's authority, the first sale
doctrine is unavailable as a defense to
Omega's claims.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
The facts are not disputed. Omega
manufactures watches in Switzerland and
sells them globally through a network of
authorized distributors and retailers.
Engraved on the underside of the watches is
a U.S.-copyrighted "Omega Globe Design."
Costco obtained watches bearing the
copyrighted design from the "gray market"'
in the following manner: Omega first sold
the watches to authorized distributors
"'Gray-market' goods, or *parallel imports,' are
genuine products possessing a brand name protected
by a trademark or copyright. They are typically
manufactured abroad, and purchased and imported
into the United States by third parties, thereby
bypassing the authorized U.S. distribution channels."
Retailers are able to sell these products at a discount
because the gray market arbitrages international
discrepancies in manufacturers' pricing systems.
overseas. Unidentified third parties
eventually purchased the watches and sold
them to ENE Limited, a New York
company, which in turn sold them to Costco.
Costco then sold the watches to consumers
in California. Although Omega authorized
the initial foreign sale of the watches, it did
not authorize their importation into the
United States or the sales made by Costco.
Omega filed a lawsuit alleging that Costco's
acquisition and sale of the watches
constitute copyright infringement under 17
U.S.C. §§ 106(3) and 602(a), and
subsequently moved for summary judgment.
Costco filed a cross-motion on the basis of
17 U.S.C. § 109(a), arguing that, under the
first sale doctrine, Omega's initial foreign
sale of the watches precludes claims of
infringing distribution and importation in
connection with the subsequent,
unauthorized sales. The district court ruled
without explanation in favor of Costco on
both motions. The court also awarded $
373,003.80 in attorney's fees to Costco
under 17 U.S.C. § 505. This appeal
followed.
H. STANDARD OF REVIEW
III. DISCUSSION
The viability of Omega's infringement
claims hinges on the relationship among
three sections of the Copyright Act of 1976:
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3), 109(a), and 602(a). In
relevant part, § 602(a) reads:
Importation into the United States,
without the authority of the owner of
copyright under this title, of copies ..
of a work that have been acquired
outside the United States is an
infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute copies . . . under section
106, actionable under section 501.
Section 106(3) states:
Subject to sections 107 through 122,
the owner of copyright under this
title has the exclusive rights . . . to
distribute copies . . . of the
copyrighted work to the public by
sale or other transfer of ownership,
or by rental, lease, or lending.
Finally, § 109(a) provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of
section 106(3), the owner of a
particular copy . . . lawfully made
under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled,
without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that
copy....
This last section codifies the so-called "first
sale doctrine," which holds that "[o]nce [a]
copyright owner consents to the sale of
particular copies of his work, he may not
thereafter exercise the distribution right with
respect to those copies."
The text of the Copyright Act establishes by
syllogism that the first sale doctrine of §
109(a) limits § 602(a). . . . In short,
infringement does not occur under § 106(3)
or § 602(a) where "the owner of a particular
copy . . . lawfully made under this title"
imports and sells that copy without the
authority of the copyright owner. 17 U.S.C.
§ 109(a).
Omega concedes that § 109(a) generally
limits §§ 106(3) and 602(a), but contends
that § 109(a) does not apply in this case.
Specifically, Omega argues that § 109(a)
provides no defense to the infringement
claims because, although the Omega Globe
Design was copyrighted in the United
States, the watches bearing the design were
manufactured and first sold overseas.
Omega claims that the copies of the design
were not "lawfully made under [Title 17]" in
these circumstances. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
Costco responds that although Omega's
position is correct under BMG Music v.
Perez, Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug
Emporium, Inc., and Denbicare U.S.A. Inc.
v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., the Supreme Court
effectively overruled those cases in Quality
King. For the reasons set forth below, we
hold that Quality King did not invalidate our
general rule that § 109(a) can provide a
defense against §§ 106(3) and 602(a) claims
only insofar as the claims involve
domestically made copies of U.S.
copyrighted works. Because we also
conclude that the exception to that rule does
not apply, § 109(a) provides no defense in
this case.
A. Current Rule in the Circuit
Omega's position was clearly correct under
pre-Quality King Ninth Circuit precedent.
This court has twice held on
indistinguishable facts that § 109(a)
provides no defense against a claim under §
602(a). In BMG Music, the defendant
purchased copies of the plaintiffs' U.S.-
copyrighted, foreign-manufactured sound
recordings, imported them into the United
States without the plaintiffs' authorization,
and then sold them to the public. Following
CBS v. Scorpio Music Distributors, we held
that § 109(a) provided no defense against a
claim under § 602(a) in the circumstances
because the phrase "lawfully made under
this title" in § 109(a) "grants first sale
protection only to copies legally made and
sold in the United States," and the copies at
issue were made and first sold abroad. The
rationale for this interpretation was twofold:
First, a contrary interpretation would
impermissibly extend the Copyright Act
extraterritorially. Second, the application of
§ 109(a) after foreign sales would "render §
602 virtually meaningless" as a tool against
the unauthorized importation of nonpiratical
copies because importation is almost always
preceded by at least one lawful foreign sale
that will have exhausted the distribution
right on which § 602(a) is premised.
Drug Emporium followed BMG Music by
holding on similar material facts that §
109(a) provided no defense. However, we
criticized the prior interpretation of §
109(a)'s key phrase-"lawfully made under
this title." By permitting the first sale
defense only against claims involving copies
that are "legally made and sold in the United
States," BMG Music appeared to give
greater copyright protection to foreign-made
copies than to their domestically made
counterparts. We found that "such a result
would be untenable, and that nothing in the
legislative history or text of § 602 supports
such an interpretation." We therefore created
an exception to BMG Music, concluding that
§ 109(a) can apply to copies not made in the
United States so long as an authorized first
sale occurs here.
Denbicare, which involved copies made in
Hong Kong and voluntarily sold by the U.S.
copyright owner within the United States,
applied the exception created by Drug
Emporium. The copyright owner sued under
§§ 106(3) and 602(a) after the defendant
purchased the copies and resold them
without permission, but we rejected the
claims: The defendant was not liable for
infringing importation under § 602(a)
because the disputed copies were imported
by third parties prior to the defendant's
purchase and resale. The defendant also was
not liable under § 106(3) because, in light of
§ 109(a) and Drug Emporium, the copyright
owner's voluntary sale of the copies within
the United States exhausted the exclusive
right of distribution.
Under these cases, Costco would not be
entitled to summary judgment on the basis
of § 109(a). The statute would not apply
because Omega made copies of the Omega
Globe Design in Switzerland and Costco
sold the copies without Omega's authority in
the United States. The district court's
unexplained grant of summary judgment on
the basis of § 109(a) was at odds with BMG
Music, Drug Emporium, and Denbicare.
B. The Impact of Quality King
We next address the degree to which the
Supreme Court's decision in Quality King
invalidates this circuit's construction of §
109(a). This panel may overrule BMG
Music, Drug Emporium, and Denbicare if
Quality King "undercut[s] the theory or
reasoning underlying the prior circuit
precedent in such a way that the cases are
clearly irreconcilable."
1.
It is clear that Quality King did not directly
overrule BMG Music, Drug Emporium, and
Denbicare. Quality King involved "round
trip" importation: a product with a U.S.-
copyrighted label was manufactured inside
the United States, exported to an authorized
foreign distributor, sold to unidentified third
parties overseas, shipped back into the
United States without the copyright owner's
permission, and then sold in California by
unauthorized retailers. The Court held that §
109(a) can provide a defense to an action
under § 602(a) in this context. However,
because the facts involved only domestically
manufactured copies, the Court did not
address the effect of § 109(a) on claims
involving unauthorized importation of
copies made abroad. Moreover, the Court
never discussed the scope of § 109(a) or
defined what "lawfully made under this
title" means.
2.
We next consider whether the reasoning of
Quality King is clearly irreconcilable with
our general rule that § 109(a) is limited to
copies "legally made . . . in the United
States." The basis for that rule was our
concern that applying § 109(a) to foreign-
made copies would violate the presumption
against the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law. Quality King dismissed a similar
concern that the triggering of § 109(a) by
foreign sales would require an invalid
extraterritorial application of the Copyright
Act, explaining that merely recognizing the
occurrence of such sales "does not require
the extraterritorial application of the Act any
more than § 602(a)'s 'acquired abroad'
language does." Costco contends that this
explanation is irreconcilable with our
interpretation of § 109(a) in BMG Music.
We reject Costco's contention and hold that
the Supreme Court's brief discussion on
extraterritoriality is not "clearly
irreconcilable" with our general limitation of
§ 109(a) to copies that are lawfully made in
the United States. The common
understanding of the presumption against
extraterritoriality is that a U.S. statute
"appl[ies] only to conduct occurring within,
or having effect within, the territory of the
United States, unless the contrary is clearly
indicated by the statute." Recognizing the
importance of avoiding international
conflicts of law in the area of intellectual
property, however, we have applied a more
robust version of this presumption to the
Copyright Act, holding that the Act
presumptively does not apply to conduct that
occurs abroad even when that conduct
produces harmful effects within the United
States.
Given this understanding of the
presumption, the application of § 109(a) to
foreign-made copies would impermissibly
apply the Copyright Act extraterritorially in
a way that the application of the statute after
foreign sales does not. Under the latter
application, the statute merely acknowledges
the occurrence of a foreign event as a
relevant fact. The former application would
go much further. To characterize the making
of copies overseas as "lawful[ ] ...under
[Title 17]" would be to ascribe legality
under the Copyright Act to conduct that
occurs entirely outside the United States,
notwithstanding the absence of a clear
expression of congressional intent in favor
of extraterritoriality. Specifically, it would
mean that a copyright owner's foreign
manufacturing constitutes lawful
reproduction under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) even
though that statute does not clearly provide
for extraterritorial application. This is
precisely what we proscribed in Subafilms
and Quality King provides no basis for
rejecting our approach.
Other significant parts of Quality King's
analysis are also consistent with BMG
Music's limitation of § 109(a) to
domestically made copies. The Court found
that copies of a work copyrighted under
Title 17 are not necessarily "lawfully made
under [Title 17]" even when made by the
owner of the copyright: The category of
copies covered by § 602(a), it was
explained, encompasses "copies that were
'lawfully made' not under the United States
Copyright Act, but instead, under the law of
some other country." Because § 602(a)
extends to such copies, but on its terms
permits an infringement action only by the
"owner of copyright under [Title 17],"
copies of a work can be lawfully made
"under the law of some other country,"
rather than "under [Title 17]," even when
the copies are protected by a U.S. copyright.
In short, copies covered by the phrase
"lawfully made under [Title 17]" in § 109(a)
are not simply those which are lawfully
made by the owner of a U.S. copyright.
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Something more is required. To us, that
"something" is the making of the copies
within the United States, where the
Copyright Act applies.
We also read one of the Court's illustrations
to be consistent with this understanding. The
Court stated that given
a publisher of [a] U.S. edition [of a
work] and a publisher of [a] British
edition of the same work, each such
publisher could make lawful copies.
If the author of the work gave the
exclusive United States distribution
rights-enforceable under the Act-
to the publisher of the United States
edition and the exclusive British
distribution rights to the publisher of
the British edition, however,
presumably only those made by the
publisher of the United States edition
would be 'lawfully made under this
title' within the meaning of§ 109(a).
The first sale doctrine would not
provide the publisher of the British
edition who decided to sell in the
American market with a defense to
an action under § 602(a).
Assuming the British edition was made
outside the United States, this illustration
suggests that "lawfully made under this
title" refers exclusively to copies of U.S.-
copyrighted works that are made
domestically. Were it otherwise, the copies
made by the British publisher would also
fall within the scope of § 109(a).
Finally, in the decision's only direct
language on the issue, Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence cited a copyright treatise for the
proposition that "lawfully made under this
title" means "lawfully made in the United
States." The majority opinion did not
dispute this interpretation, which aligns
closely with the one adopted by our circuit.
Costco contends that BMG Music's
limitation of § 109(a) to domestically made
copies is inconsistent with the plain
language of the statute and its legislative
history. This criticism has been made before,
including by this court. Perhaps most
compelling is the objection that BMG Music
would provide substantially greater
copyright protection to foreign-made copies
of U.S.-copyrighted works. A U.S. copyright
owner, for example, would be unable to
exercise distribution rights after one lawful,
domestic sale of a watch lawfully made in
South Dakota, but, without the limits
imposed by § 109(a), the same owner could
seemingly exercise distribution rights after
even the tenth sale in the United States of a
watch lawfully made in Switzerland. The
difference would likely encourage U.S.
copyright owners to outsource the
manufacturing of copies of their work
overseas. Drug Emporium and Denbicare,
however, resolved this problem by clarifying
that parties can raise § 109(a) as a defense in
cases involving foreign-made copies so long
as a lawful domestic sale has occurred.
Insofar as Costco contends that § 109(a)
should apply to foreign-made copies even in
the absence of a lawful domestic sale, the
surviving rule from BMG Music requires
otherwise.
In summary, our general rule that § 109(a)
refers "only to copies legally made ... in the
United States," is not clearly irreconcilable
with Quality King, and, therefore, remains
binding precedent. Under this rule, the first
sale doctrine is unavailable as a defense to
the claims under § § 106(3) and 602(a)
because there is no genuine dispute that
Omega manufactured the watches bearing
the Omega Globe Design in Switzerland....
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
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"Justices to Hear Retail Case"
The Wall Street Journal
April 20, 2010
Brent Kendall
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide if Costco Wholesale Corp. can be
held liable for copyright infringement for
reselling luxury Swiss watches it obtained
through third-party sources.
The case could have considerable
implications for discount stores and
companies like eBay Inc. and Amazon.corn
Inc. that facilitate the resale of CDs, books,
movies and a host of other goods.
At issue is a lawsuit filed by Omega SA, a
unit of Swatch Group Ltd., alleging that
Costco violated U.S. copyright law in 2004
by selling Omega Seamaster watches it
obtained from third parties that had imported
them into the U.S.
Costco sold the watches for $1,299, well
below Omega's suggested retail price of
$1,999. The watches were engraved with a
small emblem Omega had registered with
the U.S. Copyright Office.
Costco argued that Omega couldn't impose
any limits on how its watches are resold
once the watchmaker made its first sale of
the goods. In this case, Omega sold the
watches to overseas distributors and the
products eventually were resold to a New
York company that sold them to Costco.
A federal judge in California sided with
Costco, but an appeals court overturned that
decision and sided with Omega in 2008,
saying the watchmaker retained rights to
products that it made and sold abroad that
were later imported into the U.S.
Amazon, Target Corp. and a trade
association of retailers filed a brief
supporting Costco, saying the lower-court
ruling was a threat to companies that resell
foreign-made goods and could lead to higher
prices for consumers.
"Goods may be bought and resold several
times before reaching retail shelves," the
companies said. "Commonly, retailers
acquire products not directly from the
manufacturers, but through exporters,
importers and trading companies."
In a separate court brief, eBay said the
ruling "could have a detrimental effect on
the ability of buyers and sellers of
secondary-market goods to engage in
commerce in the United States."
Omega said the decision was consistent with
25 years of copyright law and wouldn't have
the significant economic impact that Costco
and its supporters predicted.
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"Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Case about Costco
Selling Omega Watches at Discount"
The Seattle Times
April 19, 2010
Melissa Allison
Costco Wholesale has taken its battle with
Swiss watchmaker Omega all the way to the
U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that it should
be allowed to sell watches it buys from
distributors who offer better prices than the
manufacturer.
The Supreme Court said Monday it will hear
Costco's appeal of a lower-court ruling that
sided with Omega, which has invoked U.S.
copyright law to stop discounting.
The watches are not copyrighted, but a
symbol of a globe on some of the watches is.
Companies that make high-end products
often try to control distribution so that the
goods do not end up selling for less.
However, many offer cheaper prices to
distributors in other countries. Costco and
other retailers buy the products from those
distributors, ship them to the U.S. and sell
them at a discount.
Called the "secondary" or "gray" market, it
represents $58 billion in products for the
technology industry alone, which loses up to
$10 billion a year in profits from it,
according to a study by KPMG and the
Alliance for Gray Market and Counterfeit
Abatement.
Costco Chief Financial Officer Richard
Galanti said the company does not buy a
significant portion of its goods from the
secondary market.
"The vast majority of what we do is bought
directly from manufacturers," Galanti said.
Still, he pointed out that even a small
percentage of Costco's $70 billion in annual
sales is a large dollar amount.
Costco's secondary-market dealings have
come up before.
In 2008, colorful clogs maker Crocs saw its
stock fall 8 percent in one day after Galanti
said there was "huge availability" of
branded apparel such as Crocs, jeans and
women's clothing.
Speculation that the Colorado-based
company was dealing with Costco was
"untrue," Crocs said at the time. "However,
we have discovered instances where we
believe our products were being sold
indirectly to Costco, and we promptly
terminated those relationships."
The Supreme Court previously ruled against
a manufacturer in a similar case, saying its
hair products were not protected by
copyright law simply because it had
copyrighted the label on the bottle. That
meant the products could be resold.
In that case, the manufacturer made the
products in the U.S., but they were shipped
overseas where the maker expected them to
be sold. Another company bought them and
shipped them back in to the U.S. to sell at a
discount.
The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
San Francisco ruled against Costco, saying
copyright protection does apply to products
made overseas, thus allowing Omega to
protect its globe image against resale in the
U.S.
If the high court upholds that opinion, "from
our perspective, all any copyright owner
would have to do is ship all those jobs
overseas and have their goods manufactured
elsewhere to prevent lawful resale at
discounted prices," said Seth Greenstein, an
attorney representing the Retail Industry
Leaders Association.
The association, which represents big
retailers like Wal-Mart and Sears, joined
Amazon.com, eBay and others supporting
Costco in the case.
The Obama administration said it was
troubled by aspects of the appeals-court
ruling, but had urged the justices to stay out
of the case, which will be argued in the fall.
"Market Mayhem: Sale of Gray Market
Goods Heads to the Supreme Court"
InsideCounsel
February 1, 2010
Steven Seidenberg
The design is deliberately inconspicuous.
It's just half a centimeter long, and it is
placed on the underside of a watch-thus
remaining unseen.
The design's importance, however, may be
huge. It is at the heart of a case that could
affect billions of dollars in commerce.
At stake is the future of so-called "gray
market" goods. These are legitimate branded
items, produced and put onto the market
with the approval of the appropriate rights
owners, and eventually resold outside the
rights owners' preferred distribution
channels.
For instance, Omega watches are much less
costly in Europe than in the U.S., so some of
the watches intended for Europe are resold
and imported into the U.S., where these
unauthorized watches compete with pricier
versions available through Omega SA's
authorized distribution channels.
As part of its efforts to stop these gray
market sales in the U.S., Omega inscribed
the tiny, copyrighted globe design on the
backs of its watches intended for sale in
Europe. When it found that Costco was
selling watches with the design in the U.S.
without authorization, Omega sued Costco,
alleging the warehouse club retailer is
committing copyright infringement. Costco
Wholesale Corp. v. Omega SA is now
before the Supreme Court.
Businesses and consumers have a lot at
stake. In the IT sector alone, gray market
goods accounted for $58 billion in U.S. sales
in 2007, costing the industry $10 billion in
profits, according to a 2008 study by KPMG
and the Alliance for Gray Market and
Counterfeit Abatement.
Because gray market goods are much less
expensive than the identical products in
other distribution channels, consumers like
them. And many businesses fear them: Their
bottom lines suffer because gray market
goods undercut sales of goods carrying
higher prices and higher profit margins.
"The principles behind [Omega] are
supremely important," says Eric Goldman,
who teaches intellectual property law at
Santa Clara University in California. "This
cuts across all aspects of the global
economy."
Omega's Mess
Omega isn't the only company to wield
copyright law against gray market goods. A
large-and growing-number of businesses
are using this tactic to keep gray market
goods from entering the U.S.
It is unclear, however, whether copyright
law can be used in this way.
Copyright Act Section 106(3) grants every
copyright owner the exclusive right to
distribute copies of its work in the U.S. This
distribution right is violated, according to
Section 602(a), when a copy of the work is
imported into the U.S. without the consent
of the copyright owner. Thus, Omega's
copyright is infringed by Costco's
unauthorized importation of watches bearing
the copyrighted globe design.
Costco, however, claims it is protected by
Copyright Act Section 109(a), which
codifies the first sale doctrine. This doctrine
provides that upon the first authorized sale
of a copy of a copyrighted work, the
copyright owner loses all rights to control
further distribution of that copy. Thus the
purchaser of a copy can resell, lend or
otherwise physically transfer the copy.
This doctrine has resulted in the huge-and
profitable-markets for used books, music
CDs, movie DVDs, computer games and
many other items. The doctrine has also
allowed Netflix and other DVD rental
companies to prosper.
If the doctrine applies to the watches Costco
imports, the retailer would not be liable for
infringement. However, Omega made and
initially sold the watches at issue outside
U.S. borders, and experts disagree over
whether the U.S. first sale doctrine extends
its reach that far.
First Sale
The issue turns on an ambiguous phrase in
Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act. The
statute states that the first sale doctrine
applies only to copies "lawfully made under
this title."
Omega argues that because the copies of its
globe design were made outside the U.S.,
these copies were not made under the
Copyright Act, and so they are not covered
by the first sale doctrine. Costco argues that
because the copies were made by the U.S.
copyright owner, they were "lawfully made
under this title" and should be entitled to the
protection of the first sale doctrine.
The provision could be read either way,
according to many experts. "The meaning of
this phrase is as clear as mud, and there's no
legislative history to give us guidance," says
Jonathan Hudis, a partner at Oblon, Spivak,
McClelland, Maier & Neustadt.
The 9th Circuit, in Omega S.A. v. Costeo
Wholesale Corp., agreed with Omega's
interpretation of the statute. A three judge
panel held in September 2008 that applying
the first sale doctrine to goods made
overseas "would impermissibly apply the
Copyright Act extraterritorially."
Most federal district courts that have
considered the issue have reached the same
result. But some district courts have
disagreed, ruling that copies made overseas
with the approval of U.S. copyright owners
were "lawfully made under this title."
Quality Case Law
In 1998, the Supreme Court held in Quality
King Distributors, Inc. v. L 'anza Research
International, Inc. that copies made in the
U.S. and initially sold overseas were
"lawfully made under" the Copyright Act.
The first sale doctrine thus protected
companies that purchased the copies
overseas and imported them back into the
U.S.
Moreover, Justice John Paul Stevens,
writing for eight members of the court,
stated in dicta that if a U.S. copyright owner
gave exclusive U.S. distribution rights to
one company and exclusive British
distribution rights to another company,
"presumably only those [copies] made by
the publisher of the United States edition
would be 'lawfully made under this title'
within the meaning of § 109(a). The first
sale doctrine would not provide the
publisher of the British edition who decided
to sell in the American market with a
defense."
The 9th Circuit used these comments to
buttress its decision in Omega. Many
copyright experts, however, assert that
Quality King didn't decide this issue. "The
Omega case addresses the issue left open by
the Supreme Court in Quality King,"
Goldman says.
Omega is now before the Supreme Court on
a certiorari petition. The court has asked the
solicitor general to file a brief on the matter,
so many expect the court will accept the
case. "Asking for the solicitor general
opinion is a really good sign," says Ethan
Horwitz, a partner at King & Spalding.
It is uncertain, however, how the justices
will ultimately interpret Section 109(a). "It's
not an easy one for them to decide,"
Goldman says.
"Court Lets Discounters Keep Selling U.S.-Made
Goods They Buy Overseas"
The Washington Post
March 10, 1998
Joan Biskupic
American companies from software
manufacturers to book publishers and the
recording industry lost an important battle at
the Supreme Court yesterday when the
justices ruled that businesses cannot use the
nation's copyright laws to stop discounters
from buying U.S. manufacturers' products
abroad and selling them here at reduced
prices.
Wal-Mart Stores, Costco Cos. and other
billion-dollar discounters selling a wide
range of imported goods had a big stake in
the case. Many of the products in their stores
are obtained not from the original
manufacturers but from distributors who get
the products overseas.
Yesterday's ruling will ensure that those
discounters can continue to sell these
products in their stores.
Although it is not clear what percentage of
the goods sold by drug and retail stores are
obtained through overseas discounters, both
sides in the dispute agree that the "gray
market" is a multibillion-dollar industry that
includes items from shampoos to cosmetics
to music CDs and videos. At issue are
American consumer goods sold to an
overseas distributor and intended for sale
abroad. Those products are typically sold at
substantially lower prices because they do
not include the heavy costs of advertising
and marketing that tend to hike the prices of
U.S. goods. What often happens, however,
is that those distributors then sell the
products not only in foreign countries but to
others that in turn sell the products back to
U.S. retailers for sale in the United States.
While discounters stress the benefits of such
trade practices to consumers, lawyers for
manufacturers had warned the court that it
gives discounters a "free ride," oversaturates
the market and often makes it difficult for a
consumer to obtain a warranty on a product,
even when it carries a popular brand name.
More pointedly, manufacturers tried to argue
that the practice violates federal copyright
law.
But the Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
once a U.S. company sells a copyrighted
product abroad, it loses its right to control
the distribution and, even though the product
may have been intended for sale somewhere
else in the world at a lower price, it can be
imported back for U.S. sale.
The case involved a shampoo made by
L'anza Research International, a California-
based company that sells its hair products in
the United States mostly through authorized
barber shops and beauty salons. In 1992 and
1993, its distributor in the United Kingdom
arranged to sell its products in Malta, at
about 40 percent less than U.S. distributors
pay. But the shipment was resold abroad and
the goods found their way back to the
United States without the permission of
L'anza. They were then sold by
unauthorized retailers who had bought the
hair care products at discounted prices from
a company called Quality King Distributors
Inc.
L'anza sued Quality King, alleging that its
importation and distribution of those
products bearing the copyrighted labels
violated L'anza's "exclusive rights" under
federal copyright law. The 9th U.S. Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled for L'anza, saying
the unauthorized distribution was the kind of
"evil" Congress sought to address in the
1976 copyright law.
The high court reversed that by attempting
to reconcile a federal law with potentially
conflicted components. The law does indeed
give the holder of a copyright exclusive
right to distribute those "copies" to the
public, and says that copyrighted works
acquired outside the country cannot be
imported back without the copyright
owner's consent. But another section of the
law establishes the "first sale" doctrine.
Under that provision, a subsequent owner of
a copyrighted work may freely sell the
product anywhere, including in the country
where the product originated.
"The whole point of the first sale doctrine is
that once the copyright owner places a
copyrighted item in the stream of commerce
by selling it, he has exhausted his exclusive
statutory right to control its distribution,"
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the
court.
The Clinton Justice Department had sided
with L'anza, noting the government has
been negotiating international trade
agreements based on the view that copyright
law prohibits unauthorized importation.
But Stevens wrote that such executive
branch efforts are "irrelevant" to interpreting
an act of Congress. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg wrote a short separate statement
yesterday to note that the ruling in Quality
King Distributors v. L 'anza Research
International does not affect cases in which
the allegedly infringing imports actually
were made abroad.
"This is an excellent decision for
consumers," asserted Allen R. Snyder, who
represented Quality King. "The court's
holding finds that copyright laws don't
prevent American consumers from receiving
the benefits of lower prices that some
manufacturers charge overseas."
But Raymond Goettsch, L'anza's lawyer,
said, "I do not think that that is what
Congress intended when it" wrote a law
protecting copyright owners from
infringements on their products. He and
other lawyers who represent the publishing
and recording industry said they expected to
press Congress to change the law.
"Are Foreign Sales 'First Sales' Under
Copyright Law? It Depends..."
The IP Law Blog
September 10, 2008
Scott Cameron
United States copyright law saves for the
copyright owner the exclusive right to
distribute copies of his copyrighted work.
That is, of course, unless an exception
applies. There are many exceptions, some of
which can be confusing. Among the
confusing exceptions is the First Sale
Doctrine. According to the First Sale
Doctrine, once a copyright owner has made
an authorized sale of a copyrighted product,
the copyright owner no longer has any rights
to that copy of the product. The First Sale
Doctrine sounds simple enough so far. Enter
the Ninth Circuit.
In a recent case, Omega S.A. v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., the Ninth Circuit analyzed
the First Sale Doctrine as applied to sales
that occurred outside of the United States.
Omega, the watch maker, manufactures
watches in Switzerland. These watches are
emblazoned with a logo on the back of the
watch which Omega has copyrighted in the
United States. Omega sells these watches to
distributors both in the US and abroad. The
watches sold to distributors outside the US
are significantly less expensive than those
sold to US distributors. Costco purchased
some of these watches from a distributor in
New York who had purchased them from a
foreign distributor. Again, these were
genuine Omega watches, were originally
intended for foreign sale, not for US sale, so
they were less expensive for Costco to
purchase. (So that's how Costco does it!)
Omega sued Costco for copyright
infringement, claiming it did not authorize
Costco's sale of the copyrighted products in
the US. Costco moved for summary
judgment, claiming that Omega's rights
were extinguished by the first authorized
sale it made to the foreign distributor. The
ultimate question was whether Omega could
control the U.S. distribution of the watches
it sold to foreign distributors. The US
District Court for the Central District of
California agreed with Costco, and entered
judgment in its favor. The Ninth Circuit
reversed, holding that the First Sale Doctrine
does not apply in this situation because the
watches were manufactured in Switzerland.
The District Court relied on Quality King
Distributors, Inc. v. L'Anza Research Int'l,
Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998), in which the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the first sale
doctrine applied to imported copies of
copyrighted goods. The Ninth Circuit held
in Omega v. Costco that Quality King did
not require the same result because the
watches were made in Switzerland. The hair
care products at issue in Quality King, on
the other hand, were manufactured in the
United States, then sold to a foreign
distributor at drastically reduced prices, and
then sold by that foreign distributor to a
party that brought them back into the U.S.
The key difference was the location of
manufacture.
The Ninth Circuit carefully explained its
application of the First Sale Doctrine. First,
Section 602(a) of Title 17 of the United
States Code states that importation of
copyrighted works obtained outside the
United States without the authorization of
the US copyright holder is infringement
under section 106. Section 106 provides the
copyright owner the exclusive right to
distribute copies of his copyrighted work,
subject to exceptions found in Sections 107-
122. Section 109(a), which codifies the First
Sale Doctrine, states that "the owner of a
particular copy... lawfully made under this
title ... is entitled, without the authority of
the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise
dispose of the possession of that copy."
Thus, although importing a copyrighted
good could be infringement under Section
602(a), if the copyrighted good was
purchased in an authorized "first sale," then
there would be no infringement under
Section 109(a) if the good was "lawfully
made under this title." The Ninth Circuit
held that this means "made in the U.S.A."
Because the Omega watches were not
"lawfully made under this title," i.e., not
"made in the U.S.A.," the First Sale
Doctrine did not apply, and Omega still had
the exclusive right to control distribution in
the United States.
The court did say that the first sale doctrine
would apply to foreign-made products if
there was a sale in the United States
authorized by the copyright owner. The
court said this was necessary to prevent the
anomalous result of a foreign manufacturer
gaining more protection from the U.S.
copyright laws than a U.S. manufacturer.
For example, a foreign-made product would
never be subject to the First Sale Doctrine,
thus the foreign manufacturer would always
keep its exclusive U.S. distribution rights,
while a manufacturer of U.S.-made goods
would lose its distribution rights after the
first authorized sale. So the current state of
the First Sale Doctrine in the Ninth Circuit
provides no distribution rights to a copyright
owner after it has authorized a sale of its
product if the product was made in the USA
or the authorized sale occurred here.
The increased frequency of U.S. companies
manufacturing their goods in other
countries, i.e., China, Mexico, the
Philippines, can lead to unexpected results
with regard to the application of the First
Sale Doctrine. Consider Company XYZ, an
American company that manufactures
widgets and stamps the widgets with its
copyrighted logo. XYZ has two
manufacturing plants, one in Tennessee and
one in Malaysia, and it sells widgets
manufactured in both plants throughout the
world. It commonly sells its widgets to
distributor A, in London, for about 40% less
than it sells to its U.S. distributors.
Distributor A, seeking to make a larger
profit, sells the widgets in London to a
wholesaler who promptly brings them into
the United States. XYZ sues for copyright
infringement because it has not authorized
the sale of its copyrighted goods in the U.S.
Under Omega v. Costco, however, XYZ will
be surprised to learn that it has no rights as
to one-half of the imported widgets because
they were manufactured in Tennessee. XYZ
does have rights to prevent the sale of the
widgets that originated in China, however,
because even though the widgets were
manufactured by XYZ and XYZ authorized
the first sale, they were not made or sold in
the United States.
On the other hand,, if XYZ is savvy it will
move all of its manufacturing overseas and
ensure that its first sale of widgets is always
made to a foreign distributor. XYZ could
still tailor its pricing to charge substantially
more for goods earmarked for U.S.
distribution. Since the widgets were not
made in the United States and XYZ never
authorized a sale in the U.S., it would still
control U.S. distribution rights. That can't
be the result the Ninth Circuit envisioned by
its ruling in Omega v. Costco. And while a
manufacturer is not likely to relocate its
manufacturing operation based on the First
Sale Doctrine, with costs already drastically
favoring foreign manufacturing plants, do
we really need to give them another push out
of the country?
"Calling for Time: Why the Supremes
Will Consider Costco v. Omega"
Law.corn
April 23, 2010
Joe Mullin
At first blush, Costco Wholesale Corp v.
Omega, S.A., which the U.S. Supreme Court
last week agreed to hear, doesn't involve the
kind of cutting-edge issues that copyright
lawyers usually grapple with in the digital
age. So why is the Court willing to consider
a dispute between a company that makes
fancy watches and a company that imports
and resells them? It sounds like the kind of
lawsuit that should have been resolved 200
years ago.
But this lawsuit-and many others that
hinge on its outcome-is very much a
product of the Internet-driven global
economy. Just ask John Mitchell, a
Washington D.C. attorney who's engaged in
a fight with textbook-makers over whether
his client, Ganghua Liu, has the right to
resell English-language textbooks that were
imported from China. In September, a New
York federal court denied Mitchell's motion
to dismiss the suit, brought by textbook
makers John Wiley and Sons, Inc. and
Pearson Education, but Mitchell has
appealed that decision to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. A second
suit that addresses what's called the "parallel
importation" of textbooks is set to be argued
before a Second Circuit panel on May 19.
What's at stake in these disputes is the
ability of resellers large (Costco) and small
(Liu) to offer legitimate, non-pirated
versions of copyrighted goods to U.S.
consumers at prices that undercut those
charged by the copyright holders-
something that's possible thanks to the
robust secondary markets provided by major
Internet retailers such as eBay and Amazon.
Mitchell says that the business model that
supports such reselling may be new for
modern entrepreneurs, but it's protected by
very old law. "Essentially for 150 years, the
courts have recognized that the distribution
right of copyright owners ends once they
sell their copy," says Mitchell. "But in
recent years more and more copyright
owners are trying to exert control. They're
saying, 'We made these copies outside the
U.S. and therefore the law of the land
doesn't apply to our copies."'
However the Supreme Court ultimately
decides Costco v. Omega, the opinion is
sure to have an impact on the textbook suits
and other such cases. The issue before the
Court is a narrow but important one: Can
copyright owners assert rights over imported
goods that have already been sold once?
Consumer rights advocates say no, and
argue that luxury goods makers especially
are trying to use what amounts to an
importation loophole to avoid the "first sale"
doctrine that protects consumers as well as
businesses that profit from so-called
secondary markets. (Under first sale
doctrine, a copyright or patent holder can't
use intellectual property rights to control
resold or used goods in secondary markets.)
Costco lawyers at Robbins, Russell, Englert,
Orseck & Untereiner write in their brief that
in 2003, Omega began to stamp its
Seamaster watches with a small globe
design, less than 5 millimeters across, "for
the express purpose of invoking the
Copyright Act to restrict the resale of its
products." At the time, Costco was already
selling Omega watches at prices well below
the company's suggested retail prices after
buying them from foreign importers who
had purchased the watches. For instance,
Omega sold batches of Seamaster watches to
distributors in Egypt and Paraguay, and
Costco bought 117 of those watches in 2004.
The retail chain then began selling the
Seamasters for $1,299-$700 less than
Omega's suggested U.S. retail price.
Omega then sued Costco for copyright
infringement, saying it hadn't authorized the
sale of those watches, which were also
"copies" of its copyrighted globe design.
After losing in district court, Omega scored
a win at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, where a panel of judges
agreed that by importing the watches,
Costco had violated Omega's exclusive right
to distribute and sell its copyrighted goods
as outlined in a section of the U.S. copyright
code dealing with importation rules. In its
decision, the appellate panel cited a 1991
case in which BMG Music was able to use
copyright to put a halt to a reseller's
business, BMG Music v. Perez.
Costco had argued that the controlling
precedent should actually be a 1998
Supreme Court case, Quality King
Distributors v. L "Anza Research
International, which ruled that copyright
holders don't have any say over the market
for U.S. copyrighted goods that are imported
and re-sold. Costco's lawyers argued "that
dichotomy has no basis in law or logic, yet
carries severe consequences . . . for
manufacturers, retailers, and consumers in
the U.S." Two IP-savvy consumer rights
groups, Electronic Frontier Foundation and
Public Knowledge, weighed in with an
amicus brief supporting Costco's petition.
Omega, represented by Kellogg, Huber,
Hansen, Todd, Evans & Figel, says that the
Quality King decision doesn't apply to its
Swiss-made watches, and the Ninth Circuit
agreed.
Fred Von Lohmann, a senior attorney at
EFF, maintains Omega is just embracing a
strategy of using copyright law as a pretext
for a form of price discrimination that the
Supreme Court banned in the Quality King
case. The watch maker, he argues, may not
like Costco's business of importing Omega
watches and undercutting the prices charged
by high-end jewelry shops, but that doesn't
mean it should be allowed to use copyright
law to shut down the resales. "If it's all right
for Omega to put a copyrighted logo on the
back of a watch and trump the first sale
doctrine, it gives manufacturers the ability to
use copyright law to block secondary
markets of all kinds," says Von Lohmann.
In the consumer groups' brief, attorneys
argue that if the Ninth Circuit ruling is
allowed to stand, countless resellers-from
used bookstores to neighborhood yard
sales-would be "barred from the simplest
transaction" if the copies they're reselling
were made outside the U.S. And, Von
Lohmann says, if Omega's intepretation of
the copyright-importation laws and the first
sale laws hold-and copyright holders are
allowed to control the price of imported
goods they've already sold once-then
copyright owners will have a huge incentive
to move their manufacturing offshore,
something that Congress most likely never
intended.
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"Who Cares About Costo Corp. v. Omega?"
©ollectanea
April 27, 2010
Peter Jaszi
So, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear a
case posing the question of whether
someone who busy items manufactured
abroad under license from U.S. copyright
owners can ship them back to the U.S. for
resale here in reliance on the so-called "first
sale" doctrine codified in Title 17, Sec. 109.
Specifically, the question posed is whether
such items are should be considered as
having been "lawfully made under this
title." Back in 1998, in Quality King
Distributors Inc., v. L 'Anza Research
International Inc., 523 U.S. 135, and held
that where licensed goods are made in the
U.S. and then shipped overseas for sale, they
can subsequently be reimported without
running afoul of copyright law. Then, the
court didn't have the question of genuine
foreign-manufactured copies before it. Now
(the other shoe having dropped) it does.
Quality King was a case in which a
manufacturer relied on copyright claims in
the labels on relatively inexpensive
shampoos and other personal care products
in an unavailing attempt to prop up the
higher prices it sought to charge consumers
in the U.S. market by excluding competition
from large discounters who can engage in
international arbitrage. The situation in
Costco is similar, except that the goods in
question-luxury watches-are a lot pricier.
(Apparently, Costco was offering "grey
market" Omega watches with an SRP of
almost $2,000 for $700 less!) But whether
the goods are high-end or low-end, it's
obvious that in situations like this the
copyright tail is merely wagging the price-
discrimination dog. The real value of the
goods to makers and buyers is not a function
of the L'Anza label or the engraved Omega
"Globe Design" symbol.
Buyers of shampoos, watches, batteries and
so forth obviously have a stake in the
outcome of the case. Presumably, consumer
organizations will weigh in with amicus
briefs supporting Costco's side of the rather
technical legal argument. But why should
any of this matter to those who persist,
however unfashionably, to insist that
copyright is (or should be) mainly about
culture?
For the answer, take a look at the musical
treasures advertised on websites of Bear
Family Records GmbH and Document
Records, two German companies that
specialize in box sets and other
comprehensive reissues of U.S. folk, blues,
country and rock music. In some cases,
these compilations could be made because
the music and sound recordings are in the
public domain in Europe. In others, the
German companies have licensed foreign
rights to this sometimes obscure material
from U.S. copyright owners, often at a
bargain price.
If you and I were to order directly from Bear
Family or Document Records sites, we
might rely on the Section 602 statutory
exemption for the "importation of one copy
or phonorecord of any one work at any one
time for personal use." But commercial
enterprises-whether bricks-and-mortar
stores or on-line vendors--don't have thatjustification available. So if you take a look
at Amazon.com, you'll see only a paltry few
of the thousands of these interesting German
"archival" releases available there. If this
kind of material is going to be made more
generally available in the U.S., it will be
because the scope of the "first sale" doctrine
is clarified. If Costco wins in the Supreme
Court, for example, the result could be that
U.S. retailers would feel empowered to
purchase licensed foreign-made copies of
books, records and other materials-any
otherwise unavailable in this country-and
make them available to U.S. consumers. The
financial stakes may be small-relative to
what's in play between international brand
manufacturers and big box stores-but the
cultural stakes could be significant.
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano
09-1156
Ruling Below: Siracusano v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 585 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2009), cert.
granted, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4872 (2010).
Plaintiffs, a pension fund and an individual, brought a class action under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), alleging that defendants, a pharmaceutical company
and three executives, violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by failing to disclose material
information regarding a product. The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona granted
defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiffs appealed. Plaintiffs contended that
defendants' failure to disclose information regarding a possible link between the product and
anosmia constituted the omission of a material fact. The court found that the district court erred
in relying on the statistical significance standard to conclude that plaintiffs failed to allege
materiality. The allegations were sufficient to meet the pleading requirement under the PSLRA
because the complaint specified each statement alleged to have been misleading, and sufficiently
alleged materiality because information regarding the possible link between the product and
anosmia was information that a reasonable investor would have considered significant. The
complaint alleged the requisite scienter because the inference that defendants withheld the
information regarding the product and anosmia intentionally or with deliberate recklessness was
at least as compelling as any plausible nonculpable explanation because withholding reports of
adverse effects of and lawsuits concerning the product responsible for the company's remarkable
sales increase was an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care and presented a
danger of misleading buyers or sellers.
Question Presented: Whether a plaintiff can state a claim under § 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act and SEC Rule lOb-5 based on a pharmaceutical company's nondisclosure of
adverse event reports even though the reports are not alleged to be statistically significant.
James SIRACUSANO, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff-
Appellant, NECA-IBEW Pension Fund, Claimant-Appellant,
V.
MATRIXX INITIATIVES, INC.; Carl J. Johnson; William J. Hemelt, Defendants-
Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Filed October 28, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge: Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. ("Matrixx") is a
pharmaceutical company that sells cold
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products through its wholly-owned
subsidiary, Zicam, LLC. One of its main
products is Zicam Cold Remedy, which
comes in several different forms. Plaintiffs-
Appellants are lead plaintiff, NECA-IBEW
Pension Fund, and named plaintiff, James
Siracusano, in a class action brought against
Matrixx and three Matrixx executives
(collectively "Appellees") under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("PSLRA"). Appellants alleged that
Appellees violated the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 by failing to disclose material
information regarding Zicam Cold
Remedy-specifically, that Zicam causes a
condition called anosmia, which is a loss of
the sense of smell, in its users. The district
court granted in part and denied in part
Appellees' motion to strike portions of the
complaint and granted Appellees' motion to
dismiss the complaint and the action. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. We reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
BACKGROUND
On April 27, 2004, Appellants filed a class
action against Matrixx and three individual
defendants-Carl Johnson, Matrixx's Chief
Executive Officer, President and a director;
William Hemelt, Matrixx's Chief Financial
Officer and Executive Vice President; and
Timothy Clarot, Matrixx's Vice President
and Director of Research and
Development-on behalf of investors who
purchased Matrixx securities during the
class period, October 22, 2003, to February
6, 2004. Zicam Cold Remedy accounted for
approximately 70 percent of Zicam's sales
during the class period. Zicam Cold
Remedy's active ingredient is zinc gluconate
and can be applied as a nasal spray or a gel.
Appellants alleged that Appellees were
aware that numerous users of Zicam had
developed anosmia, but that they failed to
disclose the risk and instead issued false and
misleading statements regarding Zicam.
I. Allegations of Adverse Information
Regarding Zicam
In December 1999, Dr. Alan Hirsch, the
Neurological Director of the Smell & Taste
Treatment and Research Foundation, Ltd.,
"called Matrixx's customer service line to
inquire into the amount of zinc contained in
Zicam nasal gel." Hirsch spoke with a Mr.
Landau and explained that at least one of
Hirsch's patients had developed anosmia
after using Zicam. Hirsch stated that other
studies had indicated potential problems
with "intranasal application of zinc," and
offered to conduct a clinical study on the
issue. Mr. Landau declined his offer.
In September 2002, Clarot, Vice President
of Research and Development, called
Miriam Linschoten, Ph.D., of the University
of Colorado Health Sciences Center. Clarot
contacted Linschoten because a patient
Linschoten had treated for loss of smell
following use of Zicam also had complained
to Matrixx. Linschoten expressed concern
that Zicam, an over-the-counter product,
contained no warning that it could cause a
loss of smell. Clarot told Linschoten that
Matrixx had received similar complaints
from other customers as early as 1999.
Linschoten asked whether Matrixx had
performed any studies, told Clarot about
existing studies linking zinc sulfate to the
loss of smell, and offered to send Clarot
information regarding those studies. Clarot
replied that Matrixx had not done any
studies but that "it had hired a consultant to
review the product."
On September 20, 2002, Linschoten sent an
email to Clarot including abstracts on the
link between zinc sulfate and the loss of
smell. Clarot called Linschoten to ask if she
would participate in animal studies to be
conducted by Matrixx, but Linschoten
declined because she focused on human, not
animal, research. Linschoten, Dr. Bruce
Jafek of the University of Colorado School
of Medicine, and another colleague planned
to submit their findings regarding ten
patients who had developed anosmia
following Zicam use in a presentation to the
American Rhinologic Society on September
20, 2003. On September 12, 2003, "Matrixx
sent a letter to Jafek stating that he did not
have permission to use Matrixx's name or
the names of its products" in the
presentation. Jafek asked for permission to
use the Zicam name, but Matrixx refused.
The presentation to the American
Rhinologic Society accordingly was made
without naming Zicam. "Jafek's findings
regarding Zicam were ultimately disclosed
to the public on February 6, 2004 on Good
Morning America. "
"As of April of 2004, Dr. Jafek had
evaluated over 100 cases of anosmia
following Zicam use." Linschoten had
treated approximately 65 such patients, all
of whom complained of "an 'immediate,
severe burning' immediately following use
of Zicam nasal gel, followed by a loss of
smell." None of the patients had fully
recovered. Jafek and Hirsch "have observed
that the Zicam nasal spray does reach the
upper area of the nasal cavity where smell
reception occurs."
I. Allegations of Misleading Statements
On October 22, 2003, Matrixx issued a press
release announcing that its net sales for the
third quarter of 2003 had increased by 163%
over the third quarter of 2002. Johnson was
quoted in the press release as follows:
The Zicam brand is poised for
growth in the upcoming cough and
cold season with improved retail
exposure by virtue of three [new]
unique oral delivery forms of our
Zicam Cold Remedy product, the
resumption of our television
advertising campaigns in recent
weeks and the momentum from last
year's successful season.
Additionally, our retail partners have
come to rely on the Zicam brand not
only as an efficacious product for
their customers, but also for the
profitability that Zicam branded
products produce for their respective
bottom-lines.
Appellants alleged that these statements
were materially false and misleading
because they failed to disclose Appellees'
awareness of the material health risk that
Zicam posed to consumers.
On October 23, 2003, Appellees held an
earnings conference call, at which Johnson
expressed his "enthusiasm for the most
recently completed quarter" and his
"optimis[m] about the future."...
At one point, they were asked to "make any
comment on the litigation MTXX or its
officers are involved in, or whether or not
there is any SEC [Securities and Exchange
Commission] investigation." . . . There was
no mention of the anosmia issue.
On November 12, 2003, Matrixx filed its
Form 10-Q report for the third quarter of
2003 with the SEC....
Appellants alleged that [statements in the
Form 10-Q] were materially false and
misleading because Appellees "failed to
disclose that a lawsuit alleging that Zicam
caused anosmia had already been filed and,
given the findings of the researchers at the
University of Colorado it was highly likely
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that additional suits would be filed in the
future."
Matrixx issued a press release on January 7,
2004, in which it "upwardly revised its
guidance for fiscal year 2003 ......
On January 30, 2004, an article in the Dow
Jones Newswires reported that the FDA was
"looking into complaints that an over-the-
counter common-cold medicine
manufactured by a unit of Matrixx
Initiatives Inc. (MTXX) may be causing
some users to lose their sense of smell." The
article stated that "[t]he FDA's interest
follows at least three lawsuits filed by
individuals against Matrixx and Zicam LLC,
a wholly-owned subsidiary, by users of
Zicam Cold Remedy." Appellants alleged
that Matrixx's stock declined after this
report, "falling from $ 13.55 per share on
January 30, 2004 to $ 11.97 per share on
February 2, 2004."
On February 2, 2004, Matrixx issued a press
release, "respond[ing] to the Dow Jones 'In
The Money report ... ' The press release
stated:
Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., the
manufacturer of Zicam(R) Cold
Remedy, is not aware of an FDA
inquiry into the safety of our
intranasal zinc-gluconate products...
All Zicam products are manufactured
and marketed according to FDA
guidelines for homeopathic
medicine. . . . Matrixx believes
statements alleging that intranasal
Zicam products cause anosmia (loss
of smell) are completely unfounded
and misleading.
In no clinical trial of intranasal zinc
gluconate gel products has there
been a single report of lost or
diminished olfactory function (sense
of smell)....
Appellants alleged that Matrixx's "vigorous,
but baseless, denials had their intended
effect: the stock price rose, closing at $13.40
per share on February 3, 2004."
On February 6, 2004, the television show
Good Morning America did a report on
Matrixx's zinc gluconate products and
anosmia. Reporter John Ferrugia reported
that Jafek had treated "more than a dozen
patients" and that four lawsuits had been
filed, and others were "being prepared."
Appellants alleged that, "[iln response to the
Good Morning America segment, ... the
price of Matrixx common stock plummeted,
falling from $ 13.05 per share on February
5, 2004, to close at $ 9.94 per share on
February 6-a one-day drop of 23.8% on
unusually heavy trading volume."
On February 6, 2004, Matrixx issued
another press release, describing the reports
linking anosmia with zinc gluconate
intranasal gels as "completely unfounded
and misleading." Matrixx "assure[d] our
consumers that Zicam Cold Remedy
intranasal zinc gluconate products are
manufactured and marketed according to
Food and Drug Administration guidelines
for homeopathic medicine."...
On March 19, 2004, Matrixx filed its Form
10-K with the SEC, stating that "numerous
suits alleging that its Zicam product(s)
caused anosmia had been filed." .
Appellants stated that, "[a]ccording to
Matrixx's own SEC filings, from late 2003
through October 2004 Matrixx has been
sued by approximately 284 individuals in 19
different lawsuits alleging that Zicam caused
damage to their sense of smell," and
included in the complaint a table detailing
the lawsuits. The table included suits filed
on October 14, 2003, December 8, 2003,
December 18, 2003, and January 23, 2004,
as well as numerous suits following the
close of the class period.
Appellants alleged that the financial
information contained in Matrixx's Form
I0-Q filed on November 12, 2003, was false
and misleading and violated SEC rules and
the Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles ("GAAP") promulgated by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board
("FASB")....
Appellants alleged that, "[a]s a result of
defendants' materially false and misleading
statements and failure to disclose adverse
information regarding Zicam, Matrixx
securities traded at artificially inflated prices
during the Class Period." Appellants also
alleged that, "[d]uring the Class Period,
defendants materially misled the investing
public, thereby inflating the price of Matrixx
common stock, by publicly issuing false and
misleading statements and omitting to
disclose material adverse facts regarding
Zicam, necessary to make defendants'
statements, as set forth herein not false and
misleading."
In the section of the complaint entitled
"Additional Scienter Allegations,"
Appellants alleged as follows:
[D]efendants acted with scienter in
that defendants knew that the public
statements or documents issued or
disseminated in the name of the
Company were materially false and
misleading; knew that such
statements or documents would be
issued or disseminated to the
investing public; and knowingly and
substantially participated or
acquiesced in the issuance or
dissemination of such statements or
documents as primary violations of
the federal securities laws....
Appellees filed a motion to strike any
allegations that concerned user complaints
and lawsuits that occurred after the close of
the class period. The district court denied the
motion in part and granted it in part....
The district court then dismissed the
complaint without prejudice, reasoning that
the allegations of user complaints were not
material because they were not statistically
significant. The court also found that
Appellants had failed sufficiently to allege
scienter.
The court further stated that any amendment
would be futile "[a]bsent allegations
Defendants knew there was a definitive and
statistically significant link between Zicam
and anosmia during the Class Period that
was 'sufficiently serious and frequent to
affect future earnings."' The court therefore
granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed
the complaint without prejudice. The court
then entered judgment, dismissing the
complaint and the action without prejudice.
Appellants timely appealed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The district court's dismissal for failure to
state a claim is reviewed de novo. We accept
the plaintiffs' allegations as true and
construe them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiffs. Dismissal is "inappropriate
unless the plaintiffs' complaint fails to 'state
a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face. "'
DISCUSSION
"Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b), in combination with SEC
Rule lOb-5, prohibits 'any act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security."' In order adequately to allege
a violation of Rule lOb-5, "a plaintiff must
[allege] '(1) a material misrepresentation or
omission of fact, (2) scienter, (3) a
connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, (4) transaction and loss causation,
and (5) economic loss."' The district court
dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
Appellants failed adequately to allege the
first two elements; therefore, we address
only those two elements.
I. Materiality
Appellants contend that Appellees' failure to
disclose information regarding the possible
link between Zicam and anosmia constituted
the omission of a material fact. "An omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial
likelihood that a reasonable shareholder
would consider it important in deciding how
to vote."
"Questions of materiality involv[e]
assessments peculiarly within the province
of the trier of fact." Thus, "the ultimate issue
of materiality [is] appropriately resolved 'as
a matter of law"' only where the omissions
are "so obviously important to an investor,
that reasonable minds cannot differ on the
question of materiality."
The district court summarized the
"allegations of links between Zicam and
anosmia for which Defendants had
knowledge" as follows: "a phone
conversation between a Matrixx vice-
president and University of Colorado
researcher discussing one anosmia
complaint, a 1999 study recognizing a
possible link, and a University of Colorado
study citing 11 cases of anosmia in Zicam
users." The court then found that Appellants
had failed adequately to allege materiality
because the number of complaints of which
Appellees were aware was not "statistically
significant." The court relied on the
statistical significance standard used by the
Second Circuit in In re Carter-Wallace, Inc.
Securities Litigation and In re Carter-
Wallace, Inc. Securities Litigation. We
conclude, however, that the district court
erred in relying on the statistical significance
standard to conclude that Appellants failed
adequately to allege materiality.
The Supreme Court has rejected the
adoption of a bright-line rule to determine
materiality because "[tihe determination [of
materiality] requires delicate assessments of
the inferences a "reasonable shareholder"
would draw from a given set of facts and the
significance of those inferences to him."
Instead, courts should engage in a "fact-
specific inquiry" in assessing materiality.
Thus, "[d]etermining materiality in
securities fraud cases 'should ordinarily be
left to the trier of fact."'
In relying on the statistical significance
standard to determine materiality, the district
court made a decision that should have been
left to the trier of fact. Instead, we agree
with the approach of the court in In re Pfizer
Inc. Securities Litigation where the United
States District Court for the Southern
District of New York rejected the defendant
pharmaceutical company's argument that the
plaintiffs failed to plead materiality, which
was based on the contention that three
studies revealing adverse effects of the
company's drug were not statistically
significant. The court reasoned that it
"cannot determine as a matter of law
whether such links were statistically
insignificant because statistical significance
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is a question of fact."
Thus, we are to engage in the fact-specific
inquiry required by Basic. In doing so, we
must take the allegations in the complaint as
true and construe them in the light most
favorable to Appellants and determine
whether the complaint "fails to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face."...
We believe that the allegations [made in
the CAC] are sufficient to meet the pleading
requirement under the PSLRA, which
requires that:
the complaint shall specify each
statement alleged to have been
misleading, the reason or reasons
why the statement is misleading,
and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on
information or belief, the complaint
shall state with particularity all facts
on which that belief is formed.
The allegations in the CAC are sufficient to
meet that standard and, as well, to "nudge[ ]
[Appellants'] claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible." Appellants have
sufficiently alleged materiality, and the
district court's finding to the contrary is
reversed.
II. Scienter
In order to plead scienter, the PSLRA
requires the complaint to "state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong
inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind." The plaintiff "must
allege that.. . the defendant had an intention
'to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."' "[In
determining whether the pleaded facts give
rise to a 'strong' inference of scienter, the
court must take into account plausible
opposing inferences." The complaint will
survive a motion to dismiss "only if a
reasonable person would deem the inference
of scienter cogent and at least as compelling
as any opposing inference one could draw
from the facts alleged." This does not mean
that a plaintiff must "plead more than she
would be required to prove at trial." Rather,
"[a] plaintiff alleging fraud under § 10(b)
action ...must plead facts rendering an
inference of scienter at least as likely as any
plausible opposing inference."
To establish scienter, "a complaint must
.allege that the defendants made false or
misleading statements either intentionally or
with deliberate recklessness."' We must first
"determine whether any of the plaintiffs
allegations, standing alone, are sufficient to
create a strong inference of scienter." If not,
we are to "conduct a 'holistic' review of the
same allegations to determine whether the
insufficient allegations combine to create a
strong inference of intentional conduct or
deliberate recklessness." Recklessness is
defined as
a highly unreasonable omission,
involving not merely simple, or even
inexcusable negligence, but an
extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care, and which presents
a danger of misleading buyers or
sellers that is either known to the
defendant or is so obvious that the
actor must have been aware of it.
The district court here concluded that the
CAC failed to allege the requisite scienter
because it "fails to allege any motive or state
of mind with relation to the alleged
omissions." In order adequately to allege
scienter, Appellants rely on their allegations
that Appellees knew about the problems
with Zicam but chose not to reveal them.
Appellants also argue that the importance of
Zicam to Matrixx's business supports the
inference that Appellees intentionally
withheld information of the link between
Zicam and anosmia. Appellants also point to
the revelations following the close of the
class period that, contrary to their statements
during the class period, Matrixx actually did
not know if Zicam caused anosmia and
decided to conduct studies after they had
already vouched for the safety of Zicam.
Matrixx's first allegedly misleading
statement was its October 22, 2003, press
release, announcing the 163% net sales
increase, attributed to Zicam, and stating
that the Zicam brand was "poised for
growth." The second statement was the
conference call on October 23, 2003, again
attributing the company's positive results to
Zicam and projecting further growth. By the
time of the press release and the conference
call, Hirsch had called the customer service
line regarding one patient, Clarot had
spoken with Linschoten regarding customer
complaints, Jafek had presented his report of
eleven patients, and the first lawsuit against
Matrixx had been filed. Appellees
accordingly were aware of at least fourteen
complaints regarding Zicam and anosmia at
the time they made these statements. In
addition, Appellants alleged that Clarot told
Linschoten in the September 2002 phone
call that "Matrixx had received customer
complaints of loss of smell as early as
1999." Appellants then alleged that the
November 12, 2003, Form 10-Q was
misleading because it spoke of the risk of
product liability actions against the company
without revealing that a lawsuit already had
been filed.
In Berson v. Applied Signal Tech., Inc., the
defendants argued that a passage in the
company's SEC filings regarding
backlogged work alerted reasonable
investors to the risk that the company might
not get paid for work that had actually been
stopped. We rejected the argument, stating
that "[t]he passage ... speaks entirely of as-
yet unrealized risks and contingencies.
Nothing alerts the reader that some of these
risks may already have come to fruition, and
that what the company refers to as backlog
includes work that is substantially delayed
and at serious risk of being cancelled
altogether." We therefore disagreed with the
district court's finding that the statements
were not misleading, reasoning that, "once
defendants chose to tout the company's
backlog, they were bound to do so in a
manner that wouldn't mislead investors as to
what that backlog consisted of." After
addressing scienter and loss causation, we
reversed the district court's dismissal of the
complaint.
Similar to Berson, the passage in the Form
I0-Q speaks about the risks of product
liability claims in the abstract, with no
indication that the risk "may already have
come to fruition." At the time that Appellees
filed the Form 10-Q, the CAC alleges facts
sufficient for a jury to find that Clarot was
aware of the potential anosmia problem.
Moreover, the inference that high-level
executives such as Johnson, Hemelt, and
Clarot would know that the company was
being sued in a product liability action is
sufficiently strong to survive a motion to
dismiss.
In response to the January 30, 2004, article
in the Dow Jones Newswires that the FDA
was investigating complaints of anosmia
linked to Zicam, Matrixx issued a press
release on February 2, 2004. By the time of
this press release, three more lawsuits
regarding anosmia had been filed against
Matrixx. This press release cites the two
double-blind studies regarding the "safety
and efficacy of zinc gluconate for the
treatment of symptoms related to the
common cold," but, again, the press release
did not say whether Matrixx studied the
intranasal use of zinc gluconate for safety, as
opposed to efficacy. The press release also
states that "statements alleging that
intranasal Zicam products cause anosmia...
are completely unfounded and misleading,"
and then devotes three paragraphs to
discrediting the author of the article and
urging Dow Jones to investigate the author.
By the time of the February 2, 2004 press
release, a strong inference can be drawn that
Appellees knew that the statements alleging
a link between Zicam and anosmia were not
"completely unfounded and misleading."
Appellees allegedly knew about the
presentation by Jafek to the American
Rhinologic Society, Clarot's conversation
with Linschoten, and several lawsuits
alleging that Zicam caused anosmia. In
addition, Matrixx's statements in the press
release, that Zicam's safety was "well
established" by their trials, conflict with the
allegations that Clarot told Linschoten in
September 2002 that Matrixx had not
conducted any studies and asked her to
participate in studies. The references in the
press release to clinical trials establishing
Zicam's safety also conflict with the March
4, 2004, news report that Matrixx did not
know if Zicam could cause anosmia and
formed a medical advisory panel to conduct
studies.
Matrixx's February 6, 2004, press release,
following the Good Morning America
segment regarding Jafek's findings, repeated
the statements that the safety of zinc
gluconate to treat cold symptoms had been
established in clinical trials, stated that the
common cold affects the sense of smell, and
stated that the studies linking zinc to
anosmia were conducted in the 1930s using
a different zinc compound.
Appellants have not alleged that Appellees
engaged in unusual or suspicious stock sales
at the same time that they were attempting to
downplay the reports of anosmia. The
Supreme Court has stated, however, that,
"[w]hile it is true that motive can be a
relevant consideration, and personal
financial gain may weigh heavily in favor of
a scienter inference, we agree with the
Seventh Circuit that the absence of a motive
allegation is not fatal."
On a holistic review of the CAC, the
following picture is alleged. Matrixx
received some customer complaints about
Zicam and anosmia from 1999 to 2002. In
2002, Clarot was sufficiently concerned that
he called Linschoten about one of her
patients who had complained and then called
to ask if she would participate in studies. In
September 2003, Matrixx knew that Jafek
and his colleagues were presenting findings
about ten or eleven patients who developed
anosmia after Zicam use and did not allow
Jafek to use Matrixx's or Zicam's name in
the presentation. In October 2003, Matrixx
touted the potential for growth and
profitability of Zicam in a press release and
an earnings conference call. A lawsuit
alleging anosmia in one Zicam user was
filed in October 2003. In November 2003,
Matrixx filed a Form 10-Q, but did not
disclose the lawsuit in the section entitled
"Risk Factors." More lawsuits were filed in
December 2003 and January 2004.
On February 2, 2004, Matrixx issued a press
release responding to the January 30, 2004,
Dow Jones report that the FDA was
investigating Zicam and anosmia. This press
release called the report "completely
unfounded and misleading" and asserted that
clinical trials had established the safety of
zinc gluconate. On February 6, 2004, Good
Morning America reported on the possible
link between Zicam and anosmia, and
Matrixx issued another press release
asserting that zinc gluconate's safety was
well established in clinical trials, even
though it was subsequently reported that
Matrixx had not conducted such studies. In a
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February 19, 2004, filing with the SEC,
Matrixx stated that it had convened a panel
of physicians and scientists to review the
information and asserted that there was
insufficient evidence to determine whether
zinc gluconate affected the sense of smell.
On March 4, 2004, a news article reported
that Matrixx would begin studies to
determine if Zicam caused anosmia.
Viewing the CAC as a whole, the inference
of scienter is "cogent and at least as
compelling" as any "plausible nonculpable
explanation[ I" for Appellees' conduct.
Withholding reports of adverse effects of
and lawsuits concerning the product
responsible for the company's remarkable
sales increase is "an extreme departure from
the standards of ordinary care" and "presents
a danger of misleading buyers or sellers."
We therefore conclude that the inference
that Appellees withheld the information
intentionally or with deliberate recklessness
is at least as compelling as the inference that
Appellees withheld the information
innocently.
CONCLUSION
The district court's reliance on the statistical
significance standard to conclude that
Appellants failed to establish materiality is
inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
rejection of bright-line rules and its
emphasis on having materiality determined
by the trier of fact. Viewing the CAC in the
light most favorable to Appellants, we
conclude that Appellants have sufficiently
pled materiality to survive dismissal.
Similarly, the inference that Appellees
withheld the information regarding Zicam
and anosmia intentionally or with deliberate
recklessness is at least as compelling as any
plausible nonculpable explanation. For the
foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
district court is REVERSED and the case
REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED
"U.S. Supreme Court to Hear Suit of Investors
vs. Scottsdale Drug Firm"
The Arizona Republic
June 15, 2010
Ken Alltucker
The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed
to hear [Matrixx Initiatives et aL v.
Siracusano, James et aL], a Scottsdale-
based company's appeal of a lawsuit that
alleged the company failed to disclose to
investors that some users of its Zicam Cold
Remedy products complained about losing
their sense of smell.
The company, Matrixx Initiatives, has been
the subject of more than 200 lawsuits over
the past six years relating to Zicam.
A shareholders' lawsuit filed in 2004
claimed the publicly traded company never
let investors know of consumer complaints
linking the nasal gel to loss of smell.
Shareholders often evaluate lawsuits and
product complaints to decide whether they
potentially could make a difference in the
company's future prospects and ability to
earn profits. A federal judge dismissed the
shareholders' lawsuit in 2005. The 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals last year reinstated
the lawsuit, prompting Matrixx's appeal.
A ruling in the case could impact a wide
range of pharmaceutical companies because
the high court will seek to address when
companies should disclose to investors
reports about adverse side effects from users
of a drug or medical product.
"We're pleased the court will hear the case,"
said Bill Barba, Matrixx's treasurer and vice
president of finance and accounting.
The Food and Drug Administration last June
issued a warning letter about Zicam after
receiving numerous complaints that it
triggered a condition known as anosmia, or
loss of smell. The letter prompted Matrixx to
recall from stores its Zicam Cold Remedy
nasal-spray gel and swabs. Its stock fell to
$5.78 a share on June 16, 2009, from $19.24
a share on June 15, 2009. Matrixx stock
closed at $4.91 Monday.
Matrixx has more than a dozen other Zicam
products that were not part of the FDA
warning letter or recall. The company says
that all its products are safe and that there is
no credible scientific evidence to suggest
otherwise.
The Supreme Court is expected to hear the
case this fall. A chief question it will seek to
resolve is whether a shareholder can sue a
drug company for failing to disclose even
small numbers of users who claim side
effects.
Three appeals courts previously ruled that
drug companies have no duty to disclose
random reports of side effects. The appeals
courts found that there must be "statistically
significant" evidence that the drug caused
the user's side effects instead of being
associated with the side effects.
The 9th Circuit took a different view. That
court ruled that a jury should be allowed to
decide whether such information is material
to investors.
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Matrixx
said that it would be too burdensome to
require companies to publicly report all
complaints about adverse side effects. It also
could potentially create liability for
180
pharmaceutical companies by requiring such
disclosures, Matrixx said.
Matrixx continues to face a significant
number of new lawsuits from consumers,
most of them claiming loss of smell from
Zicam. At the end of May, the company
faced 176 product-liability lawsuits
involving 671 plaintiffs.
An additional 435 people notified Matrixx
that they may file suit or pursue settlement
negotiations with the company, according to
Matrixx's securities filings.
In 2006, the company settled a batch of
lawsuits with 340 plaintiffs for $12 million.
The company said it pursued the settlement
to avoid the legal cost of defending each
individual lawsuit.
The company's legal costs continue to
mount. Matrixx spent S7.2 million on legal
expenses for its fiscal year that ended March
31, compared with $2.6 million from April
1, 2008, to March 31, 2009.
The company expects that it will spend $1.5
million to $2 million every three months on
legal bills alone. Matrixx has said that it has
limited insurance coverage for its product-
liability suits.
Attorneys representing Matrixx Initiatives
and the shareholders' lead plaintiff, James
V. Siracusano, did not return calls.
"Supreme Court to Hear Matrixx
Zicam Securities Case"
Law360
June 14, 2010
Jacqueline Bell
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to take
up the question of whether drug companies
have to disclose all reports of adverse events
linked to a particular drug to shareholders, in
[Matrixx Initiatives et aL v. Siracusano,
James et aL], a case accusing Matrixx
Initiatives Inc. of concealing from investors
reports claiming that the cold medication
Zicam caused users to lose their sense of
smell.
In a order issued Monday, the high court
granted Matrixx's petition to review a ruling
by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit which gave the go-ahead to the
securities class action against Matrixx.
The question before the high court is
whether drug companies must reveal
adverse event reports that do not show
statistically significant evidence that a
problem reported by patients is specifically
caused by the use of the particular drug.
In its petition to the Supreme Court, Matrixx
argued that three other U.S. appeals courts,
the First, Second and Third Circuits, held
that drug companies do not have a specific
duty to disclose reports of adverse events
related to a particular product until those
reports can clearly show that the symptoms
patients are suffering may actually be caused
by the drug's use.
"Expressly disagreeing with those decisions,
the Ninth Circuit below rejected a statistical
significance standard and allowed the case
to proceed despite the lack of any allegation
that the undisclosed adverse event reports
were statistically significant," Matrixx
argued in its brief to the Supreme Court.
Doug Hallward-Driemeier, a partner at
Ropes & Gray LLP who is not involved in
the case, said that for the pharmaceutical
industry, the fact that the court has decided
to review the case is very good news.
"The Ninth Circuit decision could have had
an extremely broad impact on the industry,
effectively requiring them to disclose all
adverse drug reports-and deluging
investors with information that's not really
going to be helpful to them," Hallward-
Driemeier said.
The initial complaint, filed by lead plaintiff
NECA-IBEW Pension Fund and named
plaintiff James Siracusano, alleged that
Matrixx and its executives hid information
about the reports from both the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration and shareholders.
The complaint argued that Matrixx violated
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
of 1995 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 by failing to disclose that Zicam, a
cold medication that has come under fire for
its potential danger to consumers, causes
anosmia, or the loss of one's sense of smell.
Matrixx's stock traded at artificially inflated
levels during the class period from October
2003 to June 2004, the plaintiffs claim.
But after the information was revealed, they
allege, the price of the company's common
stock plummeted and has continued to
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decrease, harming shareholders.
The district court had tossed the suit for
failure to state a claim.
But the Ninth Circuit said in an October
ruling that, to the contrary, not only had the
plaintiffs sufficiently alleged materiality, but
viewing their complaint as a whole, it found
the inference of scienter was "cogent and at
least as compelling" as any "plausible
nonculpable explanation" for the
defendants' conduct.
Withholding reports of adverse effects of
and lawsuits concerning the product
responsible for the company's remarkable
sales increase, the Ninth Circuit said, was
"an extreme departure from the standards of
ordinary care" and presented "a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers."
"The inference that appellees withheld the
information intentionally or with deliberate
recklessness is at least as compelling as the
inference that appellees withheld the
information innocently," the appeals court
said.
The class action targets Matrixx, its CEO
Carl Johnson, Chief Financial Officer
William Hemelt and Vice President Timothy
Clarot.
Jonathan D. Hacker, a partner at O'Melveny
& Myers LLP who represents Matrixx said
the company was gratified by the court's
order Monday.
"We're pleased the court has agreed to
review the case and we look forward to
arguing our position before the court,"
Hacker said.
Attorneys for the plaintiffs could not
immediately be reached for comment
Monday.
The case is Matrixx Initiatives et a. v.
Siracusano, James et al, case number 09-
1156, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Ninth Circuit case is Siracusano et aL
v. Matrixx Initiatives Inc. et al., case
number 06-15677.
"Class Action Claim Against Zicam Manufacturer
Matrixx Reinstated by the Ninth Circuit"
JOLT Digest
November 1, 2009
Abby Lauer
The Ninth Circuit has unanimously reversed
the U.S. District Court for the District of
Arizona's holding [in Siracusano et aL v.
Matrixx Initiatives Inc. et al.], which had
dismissed a class action claim against Zicam
manufacturer Matrixx for the complaint's
failure to adequately allege a violation of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995 ("PSLRA").
In an opinion written by Tashima, J., the
Ninth Circuit held that the District Court
improperly relied on a statistical
significance standard to determine that the
plaintiffs' complaint did not allege "a
material misrepresentation or omission of
fact." Instead of determining materiality as a
matter of law, the district court should have
allowed the jury to conduct a "fact-specific
inquiry." In addition, the Ninth Circuit held
that the lower court erred in dismissing
plaintiffs' complaint for failure to allege
scienter on the part of Matrixx executives.
The court reasoned that the inference that
Matrixx executives knew about the possible
link between Zicam and anosmia (loss of
smell) before issuing allegedly misleading
statements is at least as likely as any
plausible opposing inference.
Plaintiffs brought the original action in April
2004, alleging that Matrixx had information
of a possible causal connection between
Zicam use and anosmia but failed to disclose
this risk and instead issued false and
misleading statements to consumers.
The Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs'
complaint satisfied the heightened pleading
standards of past Supreme Court cases
Twombly and Tellabs and thus should have
survived a motion to dismiss. In its holding
on the materiality issue, the court examined
allegations in the complaint to consider
whether information regarding a possible
link between Zicam and anosmia was
information a reasonable investor might
consider significant. The court found that
the allegations were sufficient to satisfy the
pleading requirement under the PSLRA and
held that the issue of whether Matrixx's
misrepresentations were material should be
left for a jury to decide. On the issue of
scienter, the court emphasized that Matrixx
was aware of at least 14 complaints linking
Zicam to anosmia at the time it stated that a
causal connection between the two was
"completely unfounded and misleading."
The court also found a strong indication that
high-level Matrixx executives knew that the
company was being sued in a product
liability action on the issue of anosmia when
they released the allegedly misleading
statements. Viewing the complaint as a
whole, the court held that the inferences of
scienter drawn by the plaintiffs' complaint
were sufficiently strong for it to survive a
motion to dismiss.
The decision is the latest in a series of
setbacks for Matrixx. Following a warning
from the FDA last June that Zicam products
could cause anosmia, the company
voluntarily withdrew two forms of the drug.
Matrixx continues to maintain that anosmia
is caused by the cold virus, which Zicam is
designed to treat, and not by the drug itself.
The case will now return to the District
Court for further proceedings. Whether or
not the plaintiffs eventually prevail at trial
may have substantial implications for
Matrixx, which relied on Zicam Cold
Remedy products for about 70 percent of its
total sales at the time the action was initially
filed.
"Supreme Court to Address Securities
Fraud Pleading Standards"
DavisPolk
June 16, 2010
On June 14, 2010, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in a private securities
fraud class action, Matrixx Initiatives, Inc.
v. Siracusano ("Matrixx"). The case will
present the Court with an opportunity to
address conflicting standards in the United
States Courts of Appeals for determining
when a pharmaceutical manufacturer's non-
disclosure of reports of adverse effects from
a medication may give rise to liability under
Section 10(b) of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities and
Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5
(collectively, "10b-5").
The case raises potentially important issues
as to the requirements for pleading
"scienter" and "materiality" in a 1Ob-5 case.
Facts and Law
Matrixx involves a fact pattern that is familiar
in 1Ob-5 cases against pharmaceutical
companies. While each case has its own
specific facts, the general pattern involves a
drug that is either withdrawn from the
market or denied regulatory approval
because of harmful side effects, followed by
a lOb-5 action claiming that material risks
were known to the company and not
promptly disclosed to investors.
In Matrixx, Plaintiffs alleged that
Defendants, the manufacturer of Zicam Cold
Remedy and the manufacturer's senior
executives, made a series of positive
statements about Zicam and the company's
future prospects in press releases, earnings
conference calls, and Securities and
Exchange Commission filings without
disclosing that a number of Zicam users had
reported symptoms of anosmia (loss of the
sense of smell) and that several had filed
lawsuits against the company. Plaintiffs
further alleged that when a news story
indicated that the FDA was examining the
question of Zicam's safety, the manufacturer
issued a press release indicating that the
drug was safe. When subsequent news
reports indicated that Zicam patients were
receiving treatment for anosmia, that
lawsuits already had been filed and that
others might be filed soon, the company's
stock price fell. Plaintiffs contended that the
alleged non-disclosure of reported anosmia
incidents and lawsuits constituted securities
fraud.
The district court dismissed the claim.
Following a line of cases from the Courts of
Appeals-particularly the Second Circuit-
the district court held that Defendants did
not have a duty to disclose the reports of
anosmia until there was "statistically
significant" evidence that the anosmia was
caused by taking Zicam. Accordingly, the
district court held that Plaintiffs' complaint
failed to plead the necessary elements of
materiality and scienter.
A panel of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The
court held that the lower court's reliance on
the Second Circuit's "statistical
significance" standard was in error, and that
the question of materiality presented a fact
issue that could not be resolved at the
pleading stage.
The "Statistical Significance" Standard
In In re Carter-Wallace, Inc. Securities
Litigation, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit established a
"statistical significance" standard of
materiality for 1Ob-5 claims based on
nondisclosure of adverse drug events. Under
that standard, nondisclosure is not
"materially misleading until [a defendant]
had information that [the drug] had caused a
statistically significant number of' adverse
events. In a later opinion in the same case,
the Second Circuit explained that in the
absence of such "statistical significance,"
the complaint also failed to give rise to a
strong inference of scienter.
The First and Third Circuits have since
adopted the statistical significance standard.
The Petition for Certiorari
In seeking certiorari, Defendants argued that
the Ninth Circuit's decision rejecting the
statistical significance standard created a
split among the Courts of Appeals; to have a
more lenient pleading standard in the Ninth
Circuit than in other Courts of Appeals
would result in forum shopping. Defendants
also argued that, under the Ninth Circuit's
ruling, manufacturers seeking to avoid 1 Ob-5
litigation would be encouraged to disclose
all reports of adverse events alleged to have
been caused by their products, resulting in
confusion to investors and consumers.
In response, Plaintiffs argued that there was
no genuine split among the Courts of
Appeals. Plaintiffs contended that although
the Second Circuit applied the statistical
significance test to analyze whether an
alleged misstatement or omission was made
with scienter, the Ninth Circuit's decision
focused not on scienter but on materiality.
Materiality-the likely relevance of
information to a typical investor-often is
left for juries to resolve, and Plaintiffs
argued that the Ninth Circuit properly
refused to apply a "bright-line" statistical
significance standard to the element of
materiality. Moreover, Plaintiffs argued that
regardless of the test employed, the facts of
the case were sufficiently extreme to permit
the conclusion, at least for purposes of
deciding a motion to dismiss, that the
alleged omissions and statements were
actionable under lOb-5.
As noted above, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari. The case will be scheduled for
briefing and argument in the October 2010
Term, with a decision expected by June
2011.
Implications
The Supreme Court's decision in Matrixx
could have significant implications for
pharmaceutical companies and medical
device manufacturers, and for other
companies as well. The Second Circuit's
statistical significance test provided a
measure of predictability for manufacturers
and protected them from liability for failing
to disclose mere anecdotal reports of product
defects. If the Supreme Court rejects use of
the Second Circuit framework in favor of
the Ninth Circuit approach, companies will
face pressure to routinely disclose all
negative reports about their own products-
irrespective of the reliability of the
information-resulting in a profusion of
anecdotal information that is of limited
value either to investors, doctors or patients.
More broadly, the permissive approach
taken by the Ninth Circuit panel in Matrixx
to pleading materiality in this context-if
accepted or left undisturbed by the Supreme
Court-could have implications on private
securities cases in other contexts. Motions to
dismiss are a valuable tool for courts and
defendants to narrow or eliminate cases
brought on alleged misstatements or
omissions that clearly would not have been
material. Insofar as the Supreme Court in
Matrixx addresses the availability of that
tool, the decision could have impacts well
beyond the narrow (though common)
context of a claim against a pharmaceutical
company.
Mayo Foundation v. United States
09-837
Ruling Below: Mayo Foundation v. United States, 568 F.3d 675 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
2010 U.S. LEXIS 4390 (2010).
In separate cases, plaintiffs-appellees, the Mayo Foundation and the University of Minnesota,
sought refunds of Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) taxes from defendant-appellant
United States pursuant to 26 U.S.C.S. § 3121(b)(10). Plaintiffs claimed that stipends paid to
medical residents for services provided at hospitals and clinics were exempt from FICA taxes
under § 3121(b)(10), which excepted from the definition of "employment" and "wages" services
performed by a student in the employ of a school, college, or university. The district court
invalidated an amended version of Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2, which prevented persons who
worked 40 hours or more per week from qualifying from the student exception. The court of
appeals reversed and held that the regulation was a permissible interpretation of § 3121 (b)(10). It
was permissible for a Treasury Regulation to construe words in tax statutes that might have a
plain meaning in other contexts. The full-time employee regulation did not conflict with the plain
language of the statute. Also, the regulation was consistent with the origin and purpose of the
student exception as initially enacted and with Congress's frequent expansion of Social Security
coverage.
Question Presented: Whether the Treasury Department can categorically exclude all medical
residents and other fulltime employees from the definition of "student" in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)
(10), which exempts from Social Security taxes "service performed in the employ of a school,
college, or university" by a "student who is enrolled and regularly attending classes at such
school, college, or university."
MAYO FOUNDATION FOR MEDICAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH; Mayo Clinic,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellant.
Regents of the University of Minnesota, Plaintiff-Appellee
V.
United States of America, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Filed June 12, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
LOKEN, Chief Judge.
"Residents" participating in accredited
graduate medical education programs
receive substantial payments (called
stipends) from the Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education and Research ("Mayo")
and the University of Minnesota (the
"University") for medical and patient care
services provided by the residents at
affiliated and unaffiliated hospitals and
clinics. The difficult issue in these cases is
whether these payments qualify for the
student exception to Federal Insurance
Contributions Act ("FICA") taxes imposed
on employers and employees. The district
court answered this question affirmatively,
declaring invalid recently promulgated
Treasury Regulations to the contrary and
awarding Mayo and the University refunds
of substantial FICA taxes paid during the
second quarter of 2005. We review the
district court's invalidation of Treasury
Regulations de novo. Concluding that we
must defer to the regulation limiting this
exception to students who are not full-time
employees because it is a permissible
interpretation of the statute, we reverse.
I.
FICA taxes, which support the Social
Security system, are imposed on both
employers and employees based upon wages
paid. The term "wages" is broadly defined in
[26 U.S.C.] § 3121(a) as "all remuneration
for employment." "Employment" is also
broadly defined in § 3121(b) as "any
service, of whatever nature, performed . . .
by an employee," but there are twenty-one
specific statutory exceptions. At issue here
is the exception for "service performed in
the employ of . . . a school, college, or
university . . . if such service is performed
by a student who is enrolled and regularly
attending classes at such school, college, or
university."
A student exception has been part of the
FICA and Social Security statutes since
1939. Although litigation regarding its
application to medical school stipends paid
to enrolled residents arose only recently, it
has now exploded across the country. The
avalanche began when Minnesota sued the
Commissioner of Social Security to recover
assessments for stipends paid to the
University's medical residents under a
"Section 218 Agreement," the mechanism
by which States such as Minnesota then
obtained Social Security coverage for
designated employees. The district court
ruled for the State on two alternative
grounds, and we affirmed. The first ground,
that the State did not intend to designate
medical residents under the Agreement, is of
no relevance here. But the alternative
ground, that medical resident services fell
within the student exception in the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 410(a)(7)(A),
418(c)(5), prompted the filing of more than
7,000 claims with the IRS, as medical
schools sought refunds of FICA taxes on
medical resident "wages," based on the
student exception in 26 U.S.C. §
3121(b)(10).
One refund claim was filed by Mayo. The
IRS paid the refund, sued to recover it, and
Mayo counterclaimed for refunds in other
years....
After a bench trial, the district court granted
judgment in favor of Mayo. Relying on our
decision in [Minnesota v.] Apfel that the
Social Security Act regulations required a
fact-specific, "case-by-case examination"
and applying the above quoted portions of
the Treasury Regulations, the court found
that Mayo was the employer of its medical
residents; that Mayo is a school, college, or
university; that the residents were "students"
enrolled in a residency program and
regularly attending classes; and that "the
patient care services provided by residents in
the [Mayo] residency programs were
incidental to and for the purpose of pursuing
a course of study in postgraduate medical
education." (Mayo I).
The government appealed this decision but
then dismissed the appeal and published
notice of proposed regulations amending
Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2. After
extensive public comments and a hearing,
the IRS promulgated final amended
regulations, effective April 1, 2005....
Though the amended regulations cover a
broader range of issues, the "Need for
Regulations" section of the notice of
proposed rulemaking expressly focused on
medical residents and the decisions in Apfel
and Mayo I. The final regulations include as
an example of services not excepted under
26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10) a person employed
by a university to provide patient care
services at an affiliated teaching hospital if
the employee works at least forty hours per
week, even if the services have an
educational or training aspect. Such services
are not excluded, the regulations explain,
because the person is a full time employee
and therefore his services "are not incident
to and for the purpose of pursuing a course
of study."
Eight months later, the court granted
summary judgment in favor of the
University. The court adopted its ruling in
Mayo's case that the amended regulations
are invalid, applied the prior regulations, and
concluded that the University's medical
residents (i) are employed by the University,
not by the independent hospitals where they
provide patient care services, (ii) are
"enrolled" and "regularly attending classes"
in a residency program, and (iii) provide
patient care services that are "incident to and
for the purpose of pursuing a course of
study."
The government appeals both decisions,
arguing that the amended regulations are
valid and challenging the grant of summary
judgment to the University on the employer
issue. We assigned both appeals to the same
panel, which heard oral arguments the same
day. We resolve both appeals in a single
opinion because a single common issue is
controlling. We will focus first on that issue,
the validity of the full-time employee
limitation in 26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-
2(d)(3)(iii).
II.
Treasury Regulations interpreting the
Internal Revenue Code are entitled to
substantial deference. But in reviewing an
agency's interpretation of a statute, the first
question is "whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue." If it
has, "the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress." On the other hand, "if
the statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the
statute."
A.
In these cases, the district court invalidated
the "primary function" and "full-time
employee" provisions in the amended
regulations as contrary to the plain meaning
of an unambiguous statute. Likewise, four of
our sister circuits have recently declared, in
cases arising under the former regulations,
that the student exception statute is
unambiguous and "does not limit the types
of services that qualify for the exemption."
In other words, these courts reasoned,
because judges know what is a "school" and
who is a "student" and what it means to be
"enrolled and regularly attending classes," a
Treasury Regulation interpreting these
common terms is invalid. If that
interpretation of the statute is correct, we
must affirm in Mayo and turn to the
remaining question whether the University
is the "employer" of its medical residents.
But this interpretation of 26 U.S.C. §
3121(b)(10), part of the Internal Revenue
Code, cannot be correct. In numerous cases,
the Supreme Court has upheld Treasury
Regulations construing words in tax statutes
that may have a common or plain meaning
in other contexts. For example, in Helvering
v. Reynolds the court upheld a regulation
construing the statutory term "acquisition"
of a contingent remainder interest in
property devised by will to mean when the
decedent died, not when the remainderman
obtained title many years later. The Court
explained, "However unambiguous that
word might be as respects other transactions
... its meaning in this statutory setting was
far from clear."
Likewise, in Magruder v. Washington,
Baltimore & Annapolis Realty Corp. the
Court in upholding the regulation at issue
explained, "[t]he crucial words of the
statute, 'carrying on or doing business,' are
not so easy of application to varying facts
that they leave no room for administrative
interpretation or elucidation." In United
States v. Correll the Court upheld a
regulation limiting the deduction for travel
expenses by excluding trips that require
neither sleep nor rest, explaining "[t]he
language of the statute-'meals and lodging
. . . away from home'-is obviously not
self-defining." In National Muffler Dealers
Ass'n v. United States the Court upheld a
regulation construing the term "business
league," concluding that the term is "so
general as to render an interpretive
regulation appropriate." And in Cottage
Savings Ass'n v. Commissioner the Court
upheld a regulation construing the term
"disposition of property" as being limited to
exchanges of property for "materially
different" property, an interpretation of the
statute that a judge steeped in property law
principles would surely find contrary to
plain meaning. To be sure, the Court has
occasionally invalidated Treasury
Regulations or proposed regulations as
contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.
But in the vast majority of cases, the Court
has not invalidated an interpretive Treasury
Regulation simply because the statute used a
term that has a plain or common meaning in
other contexts.
In this case, the statute excepts from the
term "wages" the services of "a student who
is enrolled and regularly attending classes."
The prior regulation construed this phrase as
reflecting an integrated concept: "An
employee who performs services in the
employ of a school, college, or university, as
an incident to and for the purpose of
pursuing a course of study at such school,
college, or university has the status of a
student in the performance of such
services." Significantly, the district court did
not question the validity of this limitation.
Indeed, it applied the former regulation after
invalidating the amended regulation. This
interpretation, which limits the student
exception to services that are subordinate to
the student's educational activities, is not the
only possible interpretation of the common
words "student," "enrolled," and "regularly
attending classes." But those words must be
construed in context, and when the context
is a provision of the Internal Revenue Code,
a Treasury Regulation interpreting the words
is nearly always appropriate. We hold that
the statute is silent or ambiguous on the
question whether a medical resident working
for the school full-time is a "student who is
enrolled and regularly attending classes" for
purposes of 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(10).
B.
Having concluded that the statute is silent or
ambiguous on this question, we turn to the
second part of the Chevron analysis,
determining whether the Commissioner's
amended regulation is a permissible
interpretation of the statute. For this inquiry,
the Supreme Court's opinion in National
Muffler is instructive:
In determining whether a particular
regulation carries out the
congressional mandate in a proper
manner, we look to see whether the
regulation harmonizes with the plain
language of the statute, its origin,
and its purpose. A regulation may
have particular force if it is a
substantially contemporaneous
construction of the statute by those
presumed to have been aware of
congressional intent. If the regulation
dates from a later period, the manner
in which it evolved merits inquiry.
Other relevant considerations are the
length of time the regulation has
been in effect, the reliance placed on
it, the consistency of the
Commissioner's interpretation, and
the degree of scrutiny Congress has
devoted to the regulation during
subsequent re-enactments of the
statute.
We must defer to a Treasury Regulation so
long as it is reasonable.
The amended regulation modified the
general "incident to" test in the prior
regulation by providing that "[t]he services
of a full-time employee are not incident to
and for the purpose of pursuing a course of
study," and, more particularly, that an
employee who works forty hours per week
or more is considered "full-time." This
regulation "harmonizes" (does not conflict)
with the plain language of the statute.
Whether it is consistent with the student
exception's origin and purpose requires
closer scrutiny.
The student exception and other exceptions
to the statutory definition of "wages" and
"employment" were first enacted in the
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939.
At this time, the Social Security program
was in its infancy, and its coverage was less
universal. The 1939 amendments excepted
all federal, state, and local government
employees, which included all employees of
the University. In addition, services
performed by employees of tax-exempt
organizations were largely excluded,
including service "performed by a student
who is enrolled and is regularly attending
classes at a school, college, or university."
Services performed by students employed
by a non-tax-exempt school were also
excluded if the student was enrolled and
regularly attending classes at that school and
the remuneration in a calendar quarter "does
not exceed $45 (exclusive of room, board,
and tuition)." And Congress provided a
separate exclusion for student nurses and
medical interns employed by private
hospitals. The congressional committee
reports explained:
The intent of the amendment is to
exclude those persons and those
organizations in which the
employment is part-time or
intermittent and the total amount of
earnings is only nominal, and the
payment of the tax is inconsequential
and a nuisance. The benefit rights
built up are also inconsequential.
Many of those affected, such as
students and the secretaries of
lodges, will have other employment
which will enable them to develop
insurance benefits.
When Congress amended the Social
Security Act in 1950, it combined the
student exception for employees of tax-
exempt and non-exempt schools and
eliminated the $45 remuneration limit, but
severely limited the broad exception for
services by other employees of tax-exempt
organizations. The House Committee on
Ways and Means report explained: "The bill
would continue to exclude service
performed for nominal amounts in the
employ of tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations, service performed by student
nurses and internes, [sic] and service
performed by students in the employ of
colleges and universities." Given the explicit
legislative history that these FICA
exceptions were directed to part-time
workers, we conclude that the full-time
employee limitation in the amended
regulation is consistent with the origin and
purpose of the student exception....
Whether the regulation is a substantially
contemporaneous construction of the statute
or dates from a later period, the manner in
which it evolved, the consistency of the
Commissioner's interpretation, and the
degree of scrutiny Congress has devoted to
the issue are also complex factors in this
case. Mayo and the University argue that the
full-time employee provision is of recent
vintage, which is obviously true, and is
inconsistent with the Commissioner's "prior
longstanding interpretation" of the statute,
which requires close examination.
The provision limiting the student exception
to services that are "incident to and for the
purpose of pursuing a course of study" has
been in the regulations for more than fifty
years. We have found no reported rulings or
decisions applying the student exception or
this regulation to medical residents prior to
1978. There are likely a number of reasons
for this vacuum: (i) in 1939 and for some
years thereafter residents functioned more
like young doctors than students, (ii) all
public employees were excluded until 1950
and until 1991 States could elect to exclude
public employees, and (iii) at least some
medical schools claimed their payments to
residents were non-taxable scholarships. But
a series of events brought this student
exception issue to the fore:
- In 1964, the Sixth Circuit held that
medical residents did not fall within the
intern exception even though "distinctions
between interns and residents-in-training
have been substantially reduced in the years
since 1939." The student exception was not
at issue in St. Luke's, likely because the
employer was a private hospital, not a
medical school.
- The next year, Congress expanded
coverage of the Social Security program by
repealing the intern exception and the
exception for self-employed doctors. The
legislative history noted the plight of an
intern's young widow and children left
without Social Security benefits.
- In 1969, the Supreme Court ended the
practice of treating stipends to medical
residents as non-taxable "scholarships"
when it ruled "that bargained-for payments,
given only as a 'quo' in return for the quid
of services rendered," are not excludable
from income as "scholarships."
• In a 1978 ruling, the Commissioner of
Social Security cited St. Luke's and
observed, "[t]he Social Security
Administration has always held that resident
physicians are not students."
- In a 1985 ruling, the Commissioner
construed the language of the statute and its
legislative history as limiting the student
nurse exclusion to "substantially less than
full-time" employment for "nominal"
earnings. In Johnson City, the Sixth Circuit
majority upheld that Revenue Ruling; even
the dissent would have upheld the
"substantially less than full-time" limitation.
Mayo and the University argue that the
amended regulations reflect a change from
the "purely facts and circumstances
approach" of the prior regulation, to "bright-
line limitations upon eligibility." But they
cite no evidence that the Commissioner has
ever agreed that a medical resident working
forty hours a week or more and earning
upwards of $50,000 per year qualified for
the student exception. Rather, the historical
record reflects a consistent substantive
policy applying the generally worded
"incident to" regulation as not including
full-time student employees. Our decisions
in Apfel and Mayo I applied the prior
regulation in a contrary manner, and the
Commissioner responded with amended
regulations more specifically articulating the
underlying policy. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that agencies may validly
amend regulations to respond to adverse
judicial decisions, or for other reasons, so
long as the amended regulation is a
permissible interpretation of the statute. An
agency's substantial change of position is
relevant to reasonableness, but not
determinative.
Mayo and the University concede, as the
district court recognized, that the prior
regulation limiting the student exception to
services "incident to and for the purpose of
pursuing a course of study" is a permissible
interpretation of the statutory student
exception. In the notice of proposed
rulemaking, the IRS set forth a lengthy,
detailed, historically accurate explanation of
wh "IRS and Treasury believe that Congress
has shown the specific intent to provide
social security coverage to individuals who
work long hours, serve as highly skilled
professionals, and typically share some or
all of the terms of employment of career
employees, particularly medical residents
and interns." We conclude that this
interpretation of the student exception, while
not the only permissible interpretation, does
not conflict with the plain language of the
statute, and is consistent with the origin and
purpose of the student exception as initially
enacted and with Congress's frequent
expansion of Social Security coverage in the
last fifty years. We do not doubt-indeed we
applaud -the educational benefits of the
medical residency programs offered by
Mayo and by the University. We do not rule
that medical residents are not "students" or
are not "enrolled" or are not "regularly
attending classes" for other purposes. But
we conclude that the full-time employee
regulation is a permissible interpretation of
the statutory student exception and
therefore, in the tax periods in question, the
residents' compensation for health care and
patient services was subject to FICA taxes.
III.
The government also argues that the district
court erred in invalidating the amended
regulation providing that an organization, in
this case Mayo, is not a "school, college, or
university" within the meaning of 26 U.S.C.
§ 3121(b)(10) unless its "primary function"
is education. Although we are inclined to
believe that this provision is arbitrary and
unreasonable in this context, we need not
decide the issue because it is undisputed that
Mayo's medical residents did not fall within
the student exception during the tax year in
question because they worked more than
forty hours per week and were therefore
full-time employees. For the same reason,
we need not address the Government's
contention that the district court erred in
concluding as a matter of law that the
University's medical residents were
employed by the University, not by the
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independent hospitals where their services
were performed.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of
the district court are reversed, and the cases
are remanded for entry of judgments in
favor of the United States. Further
proceedings to determine the proper terms of
those judgments, if needed, are of course not
foreclosed.
"IRS Faceoff with Medical Residents
Set for High Court"
AOL News
June 1, 2010
Tamara Lytle
The Supreme Court announced today that it
will diagnose a medical mystery: whether
medical residents are students who don't
have to pay Social Security taxes, or regular
working stiffs like the rest of us.
About $700 million a year in Social Security
and Medicare taxes-not to mention the
bottom lines of some 100,000 medical
residents and the institutions they work
for-rides on the outcome.
Congress decided in 1939 that students
should be exempt from Social Security
taxes. But the IRS has argued in court for
years that medical residents who work 40
hours or more (as nearly all do) aren't
"students."
In 2005, after losing its case in several of the
nation's judicial circuits, the IRS passed a
regulation disqualifying medical residents
from the tax break. Now, by announcing it
will hear the case Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education and Research v. United
States in its next term, the high court will
decide if the IRS had the right to do that.
"These are students receiving a stipend
between $40,000 and $60,000 a year and
working 80 hours a week in a hospital
setting, in addition to attending classes,
writing research papers and doing outside
research," said Amir Tayrani of Gibson,
Dunn & Crutcher, and an attorney for the
Mayo Foundation and the University of
Minnesota, who have residency programs
and are fighting the tax.
Ivy Baer, regulatory counsel for the
Association of American Medical Colleges,
agreed that medical residents should be
treated as students. "It takes a lot of hours to
get someone from [being] a graduate of a
medical school to being able to practice
independently," she said. "They are still
being trained."
After graduating from medical school, most
would-be doctors spend three to five years
in residency and fellowship programs. Baer
said they cannot even get a medical license
without a residency.
But a brief filed on behalf of the government
by Solicitor General Elena Kagan (now a
Supreme Court nominee) argues that
residents working full time are not students.
Because the law giving students a tax break
was ambiguous in defining "student," the
IRS has the right to do so, she argued.
Kagan also argued that the point of the
Social Security and Medicare tax (called
FICA) is to collect "contributions during an
employee's entire working career in order to
fund benefits in retirement."
When Congress exempted students, it
intended only to do so for "employment that
generates nominal wages and exemption of
which will not result in significant loss of
Social Security and Medicare benefits,"
according to the brief. (The IRS referred
questions on the case to the Justice
Department, which refused to comment.)
The FICA tax is paid by both employer and
employee. Lawrence Hughes, assistant
general counsel for the American Hospital
Association, said if medical institutions
don't owe the tax, they could spend the
money on residency training and community
programs.
The brief filed by the Mayo and Minnesota
programs said all the residents' work is
designed to be educational. Hospitals, in
fact, could save money by not having
residents "because of the time and effort
required to supervise and teach them."
The two sides disagreed over whether the
Supreme Court needed to hear the case. The
government, which won the case at the
appeals level, said the 2005 IRS regulation
had cleared up the disagreements over the
issue and now all full-time residents are
subject to the tax. But Tayrani said the
Supreme Court needs to settle the issue.
Residency programs have won in four other
appeals courts and students in some regions
could be exempt from the tax while others
pay it, creating unfairness, he said.
The ruling would affect about 8,000
residency programs, along with the medical
residents. And $2.1 billion is pending in
refund claims from residents and their
employers.
"U.S. Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Case
on Taxing Medical Residents"
The Chronicle of Higher Education
June 1, 2010
Eric Kelderman
The U.S. Supreme Court announced on
Tuesday that it would take up a case
involving a longstanding dispute between
medical colleges, which argue their residents
are students, and the Internal Revenue
Service, which deems the residents as
employees.
What's at stake is as much as $700-million
that medical colleges pay annually in taxes
to the federal government on behalf of their
residents. If the residents are considered
employees, the institutions must pay half of
the amount of Social Security and Medicare
taxes for the residents. If they are considered
students, they and the institutions are
exempted from those levies, called FICA
taxes, after the federal law that authorizes
their collection.
"The issue is, really, Does the IRS have the
authority to say categorically that residents
are not students?" said Ivy Baer, a lawyer
for the Association of American Medical
Colleges.
The case that the Supreme Court will
consider, Mayo Foundation et al. v. United
States, No. 09-837, involves the Mayo
Clinic, in Rochester, Minn., and the
University of Minnesota, which won a
federal district-court ruling in 2008. In that
opinion, the judge found that rules issued by
the U.S. Treasury Department in 2005,
excluding full-time medical residents from
the student exception, were invalid because
they were contrary to the law that created
the Social Security system.
A three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit overturned
that decision in 2009, saying the exception
for students was meant only for those who
worked part time while attending classes,
but not medical residents, who are basically
full-time employees of the teaching
hospitals.
Four other federal appeals courts, in the
Second, Sixth, Seventh and l1th Circuits,
have ruled to the contrary, saying that the
IRS must consider the situation at each
institution rather than automatically
applying the rule to exclude all medical
residents from the student exception.
Because there is only a month left in the
Supreme Court's current term, the case is
likely to be argued before the justices in the
fall....
"Court Sides with IRS on Medical
Residents' Payroll Taxes"
The Wall Street Journal
June 12, 2009
Judith Bums
Medical residents may be considered as full-
time employees whose pay is subject to
Social Security taxes, a federal appeals court
ruled Friday.
The Eighth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
reversed two district court opinions that had
concluded the U.S. erred in collecting Social
Security taxes from medical residents at
University of Minnesota and the Mayo
Foundation for Medical Education and
Research. The three-judge appellate court
panel said [in Foundation v. United States
that] the U.S. Treasury Department has
latitude to interpret the Internal Revenue
Code and made a "permissible
interpretation" that medical residents are
full-time employees subject to payroll taxes.
"We're obviously disappointed with the
ruling," said Karl Oestreich, a spokesman
for the Mayo Clinic, in Rochester, Minn.
William Donohue, University of
Minnesota's deputy general counsel, said the
university is weighing whether to appeal the
ruling to the full Eighth Circuit, which
covers seven states stretching from North
Dakota to Arkansas, or take the matter to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
"Our basic sense is that residents are
students," Mr. Donohue said.
IRS spokesman Bruce Friedland declined to
comment.
While most employees and employers are
required to pay taxes on wages to support
the Social Security system, Congress has
long excluded students whose work is linked
to their studies. Questions about whether
medical residents qualify for the student
exemption have exploded in the past decade,
triggering a lengthy, multimillion-dollar
tussle between medical schools and the
Internal Revenue Service.
The IRS sought to clarify matters with a
2005 regulation specifying that anyone who
works at least 40 hours a week is a full-time
employee subject to Social Security taxes,
even if their work has educational or
training aspects. The change was aimed
squarely at residents--doctors with medical
degrees who put in brutally long hours for
years, typically earning $30,000 to $60,000.
In cases that pre-date the 2005 regulation,
federal appeals courts in Florida, Illinois,
Michigan and New York sided with medical
schools rather than the IRS, declaring the
student exemption to be unambiguous.
The Eighth Circuit, which had sided with
medical schools and teaching hospitals in
cases before 2005, did a turnabout in its
latest ruling, finding U.S. tax law "is silent
or ambiguous" on whether a medical
resident who works full-time at a university
hospital is a student or an employee, giving
the IRS leeway to adopt reasonable
guidelines.
The court found the 2005 regulation "does
not conflict with the plain language of the
statute, and is consistent with the origin and
purpose of the student exemption as initially
enacted and with Congress's frequent
expansion of Social Security coverage in the
last fifty years."
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Although the court declined to weigh in on
whether residents are students, it said the
IRS can deem them to be full-time
employees subject to Social Security taxes.
The University of Minnesota has been
paying its portion of payroll taxes on wages
paid to medical residents since 2005 and has
been withholding the residents' portion,
according to Donohue. He said the school
has about 800 medical residents and that the
taxes in question amount to about $5 million
annually.
"IRS Rule Could Threaten Residents'
Tax Status"
Psychiatric News
April 2, 2004
Eve Bender
Are medical residents students or
employees? This is the hotly contested
question on which the tax-paying fates of
thousands of medical residents will
ultimately turn.
If adopted, a regulation proposed in late
February by the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) could limit the number of medical
residents who are exempt from paying taxes
under the Federal Insurance Contributions
Act (FICA).
The new proposal provides guidance on the
definition of schools, colleges, and
universities (SCU) and whether medical
residents fall under the category of student
or employee in the FICA law.
Under FICA, enacted by Congress in 1939,
employers collect taxes by deducting 7.65
percent of employee wages and paying an
equal share of taxes to the IRS to support
Social Security and Medicare.
Under the IRS code, all wage earners must
pay FICA taxes.
However, section 3121 (b)(1) of the code
states that "employment" excludes services
performed in the employ of an SCU or an
organization that it operates, if the services
are performed by a student who is enrolled
in classes at the SCU.
For residents, the benefits of being exempt
from having to pay taxes under FICA
include having more disposable income
during a time when salaries are typically
low-a resident earning $40,000 per year,
for example, would pay $3,060 in FICA
taxes.
However, being exempt from FICA taxes
may also present problems for residents.
To qualify for benefits under Social
Security, a person must accumulate a certain
number of credits. Being exempt from FICA
taxes during residency training reduces the
number of credits a physician has accrued
and could prevent him or her from
qualifying for disability benefits in the early
years of practice.
State Wants Money Back
Under FICA, students were clearly exempt
from paying FICA taxes, but another group
fell into a gray area-resident physicians
working in hospitals. Were they students or
employees?
According to the IRS, they are employees
who must pay the taxes. Many in the
medical field disagreed.
In 1998 the state of Minnesota petitioned the
8th Circuit Court of Appeals for a refund of
taxes paid under FICA because, the state
maintained, residents were students and
therefore should not have to pay the taxes.
In the case, Minnesota v. Apfel, the court
ruled that resident physicians at the
University of Minnesota qualified for the
student exemption. The court said that "the
primary purpose for a resident's
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participation in the program is to pursue
a course of study rather than earn a
livelihood.. .
Claims Filed
Following the decision, a number of
teaching hospitals filed claims for tax
refunds. According to data published in
several news reports, 228 organizations
requested more than $162 million in FICA
refunds by 2000, which prompted the IRS to
publish two General Counsel Memoranda in
2000 and 2001.
In the November 2001 memorandum, the
IRS said that hospitals, whether affiliated
with a teaching school or not, do not meet
the qualifications of an SCU. It stated, "The
authorities have concluded that an affiliation
agreement with a medical school does not
mean a teaching hospital itself must qualify
as a school" and "a teaching hospital's
graduate medical education program is
generally incidental to, and intended to
further, the hospital's primary purpose,
namely, patient care."
Despite the IRS memoranda, a federal
district court in Minnesota ruled in August
2003 that residents did not have to pay the
FICA taxes. The case was United States v.
Mayo Foundation for Medical Education
and Research.
The Mayo Foundation is a nonprofit
organization based in Rochester, Minn., that
provides graduate medical education
programs for residents and fellows through
its hospitals and clinics.
In this case, the IRS contended that
residents' employers were the hospitals and
clinics in which the residents delivered
health care services, but the judge asserted
that the residents' employer was the Mayo
Foundation, "a nonprofit institution having
as its charitable purposes medical education
and scientific research," and that the
foundation "spends more on medical
education and research than it receives from
patient care."
The IRS sought to settle the issue by
publishing proposed guidelines in the
February 25 Federal Register.
The proposed regulations first attempt to
clarify whether hospitals qualify as SCUs.
According to the guidelines, despite the fact
that hospitals may conduct educational
activities, the primary function of a hospital
is the care of patients, and "defining the
term SCU to include institutions whose
primary function is other than to carry on
educational activities could lead to
expansion of the student FICA exception
beyond what Congress intended," the
guidelines state.
The regulations also set forth a number of
standards to determine whether a resident is
considered a student or an employee under
FICA.
A resident would be considered a student if
he or she is enrolled and regularly attending
classes that follow the curriculum designed
by a faculty member and is pursuing a
course of study required to receive a degree.
In contrast, the IRS would consider a
resident an employee if he or she regularly
works more than 40 hours a week, is eligible
to participate in retirement-benefit programs
offered by the employer, and must be
licensed in order to perform work duties.
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"IRS Gives in on Medical Residents"
Inside Higher Ed
March 5, 2010
Doug Lederman
After seeing its position repeatedly rejected
by federal courts, the Internal Revenue
Service this week conceded (partially) that it
has been wrong about whether the annual
stipends that teaching hospitals and
universities pay to medical residents are
subject to payroll taxes.
The tax agency has lost a steady stream of
court cases in which it argued that doctors in
training do not qualify under the "student
exception" to the Federal Insurance
Contributions Act that says that Social
Security and Medicare taxes "do not apply
to service performed by students employed
by a school, college, or university where the
student is pursuing a course of study." The
IRS maintained that medical residents,
during their post-medical school period of
training, are employees.
Universities and medical schools have
submitted claims believed to be in the
hundreds of millions of dollars in the last 10
to 15 years, some of which were contested
in court and some of which were settled. In
2005, in the face of those court losses, the
IRS published new regulations that codified
its stance that residents are not students.
A round of lawsuits challenging those 2005
rules have developed, and last year a federal
appeals court sided with the IRS in one of
those cases, [United States v. Mayo
Foundation for Medical Education and
Research,] involving the University of
Minnesota and the Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education and Research. The
Minnesota institutions have asked the U.S.
Supreme Court to hear their appeal, and a
coalition of college and medical groups has
filed a friend of the court brief urging the
high court to take the case.
The IRS is standing firmly behind the 2005
rules. But perhaps reading the writing on the
wall (or, more accurately, in the appeals
court briefs), the agency said this week that
it had "made an administrative
determination to accept the position that
medical residents are excepted from FICA
taxes based on the student exception for tax
periods ending before April 1, 2005," when
the new regulations took effect.
The agency's news release said that its
officials would "begin contacting hospitals,
universities and medical residents who filed
FICA (social security and Medicare tax)
refund claims for these periods with more
information and procedures" about how to
get their refunds.
Ivy S. Baer, director & regulatory counsel at
the Association of American Medical
Colleges, said it was unclear how many
universities and teaching hospitals (or
individual medical residents) still had
outstanding claims from before the 2005
rules took effect, and how much money was
at stake. But she said she had heard from a
few institutions that "anticipated getting
multiple millions of dollars."
The IRS's concession does not affect its
stance in the Minnesota case or other cases
based on the post-2005 rules, Baer said.
"Still, we're happy they did" make that
change, she said.
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Staub v. Proctor Hospital
09-400
Ruling Below: Staub v. Proctor Hospital, 560 F. 3d 647 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, Staub v.
Proctor Hospital, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 3333 (2010).
The employee, a member of the Army reserve, was fired from his position as an angiography
technologist. He argued that the discharge was in violation of Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA) because the reasons given-insubordination,
shirking, and attitude problems-were just a pretext for discrimination based on his association
with the military. The employee invoked the "cat's paw" theory of liability, claiming that the
decisionmaker based the termination decision on false information from another supervisor who
was biased against the employee's military status. A jury sided with the employee, and the
district court denied the employer's motion for judgment as a matter of law. On appeal, the
employer argued that the court gave a faulty instruction regarding the "cat's paw" theory and
improperly admitted evidence of animus by non-decisionmakers. The court agreed with the
employer and found that there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict under the cat's paw
theory. A reasonable jury could not have found that the decisionmaker was singularly influenced
by anyone. Instead, the evidence supported that the decisionmaker made an independent decision
that the employee was a liability to the company.
Question Presented: In what circumstances may an employer be held liable based on the
unlawful intent of officials who caused or influenced but did not make the ultimate employment
decision?
Vincent E. STAUB, Plaintiff-Appellee,
V.
PROCTOR HOSPITAL, an Illinois corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Decided March 25, 2009
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
EVANS, Circuit Judge:
One would guess that the chances are pretty
slim that the work of a 17th century French
poet would find its way into a Chicago
courtroom in 2009. But that's the situation
in this case as we try to make sense out of
what has been dubbed the "cat's paw"
theory. The term derives from the fable "The
Monkey and the Cat" penned by Jean de La
Fontaine. In the tale, a clever-and rather
unscrupulous-monkey persuades an
unsuspecting feline to snatch chestnuts from
a fire. The cat bums her paw in the process
while the monkey profits, gulping down the
chestnuts one by one. As understood today,
a cat's paw is a "tool" or "one used by
another to accomplish his purposes." More
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on this a little later.
Vincent Staub sued the Proctor Hospital of
Peoria, Illinois, under the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment
Rights Act (USERRA) after he was
discharged from his position as an
angiography technologist. An Army
reservist, Staub alleged that the reasons
given-insubordination, shirking, and
attitude problems-were just a pretext for
discrimination based on his association with
the military. A jury sided with Staub, and
the district court denied Proctor's renewed
motion for judgment as a matter of law or
for a new trial. On appeal, Proctor argues
that the court gave a faulty instruction
regarding the "cat's paw" theory and, in
connection with that error, improperly
admitted evidence of animus by
nondecisionmakers. The cat's paw theory,
which we will discuss later in more detail, is
a way of proving discrimination when the
decisionmaker herself is admittedly
unbiased; under the theory, the
discriminatory animus of a
nondecisionmaker is imputed to the
decisionmaker where the former has
singular influence over the latter and uses
that influence to cause the adverse
employment action. In addition to attacking
the way the district court handled this
theory, Proctor says the evidence was
insufficient to support a verdict under it.
Staub contests these arguments head-on, but
he also says the premise is flawed. We need
not analyze this as a cat's paw case, Staub
claims, because there was evidence that
there were two decisionmakers, one of
whom was clearly prejudiced. We start with
the facts viewed in the light most favorable
to the verdict.
Staub was a veteran member of the United
States Army Reserve. Like all reservists, he
was a part-time soldier, spending the bulk of
his hours in the civilian world. For Staub,
that meant employment as an angio tech for
Proctor. Balancing work and military duties
can be a complicated task, but Staub
apparently managed. For a while, at least. In
late 2000, some 10 years after he was hired,
things began to grow a little tense.
[Staub worked with a person named Janice
Mulally who quickly grew to dislike Staub.
Mulally then allegedly began creating
scheduling conflicts between Staub's shifts
at the hospital and his military obligations.
Mulally also allegedly began spreading false
and damaging information about Staub's
character to Linda Buck, who was the vice-
president of Human Resources and the
ultimate decisionmaker with regard to
employment in this department of the
hospital.]
.. . Like other employment discrimination
legislation, USERRA prohibits adverse
action based on a prohibited criterion, in this
case military status. But also as with other
discrimination legislation, a plaintiff suing
under USERRA does not win by showing
prohibited animus by just anyone. He must
show that the decisionmaker harbored
animus and relied on that animus in
choosing to take action. Since Buck was the
decisionmaker and there was no evidence
she had a problem with Staub on account of
his membership in the Reserves, Staub was
out of luck under the traditional rubric. But
that doesn't mean he had no case at all.
Deploying the cat's paw theory, Staub
sought to attribute [coworker] Mulally's
animus to Buck, and therefore to Proctor. He
posited that Mulally fed false information to
Buck (i.e., that he dodged work on January
26, 2004); that Mulally was motivated to do
this because he was a member of the Army
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Reserves; and that Buck relied on this false
information (without vetting it any
meaningful way) in deciding to fire him.
The case made it to trial on this theory,
where the jury apparently found it
convincing, returning a verdict in Staub's
favor. Pursuant to the parties' stipulation,
Staub was awarded $57,640 in damages.
The court then denied Proctor's renewed
motion for a new trial or judgment as a
matter of law.
Proctor argues on appeal that the district
court mishandled the cat's paw theory (both
in terms of instructing the jury and admitting
certain evidence), and also that the evidence
was insufficient ...
In Brewer v. Board of Trustees of University
of Illinois, 479 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2007), we
applied the cat's paw concept to
discrimination law. That case dealt with the
"Machiavellian world of permit parking at
the University of Illinois's Urbana-
Champaign campus, and the ill fortune of a
student who became involved in it." The
student, Lonnell Brewer, was fired from his
part-time job after he was caught with a
modified parking tag. Brewer said his
supervisor (Kerrin Thompson) gave him
permission to modify the tag, and she kept
this fact a secret because he was black and
she wanted him fired. The evidence of
animus on the part of Thompson was
significant, to say the least. Just before
Brewer got the boot, Thompson yelled, "I
have had it with you nigger, get my tag!"
Thompson, however, did not make the
decision to terminate. The decision instead
came from someone higher up the chain of
command-Denise Hendricks-and there
was no evidence that she harbored any racial
animus. Under the normal discrimination
framework, that would have been the end of
the road for Brewer's case. But we held that
his claim could survive if he showed
Thompson used Hendricks as her cat's paw.
We said,
where an employee without formal
authority to materially alter the terms
and conditions of a plaintiff's
employment nonetheless uses her
"singular influence" over an
employee who does have such power
to harm the plaintiff for racial
reasons, the actions of the employee
without formal authority are imputed
to the employer and the employer is
in violation of Title VII.
And we noted that this influence may be
exercised by, among other things,
''supplying misinformation or failing to
provide relevant information to the person
making the employment decision."
So Brewer's case looked strong under this
formula-there was evidence that
Thompson was racist, and that she
influenced Hendricks's decision by
withholding the fact that she told Brewer he
could park where he liked. But, alas, we
held against Brewer. It wasn't fair to impute
Thompson's animus to Hendricks, we
concluded, because Hendricks looked into
the situation for herself; though she "listened
to the information Thompson relayed to
her," she "did not simply rely on it." From
this we derived a simple rule to prevent the
cat's paw theory from spiraling out of
control:
[W]here a decision maker is not
wholly dependent on a single source
of information, but instead conducts
its own investigation into the facts
relevant to the decision, the
employer is not liable for an
employee's submission of
misinformation to the decision
maker.
By asking whether the decisionmaker
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conducted her own investigation and
analysis, we respected the role of the
decisionmaker. We were, and remain to this
day, unprepared to fird an employer liable
based on a nondecisionmaker's animus
unless the "decisionmaker" herself held that
title only nominally. If the decisionmaker
wasn't used as a cat's paw-if she didn't
just take the monkey's word for it, as it
were-then of course the theory is not in
play.
We affirmed this principle in Metzger v.
Illinois State Police, 519 F.3d 677 (7th Cir.
2008). Though we acknowledged the cat's
paw as a viable theory in certain cases, we
held that it was wholly inappropriate in
Metzger's situation because there was
neither evidence of singular influence nor
proof that the decisionmaker's review was
"anything but independent. .. "
Measured against this precedent, we find
that there was insufficient evidence to
support a verdict against Proctor under the
cat's paw theory. But before we explain
why, it is necessary to comment on the way
the trial court handled the matter. We do not
fault the court much for its approach-the
judge certainly did an admirable job given
the dearth of case law-but we agree with
Proctor that the division of labor between
jury and court, if not the jury instruction
itself, was legally defective.
Just before the case went to trial, Proctor
filed motions in limine seeking to exclude
evidence of military animus on the part of
individuals, principally Mulally, not
involved in the decision to terminate. The
court denied the motions, however,
reasoning that the evidence was essential to
the cat's paw theory. But the court agreed
that animus by a nondecisionmaker is only
relevant if she exercised singular influence
over the decisionmaker, and it instructed the
jury to that effect. The instruction read as
follows:
The Defendant is a corporation and
can act only through its officers and
employees. Animosity of a co-
worker toward the Plaintiff on the
basis of Plaintiffs military status as
a motivating factor may not be
attributed to Defendant unless that
co-worker exercised such singular
influence over the decision-maker
that the co-worker was basically the
real decision maker. This influence
may have been exercised by
concealing relevant information from
or feeding false information or
selectively-chosen information to the
person or persons who made the
decision to discharge Plaintiff.
If the decision maker is not wholly
dependent on a single source of
information but instead conducts its
own investigation into the facts
relevant to the decision, the
Defendant is not liable for a non-
decision maker's submission of
misinformation or selectively chosen
information or failure to provide
relevant information to the decision
maker. It does not matter that much
if the information has come from a
single, potentially biased source, so
long as the decision maker does not
artificially or by virtue of her role in
the company limit her investigation
to information from that source.
This instruction, we think, is unwieldy-a
fact-driven instruction would have been far
more useful-but not technically wrong. It
captures the essence of Brewer, telling the
jury that it can only consider
nondecisionmaker animosity in the case of
singular influence, and even then that the
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employer is off the hook if the
decisionmaker did her own investigation. So
we reject Proctor's challenge to the
instruction itself. But a court faced with the
cat's paw theory case should not just give an
instruction and ask the jury to sort it all out.
The court has a critical task to perform
before giving the instruction or admitting
evidence of nondecisionmaker animus-
preferably at the summary judgment or in
limine stage of the proceedings. Namely, the
court should determine whether a reasonable
jury could find singular influence on the
evidence to be presented. If there is not
sufficient evidence to support such a
determination, then the court has no
business admitting evidence of animus by
nondecisionmakers. Admitting this sort of
evidence would not only be technical legal
error; it would likely be prejudicial due to
the jury's tendency to associate the
nondecisionmaker's remarks with the
employer, fairly or not.
As we say, however, we do not fault the
court here for failing to perform this task.
Nothing in Brewer, Metzger, or our other
cases on the cat's paw, impart guidance as to
how a trial court should handle the theory.
They say what the cat's paw requires, but
nothing about the division of labor between
judge and jury. Nevertheless, the approach
we suggest-with the judge making a
threshold determination of whether a
reasonable jury could find singular influence
before admitting evidence of
nondecisionmaker animus-is supported in
the law. Allowing the jury to entertain the
cat's paw theory and decide whether there
was singular influence, but only upon a prior
determination that there is sufficient
evidence for such a finding, is consistent
with Federal Rule of Evidence 104(b). That
rule instructs courts to admit conditionally
relevant evidence-here, animosity by a
nondecisionmaker--"upon . . . the
introduction of evidence sufficient to
support a finding of the fulfillment of the
condition." In other words, the jury could
only properly consider evidence of
animosity by Mulally (or any other
nondecisionmaker) if the court determined
that there was sufficient evidence to support
a finding of singular influence by Mulally
(or another) over Buck.
Because the trial court in this case did not
follow this procedure, Staub's abundant
evidence of Mulally's animosity was
erroneously admitted into evidence. And this
error was prejudicial because the strongest
proof of anti-military sentiment came from
the improperly admitted evidence.
The normal remedy for prejudicial
evidentiary error is a new trial. However, a
new trial is not warranted where the
properly considered evidence is insufficient
to support the jury's verdict. In that case-
assuming the losing party filed a Rule 50(b)
motion for judgment as a matter of law or a
new trial after the verdict, as Proctor did-
judgment should be entered in its favor. Of
course, the standard is steep. "A verdict will
be set aside as contrary to the manifest
weight of the evidence only if no rational
jury could have rendered the verdict."
Moore v. Tuleja, 546 F.3d 423, 427 (7th Cir.
2008). Considering the evidence as a whole,
we conclude that Proctor is entitled to
judgment.
USERRA states that "[a] person who ... has
performed... service in a uniformed service
shall not be denied initial employment,
reemployment, retention in employment,
promotion, or any benefit of employment by
an employer on the basis of that
performance of service. ." A plaintiff
suing under this Act must "demonstrate that
he suffered an adverse employment action
and that the adverse action was motivated in
part by his military service." Maher v. City
of Chicago, 547 F.3d 817, 824 (7th Cir.
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2008). Staub failed to clear this bar.
The story told by the evidence is really quite
plain. Apart from the friction caused by his
military service, the evidence suggests that
Staub, although technically competent, was
prone to attitude problems. The fact that he
made some friends along the way
doesn't diminish the fact that he offended
numerous others for reasons unrelated to his
participation in the Reserves. So, when
Staub ran into trouble in the winter and
spring of 2004, he didn't have the safety net
of a good reputation. Even if Staub behaved
reasonably on the day of his discharge and
the January 27 write-up was exaggerated by
Mulally, his track record nonetheless
supported Buck's action. Most importantly,
Buck took this action free of any military-
based animus, which Staub admits. And the
cat's paw is not applicable-even setting
aside the evidentiary error-because a
reasonable jury could not find that Mulally
(or anyone else) had singular influence over
Buck. . . . We admit that Buck's
investigation could have been more robust,
e.g., she failed to pursue Staub's theory that
Mulally fabricated the write-up; had Buck
done this, she may have discovered that
Mulally indeed bore a great deal of anti-
military animus. But the rule we developed
in Brewer does not require the
decisionmaker to be a paragon of
independence. It is enough that the
decisionmaker "is not wholly dependent on
a single source of information" and conducts
her "own investigation into the facts relevant
to the decision." To require much more than
that would be to ignore the realities of the
workplace. Decisionmakers usually have to
rely on others' opinions to some extent
because they are removed from the
underlying situation. But to be a cat's paw
requires more; true to the fable, it requires a
blind reliance, the stuff of "singular
influence." Buck was not a cat's paw for
Mulally or anyone else. Although Mulally
may have enjoyed seeing Staub fired due to
his association with the military, this was
not the reason he was fired. Viewing the
evidence reasonably, it simply cannot be
said that Buck did anything other than
exercise her independent judgment,
following a reasonable review of the facts,
and simply decide that Staub was not a team
player. We do not mean to suggest by all
this that we agree with Buck's decision-it
seems a bit harsh given Staub's upsides and
tenure-but that is not the issue. The
question for us is whether a reasonable jury
could have concluded that Staub was fired
because he was a member of the military. To
that question, the answer is no.
We REVERSE and REMAND with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of
Proctor.
210
"Supreme Court to Review Proctor Hospital's
Firing of Army Reservist"
Peoria Journal Star
April 19, 2010
Andy Kravetz
The U.S. Supreme Court will decide
whether a former Proctor Hospital employee
was fired because of his military service and
in the process, resolve a long-standing legal
issue which has the nation's appellate courts
divided.
The high court announced Monday it would
hear the case of Vincent Staub, who worked
as an angiography technologist at Proctor
and who was in the U.S. Army Reserves in
2004 when he was fired from his job of 15
years.
Staub maintained his termination was a
result of his immediate supervisor's
disliking his obligations to the Army-he
was a member of the 801st Combat Support
Hospital-and the burden that those duties
placed upon the hospital.
Staub said the reasons given for his
dismissal, insubordination and not doing his
job, were a smokescreen for the real reason;
his boss didn't like him being gone for
months in 2003 when he was deployed to
help soldiers headed to Iraq.
Staub sued under the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act, which prohibits using a position in the
National Guard or the Reserves as a basis
for termination or disciplinary action.
Proctor contended at the 2008 trial that his
position with the Army had nothing to do
with his termination. But a federal jury here
disagreed and found Staub's status as
reservist was a "motivating factor in
(Proctor's) decision to terminate him in
2004," and awarded him $57,640, the
amount he lost in back wages.
That was thrown out last March by the 7th
Circuit Court of Appeals in Chicago. That
court found Staub didn't prove the person
who actually dismissed him had bias. It was
his immediate supervisor, not the one who
made the final decision, who had bias. There
was no evidence the other person had
anything against Staub.
The nation's appellate courts are divided on
the issue, said one of Staub's attorneys, Eric
Schnapper, a law professor at the University
of Washington School of Law.
"The circuit split has existed for about a
decade. The court had granted review of this
same issue but that case dropped out.
Another time, a similar issue was going to
be reviewed but then it settled," he said from
his office in. Seattle. "I guess they were
waiting for the right case to come along to
settle the matter."
The Supreme Court only grants review to
about five percent of the cases that appeal a
lower court's ruling, so that Staub's case
was heard at all is a feat in and of itself.
Proctor issued a written statement Monday
that said officials would not comment on the
details of Staub's employment or his
dismissal because of his position as a former
employee. However, officials maintain their
actions were appropriate.
"We are confident our employment decision
was appropriate and unrelated to Mr.
Staub's service in the Army Reserve. Mr.
Staub was terminated by an unbiased
decision-maker, following hospital policies,
and after an independent investigation
showed no evidence of any bias based on
Staub's military service," said Steve Wilson,
a hospital spokesman in the written
statement.
Briefs will likely be filed by the end of the
summer with oral arguments late in the fall.
A decision, Schnapper said, could be a year
away.
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"Circuit Split over Cat's Paw Theory
Seeks Supreme Court Attention"
Law.corn
November 30, 2009
Tresa Baldas
Employment lawyers are hoping the U.S.
Supreme Court will resolve a conflict in the
federal circuits over the so-called cat's paw
theory. That says an employer is liable for
discrimination when a final decision-maker
is influenced by a lower-level employee
with discriminatory motives to take an
adverse action against another worker.
On Nov. 9, the Supreme Court asked the
solicitor general for the government's views
on the case of Staub v. Proctor Hospital,
which raises the cat's paw theory. The Court
is considering whether to hear the case.
Vincent Staub, a member of the Army
Reserve, alleges that he was fired from his
hospital technician job in Illinois because of
the influence of a supervisor who was anti-
military. Staub claims that the nonbiased,
ultimate decision-maker was influenced by
the supervisor. A jury awarded him $57,640,
but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th
Circuit reversed the verdict in March.
The federal circuit courts remain split on the
concept of holding an employer liable for
unlawful discrimination by someone other
than the primary decision-maker. The 1 st,
3d, 5th and 9th circuits have all upheld a
cat's paw claim where the terminated
employee could prove that a biased worker
actually influenced the final decision. At the
other end of the spectrum, the 4th Circuit
has held that if the final decision-maker's
motive is pure, an employer cannot be held
liable for a subordinate's alleged bias. And
the 10th Circuit requires evidence that the
biased subordinate caused the firing or
demotion through his discriminatory
recommendations, reports or actions.
"There is a clear split among the circuits...
and, ultimately, that's what the Supreme
Court is there for. It really shouldn't be that
you have a different application of federal
law because you're in Ohio or you're in
California," said Robert Niccolini, a partner
in the Washington office of Ogletree,
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, who has
successfully defended several cat's paw
cases on behalf of employers.
For employers' sake, Niccolini hopes that
the Supreme Court rules against Staub. "If
the final decision-maker does have a clear
motive, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
motivation or reason for a decision, then that
really should be the end of the analysis as a
matter of law," Niccolini said.
But if that were the rule, federal
discrimination laws "would be a dead letter
for most employers," countered Eric
Schnapper, a professor at the University of
Washington School of Law who is
representing Staub and filed the writ of
certiorari at the Supreme Court. He said that
at most companies, several individuals are
involved in making employment decisions
and, too often, the biased opinions and
inaccurate information of some are passed
along to the final decision-maker.
Employers, he stressed, should not be
shielded from liability when someone within
the company commits a wrongdoing against
another. That, Schnapper said, is what's
going on within the 4th and 7th circuits.
"The problem is that employers within these
circuits simply aren't liable for
discrimination because they're not being
held legally responsible for the people that
work for them," he said.
Hopefully, that will change, said Schnapper,
who has three times petitioned the Supreme
Court to take up the cat's paw theory. "The
Court is clearly going to take this at some
time," he said. "There's a split in the
circuits, and the issue comes up a lot."
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"The High Court Asks for SG Views
on 'Cat's Paw' Theory"
Law360
November 9, 2009
Jacqueline Bell
The U.S. Supreme Court has asked the
solicitor general to weigh in on a case that
examines the "cat's paw" theory of
employment law, looking at whether an
employer can be held liable for unlawful
discrimination by an official other than the
primary decision maker.
On Monday, the Supreme Court invited the
solicitor general to file a brief expressing the
views of the U.S. in a case that examines a
claim made by Army Reservist Vincent
Staub against Proctor Hospital in Peoria, Ill.,
under the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act, arguing that
he was improperly discriminated against and
ultimately fired from his position as an
angiography technologist because of his
association with the U.S. military.
The "cat's paw" term stems from a fable
written by a 17th-century French poet
named Jean de La Fontaine, in which a
monkey convinces a cat to steal chestnuts
from a fire. The cat bums her paw in the
attempt, but the monkey ultimately enjoys
the fruits of her labors by gobbling up the
chestnuts. In employment law, a "cat's paw"
is generally understood to be a tool used by
a party to accomplish a purpose.
In the Staub case, the dispute centers on
whether the vice president of human
relations at Proctor Hospital, who made the
ultimate decision to fire Staub, was merely
the "cat's paw" of Staub's direct
supervisors, who had openly expressed an
anti-military sentiment, and publicly sought
to remove Staub from his position.
The district court admitted evidence on that
theory, and a jury found in favor of Staub.
But in a March ruling by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the appeals
circuit ruled that in spite of open statements
Staub's direct supervisors made about their
disdain for his military duties, there was no
evidence the human resources official at the
hospital who ultimately made the decision
had anti-military sentiment.
Staub did claim that some of the evidence
the human resources official used to make
her decision was fabricated by his
supervisors, but the Seventh Circuit said a
plaintiff is required to show that the decision
maker herself harbored anti-military
sentiments, and relied on those feelings
when choosing to take action.
The Seventh Circuit's rule in these types of
cases, the court said, does not require the
decision maker to be a "paragon of
independence."
"Decision makers usually have to rely on
others' opinions to some extent because they
are removed from the underlying situation.
But to be a cat's paw requires more; true to
the fable, it requires a blind reliance, the
stuff of 'singular influence,"' the Seventh
Circuit said, reversing the lower court's
ruling and remanding the case with
instructions to enter judgment in favor of
Proctor Hospital.
In a petition to the Supreme Court, Staub
asked the court to examine the question of
when an employer may be held liable for the
unlawful motives and actions of an official
215
other than the formal decision maker, and
argues that the case presents a good vehicle
for resolving this long-standing question that
has split the appeals courts.
Eric Schnapper, law professor at the
University of Washington School of Law
and Staub's attorney, said that while it's
impossible to know just what's in the court
mind when it looks for a viewpoint from the
solicitor general, the high court is likely
looking for a view on whether this is the
right case.
"This has been one of those cases the court
was going to take sooner or later,"
Schnapper said. "I would guess they just
want to make sure that this is a good vehicle
for deciding the case."
The case is Staub v. Proctor Hospital, case
number 09-400, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
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"Avoiding Cat's Paw Liability: Limiting the Impact
of Alleged Bias by a Subordinate Employee--
Especially in a RIF"
New York Law Journal
May 26, 2009
Caroline J. Honorowski & David E. Schwartz
In the current economic environment,
employers are continuing to reduce staff at
unprecedented levels. In the selection of
specific employees to terminate in a
reduction in force (RIF), cat's paw liability
is an emerging issue that employers should
consider. "Cat's paw," the name coined for
the theory by Seventh Circuit Judge Richard
A. Posner ... traditionally refers to a fable
"in which a monkey convinces an unwitting
cat to pull chestnuts from a hot fire," or, as
more recently defined, "one used by another
to accomplish his purposes."
In the employment law context, the phrase
applies to situations where an employer
terminates an employee based on input from
another employee who is subordinate to the
ultimate decisionmaker, even if not
subordinate to the person being terminated.
For this reason, the doctrine is also known
as the subordinate bias or rubber-stamp
theory.
Acknowledged by the U.S. Supreme Court
in 1998, the principles underlying the cat's
paw theory have been generally recognized
by every circuit court but there is no uniform
standard for its application .... As such, the
cat's paw tests continue to diverge, falling
into three general camps.
This article will first discuss the ongoing
split among circuit courts, looking at the
three general approaches and focusing on
the Second Circuit's approach. Next, the
article will address the role independent
investigations play in minimizing employer
liability. Last, the article will offer practical
suggestions for employers planning RIFs.
The 'Split'
The cat's paw theory addresses the "ultimate
question," whether an employee suffered
from intentional discrimination, and
attempts to limit the ability of employers to
"hid[e] behind the blind approvals, albeit
non-biased, of formal decisionmakers." The
theory has been generally accepted as a
complement to the agency principles of Title
VII and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, which define an
"employer" to include "any agent of such a
person." As outlined by the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in BCI Coca-
Cola, the circuit courts follow three general
approaches when examining cat's paw
liability.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, relying heavily on an agency
analysis, has the strictest test, requiring a
biased subordinate to be the decisionmaker's
functional alter ego in order to impose
liability. Under its analysis, an employer
may be liable under a cat's paw theory only
if the subordinate was "the actual
decisionmaker or the one principally
responsible for the contested employment
decision" and "otherwise falls within the
parameters of the discrimination statute's
definition of an employer or agent of the
employer." Thus in Hill, the Fourth Circuit
found that the discriminatory bias of a safety
inspector-who initiated two of three
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reprimands and contributed to the decision
to terminate the plaintiffs employment-
could not be imputed to his employer as he
was neither an actual decisionmaker nor
principally responsible for the employee's
termination.
In BCI Coca-Cola, the Tenth Circuit
criticized the Fourth Circuit's "peculiar
focus" on the identity of the decisionmaker,
finding it undermined the deterrent effect of
the cat's paw theory and did not properly
analyze agency principles. Instead, it found
the agency concept encompassed those who,
"aided by the agency relation, cause injury."
Formulating a middle-ground analysis, the
Tenth Circuit joined the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's approach
and asked "whether the biased subordinate's
discriminatory reports, recommendation, or
other actions caused the adverse
employment action (emphasis added)."
Applying this test, the court in BCI Coca-
Cola held that although a decisionmaker did
not know the employee she terminated was
African-American, her reliance on
information provided by a biased supervisor
raised genuine issues of fact as to whether
the proffered reason for termination-
insubordination-was really pretext for
racial discrimination.
Falling at the other end of the spectrum, the
"lenient" analysis looks at whether a biased
subordinate influenced a tangible
employment decision. Following this
approach, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Russell v. McKinney
Hospital Venture found that remarks made
by a co-worker who "wielded sufficiently
great 'informal' power within [the
company]" could be circumstantial evidence
of age discrimination if the co-worker "had
influence or leverage over the official
decisionmaker." As such, it reversed the
district court and reinstated the jury's verdict
in favor of the plaintiff.
Second Circuit's Analysis
In Rose v. New York City Bd. of Educ., a
school principal, Shirley Rose, alleged age
discrimination following her demotion. She
supported her claim with evidence that her
supervisor, who was not the ultimate
decisionmaker but who had "enormous
influence in the decision-making process"
had commented that he could replace Ms.
Rose with someone "younger and cheaper."
Without using the term "cat's paw," the
Second Circuit held that the plaintiff had
adduced direct evidence of discrimination
sufficient to shift the burden of persuasion to
the defendant.
Based on these facts, lower courts (and some
circuit courts) have cited to the Rose case as
endorsing the cat's paw theory. However,
the lower courts have not settled on a
uniform application for this theory. In
Downes v. Potter, the Eastern District of
New York denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment, finding, in part, that the
employee could make a discrimination claim
if he established that his supervisor "was
motivated by racial factors in recommending
termination." In doing so, the court
positively cited to Rose along with the Fifth
Circuit's more lenient analysis in Russell v.
McKinney Hospital Venture.
Applying a more stringent standard for
application of this theory, the Northern
District of New York nevertheless refused to
grant an employer summary judgment on a
race discrimination claim, finding that the
terminated employee established questions
of fact regarding pretext. The court found
that a biased supervisor's report may have
played a "substantial role" in the termination
decision. Similarly, in Pjetrovic v. Merrill
Lynch & Co. Inc., the Southern District of
New York found that a subordinate's bias
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may be imputed to the decisionmaker if the
subordinate "was significantly influential in
the final arbiter's decision."
Recent Developments
Recent case law confirms the circuit split
and the expansion of the cat's paw analysis
to the Uniform Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA). In
Staub v. Proctor, the Seventh Circuit
addressed whether a hospital employee was
discriminated against because he was an
Army reservist.
In holding a reasonable jury could not have
found that the biased subordinate had a
"singular influence" in the adverse
employment action-finding the
decisionmaker conducted an investigation
and exercised "independent judgment"--the
Seventh Circuit also held that in such a case
the subordinate's bias should not have been
heard by the jury.
Independent Investigation
Although, arguably, a biased person who is
subordinate to the decisionmaker may be a
"but for" cause of any cat's paw
discrimination claim, courts have generally
acknowledged that an adequate independent
investigation can bar employer liability.
Like the range of cat's paw analyses,
however, the courts' acceptance of
independent investigation as a mitigating
factor varies and, even more than the cat's
paw test itself, requires a fact-sensitive
analysis.
In Hill v. Lockheed, the Fourth Circuit
articulated a broad acceptance of the
mitigating effect of an independent
investigation. It observed that if the fact of a
biased supervisor alone was enough to avoid
summary judgment, "an unbiased employer
could never discipline or terminate an
employee for an undisputed violation of
company rules ... so long as the employee
could demonstrate that she was 'turned in'
by a subordinate employee 'because of a
discriminatory motivation." Following this
analysis, the Fourth Circuit found that while
a biased subordinate with "no supervisory or
disciplinary authority" may have "initiated"
the employee's termination, when the actual
decisionmaker makes an independent and
non-biased determination to terminate,
summary judgment is appropriate.
Similarly, in Staub v. Proctor, the Seventh
Circuit held that a decisionmaker does not
need to be "a paragon of independence," as
long as her decision is not "wholly
dependent on a single source of
information." In Staub, the decision to fire
was made after the decisionmaker,
consulting with an arguably biased
supervisor, but also independently reviewing
alleged workplace performance incidents,
examined past situations and referenced the
employee's file.
The decisionmaker did not, however,
interview co-workers and discussed the
situation with the employee only as part of a
post-termination grievance. Notwithstanding
these arguable investigative deficiencies, the
court found the determination was more than
"blind reliance" and rejected cat's paw
liability. Likewise, a recent decision by the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
held that a subordinate's bias could not be
imputed to the decisionmaker where the
decisionmaker heard the employee's version
of events and independently determined that
the employee's actions were insubordinate.
The mitigating effect of an independent
investigation varies by circuit. For example,
in BCI Coca-Cola, the Tenth Circuit noted
that in certain cases, "simply asking an
employee for his version of events may
defeat the inference that an employment
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decision was racially discriminatory."
Expanding the reach of the independent
investigation defense, the Fourth Circuit
noted in Hill v. Lockheed Martin that the
employee's failure to challenge a pre-
termination reprimand with an unbiased
decisionmaker supported summary
judgment in favor of her employer.
Not all courts are willing to go so far,
however. In Madden v. Chattanooga City
Wide Serv. Dept., the Sixth Circuit held an
employer was liable for racial discrimination
notwithstanding the terminated employee's
failure to raise his supervisor's racial bias
during an investigation by a middle
manager. Looking to the particular facts, the
Sixth Circuit found that it was reasonable to
conclude that managers should have known
that white employees' similar workplace
infractions were not being reported,
supporting a claim of cat's paw
discrimination.
At the other end of the spectrum-and
perhaps a reflection of its lenient cat's paw
test-the Fifth Circuit in Gee v. Principi
refused to find independent discussions with
third parties and interviews with candidates
for a new position to be a sufficient
independent investigation to mitigate cat's
paw liability in a Title VII retaliation case.
The employee, who had filed a sexual
harassment claim against her former
supervisor two years prior, claimed the
decisionmaker was simply the "cat's paw"
of that supervisor, a member of the hiring
committee. The Fifth Circuit held that she
established a prima facie case of retaliation
notwithstanding the decisionmaker' s
investigation.
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"Returning Troops Face New
Fight for Old Jobs"
The Washington Post
July 5, 2010
Kathryn Watson
As the Iraq and Afghanistan wars persist,
some employers are becoming increasingly
resistant to rehire service members who
return from active duty as federal law
requires, legal analysts say.
Washington lawyer Matthew Tully, who
specializes in these cases, said that as the
war on terrorism-which relies heavily on
National Guard and Reserve units-
stretches into its second decade, companies
have become more familiar with the
Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act.
But Mr. Tully, a founding partner at Tully
Rinckey PLLC, said some employers have
objections with the law and have been
upfront with his firm about their failure to
re-employ and sometimes even to hire
citizen-soldiers. One prime reason is
financial. He said, without specifying
names, that airline companies have told the
law firm that hiring military personnel has
resulted in higher labor costs.
"We've seen the number of intentional
violations skyrocket in the past three years,"
he said.
The 1994 law requires employers to rehire
workers who return from active military
duty and, in the hiring process, prohibits
discrimination against those who might
become deployed.
A 2008 Labor Department report states that
the employment law is entirely "complaint
driven" and the government does not bring
criminal charges against companies that
violate the law.
Eric Montavo, a partner with the law firm
Puckett & Faraj PC, said he also has noticed
an increasing number of willful violations
by employers. Mr. Montavo said the
economic downturn has aggravated the
situation because fewer jobs are available.
"The circumstances are driving [service
members] to be very aggressive in pursuing
their rights," he said.
Maj. Melissa Phillips, chief of strategic
communications at Employer Support of the
Guard and Reserve, which handles initial
contact with the service members who report
violations of the employment law, said the
number of inquiries were up notably in 2009
from 2008, and are running higher than
usual in 2010.
In 2009, the Defense Department
organization received 15,870 inquiries
related to the 1994 law, up from 13,090 in
2008. Nine months into fiscal 2010, it has
received 12,600 such inquiries, an annual
pace of close to 17,000.
Maj. Phillips said higher unemployment
rates, coupled with an increased awareness
of rights among service members, may be
responsible for the increase.
Capt. Samuel Wright, director of the Service
Members Law Center at the Reserve
Officers Association, has been writing about
and dealing with laws pertaining to the
hiring of veterans since 1982. The roots of
service members' employment rights extend
back to 1940, with the Veterans'
Reemployment Rights Act, which has been
revised and transformed into the current law.
"I think we're seeing a lot more employer
resistance as people have been called up
three, four, five times," Capt. Wright said.
Even as employers wrestle with uncertainty,
many military members and their families
are left to make their own way.
Cmdr. Randy Jensen was a reservist when
he was called back to active duty in the
global war on terrorism in 2001. Before
leaving for the Middle East, Cmdr. Jensen
worked in the technology department for
TASC Inc., a company specializing in
national security technology. The company
underwent an overhaul during Cmdr.
Jensen's absence and did not have his job
available upon his return in 2008.
"The bottom line is the law says you're
supposed to get the same opportunities as if
you've never left," Cmdr. Jensen said.
"While I was gone, everything changed.
When I came back, I didn't really fit into
anything."
Although Cmdr. Jensen was technically
rehired, he wasn't assigned to a project that
supplied enough earnings to support him, his
wife, Jean, and their two daughters, ages 16
and 8.
"For two years, my family lived in fear,"
said Mrs. Jensen, adding that the complaint-
driven nature of the employment law's
enforcement makes it easy for major
employers to ride out cases.
"Once you get laid off, you don't even have
the money to fight," she said.
TASC representatives said they kept their
end of the deal, but declined to discuss
Cmdr. Jensen's case on the record because
of a pending investigation.
Company spokesman Jay McCaffrey said
TASC does not violate veterans employment
laws.
"TASC honors all of its commitments under
USERRA," he said. "We take that very
seriously."
Whether the Jensen case is the result of a
violation or a misunderstanding, the family
is not alone.
The federal government can become a party
to such cases, but tracking government
numbers over the years doesn't yield clear
trends for a variety of reasons:
- From 2000 through 2003, the Department
of Labor, which is responsible for tracking
cases of the Uniformed Services
Employment and Reemployment Rights
Act, didn't submit annual reports to
Congress on violations.
0 Different government agencies use
different definitions of "complaint," "case"
and "referral."
- The way the Labor Department categorizes
the basis for its cases-discrimination, wage
disputes, refusal to rehire and others-has
varied over the years.
- Congress did not start receiving reports
about the Uniformed Services Employment
and Reemployment Rights Act until 2007,
after a recommendation from the
Government Accountability Office.
During fiscal 2008, the Labor Department
took up 1,389 new cases of the uniformed
services act, 35.6 percent of which dealt
with "discrimination over military
obligations" and 25 percent of which dealt
with reinstatement. The other 40 percent
covered a score of issues such as pay,
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pensions, seniority and promotion.
In its annual report to Congress on 2008
violations, the Department of Labor, which
is responsible for tracking the cases, said it
found "no patterns of violations to
USERRA."
Mr. Tully said that only about 1 percent of
the cases that his office handled in 2004
involved intentional employer violations.
Now, however, he estimates that 15 percent
to 20 percent of cases processed through his
office involve intentional violations.
He also said government statistics could be
misleading because many Guard and
Reserve members become frustrated with
government dealings and pursue their claims
through private firms such as his, which can
resolve cases more quickly.
He said his firm handled 973 cases in 2008,
more than two-thirds of the 1,389 cases that
the entire federal government took that year.
He estimated that 98 percent of his firm's
cases are resolved in less than six months.
"We are their main advocate, whereas the
Department of Labor acts as an ombudsman.
Our job is only to protect our client.... We
have actually represented Department of
Labor investigators in USERRA claims
against the Department of Labor," he said.
Jesse Lawder, a Labor Department
spokesman, declined numerous requests to
speak on the record about violation patterns
or other issues in regard to the employment
act.
A study of 58,000 returning reservists
released in November 2007 by the Defense
Department's Status of Forces Survey
revealed that nearly 11,000 post-Sept. 11
returning reservists and National Guard
members were denied prompt re-
employment. Additionally, more than
20,000 lost seniority, including pay and
other benefits, upon leaving for military
service.
In April, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to
hear its first case of a firing in which a
service member asserted protection under
the Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act.
A year earlier, the Justice Department
reached an agreement in which American
Airlines was required to pay 353 pilots a
total of $345,773 for the loss of vacation and
sick leave benefits while on military duty.
In November, President Obama signed an
executive order establishing the Veterans
Employment Initiative for the executive
branch, aiming to increase the employment
of veterans in the executive branch and help
veterans adjust to civilian service.
"Honoring our sacred trust with America's
veterans means doing all we can to help
them find work when they come home so
they never feel as if the American Dream
they fought to defend is out of reach for
them and their families," Mr. Obama said in
a White House press release.
In a 2010 G.I. Jobs report ranking military-
friendly employers, Union Pacific Railroad
was at the top of the list. The railroad
company also was No. 1 in 2005 and 2006.
Tom Lange, a spokesman for Union Pacific,
said those who have served in the armed
services are assets to the company. He said
many Union Pacific employees have been
deployed overseas since 2001.
"The job responsibilities that go into
working on the railroad match up very, very
well with the background that veterans have
and their military experience," Mr. Lange
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said. "You have to really be adaptable to
different environments."
According to Labor Department statistics,
the nation's work force includes 1.9 million
veterans who have served since the Sept. 11
terrorist attacks. In that veterans pool, 10.7
percent of men and 15.2 percent of women
were unemployed in May, compared with
7.5 percent of non-veteran civilian men and
8.2 percent of non-veteran civilian women.
Capt. Wright said he has seen cases in which
employers don't want to hire service
members in the first place.
"Our real concern is employers won't hire
National Guard and Reserve members," he
said.
Spokesmen for Sens. Carl Levin of
Michigan and John McCain of Arizona, the
Democratic chairman and ranking
Republican, respectively, on the Senate
Armed Services Committee, said the
lawmakers were unavailable for comment.
In an informal 2007 online poll by
Workforce Management magazine, 51
percent of the 348 respondents said they
would not hire a citizen-soldier if they knew
that the employee might be called away
from the job for an indeterminate period.
Capt. Wright acknowledged the high
demands that the law places on many
employers, who have to find replacements
for the citizen-soldiers and give them their
positions when they return. In some cases,
that means the employers have to dismiss
the citizen-soldiers' replacements.
"Yes, [violating the act] is illegal," Capt.
Wright said. "But if employers generally
don't like it, or just don't want to go along
with the program, it's hard to enforce a law
when there is general resistance."
Bert Louthian, a lawyer at the Louthian Law
Firm in South Carolina, also acknowledged
that the law is "inconvenient" for employers,
but he sided with the service members.
"If you balance that out, who's making the
bigger sacrifice?" Mr. Louthian said. "I
think it's a good law."
Mrs. Jensen said employment is a small
price to pay given the service members'
sacrifices.
"They just want to return to normal life."
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Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc.
08-1314
Ruling Below: Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 167 Cal. Rptr. 3d 545 (2008), cert.
granted, 2010 U.S. LEXIS 4352 (2010).
Plaintiffs-appellants alleged that a passenger died because of the manufacturers' failure to install
a lap/shoulder seatbelt in a minivan's middle row center seat. The defendant-respondent
manufacturers demurred, asserting a federal preemption argument. After the claimants' attorney
conceded that all of the claims were premised on the allegedly defective seatbelt configuration,
all of the claims were dismissed. The court held that federal preemption under U.S. Const., art.
VI, applied and that the suit was barred by the version of Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard
208, 49 C.F.R. § 571.208, in effect when the minivan was manufactured. The court stated that
the express preemption provision in 49 U.S.C. § 30103(b)(1) left adequate room for state tort law
to operate pursuant to the saving clause in § 30103(e). Nothing in the language of the saving
clause suggested an intent to save state tort actions that conflicted with federal regulations,
however, and thus § 30103 did not bar the ordinary working of conflict preemption principles. In
light of the concessions made as to the claimants' alternative theories of recovery, those theories
also were barred by federal preemption.
Questions Presented: (1) Where Congress has provided that compliance with a federal motor
vehicle safety standard "does not exempt a person from liability at common law," 49 U.S.C. §
30103(e), does a federal minimum safety standard allowing vehicle manufacturers to install
either lap-only or lap/shoulder seatbelts in certain seating positions impliedly preempt a state
common-law claim alleging that the manufacturer should have installed a lap/shoulder belt in
one of those seating positions? (2) Under this Court's recent ruling in Wyeth v. Levine, _ S. Ct. _,
2009 WL 529172 (2009), does a federal motor vehicle safety standard allowing vehicle
manufacturers to install either lap-only or lap/shoulder seatbelts impliedly preempt a state tort
suit alleging that the manufacturer should have warned consumers of the known dangers of a lap-
only seatbelt installed in one of its vehicles?
DELBERT WILLIAMSON et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants,
V.
MAZDA MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC., et al., Defendants-Respondents.
Court of Appeal of California, Fourth Appellate District
Filed October 22, 2008
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
RYLAARSDAM, J.-This appeal concerns 208 (49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (2008); FMVSS
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard No. 208), a regulation promulgated under the
225
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act of 1966 (49 U.S.C. § 30101 et seq.;
Safety Act), which authorizes automobile
manufacturers to install a lap-only seatbelt at
the inboard seating positions of a vehicle.
The issue is whether the regulation preempts
a common law tort action against a
manufacturer for not choosing the option to
install a lap/shoulder seatbelt at such a
position. We conclude that under the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co. and its progeny
this claim is preempted because it conflicts
with FMVSS 208.
In addition, while plaintiffs alleged other
grounds for recovery not barred by federal
preemption, in light of their concessions the
failure to use a lap/shoulder seatbelt was
"integral" to the case, we affirm the
judgment dismissing the action.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Delbert Williamson, Alexa
Williamson, through Delbert as her guardian
ad litem, and the Estate of Thanh
Williamson sued defendants Mazda Motor
of America, Inc., and Mazda Motor
Corporation for strict products liability,
negligence, deceit, and wrongful death
arising from injuries suffered in a front-end
motor vehicle collision between their 1993
Mazda MPV Minivan and another vehicle.
According to the second amended
complaint, Delbert and Alexa Williamson
wore "three-point [lap/shoulder] seatbelts"
at the time while Thanh Williamson, "sitting
in the middle seat of the [vehicle's] middle
row," wore "only .. . a two-point seatbelt or
lap[]belt." The complaint alleged all three
occupants suffered injuries in the crash, but
Thanh's injuries were fatal because "the
forces generated by th[e] collision caused
her body to 'jackknife' around her defective
lap[]belt, causing severe abdominal injuries
and internal bleeding." Plaintiffs claimed
defendants were liable because they
designed, manufactured, marketed, and sold
a minivan that, among other things, "was
equipped with inferior . . . two-point
lap[]belts in the middle seating positions,
when it should reasonably have been
equipped with three-point seat[]belts[] as
[were] the [vehicle's] remaining seats," and
that defendants knew "of the dangers of
two-point lap[]belts," but "failed to warn...
consumers," including plaintiffs, "of such
dangers."
Defendants answered the amended
complaint and then moved for judgment on
the pleadings. They argued federal
preemption barred plaintiffs' allegation
Thanh Williamson's death "was directly
attributable to the center seat being equipped
with a lap safety belt" rather than "a lap and
shoulder belt" because it "directly
conflict[ed] with the choice that federal law
gave to manufacturers ... ." The trial court
granted the motion with leave to amend. It
agreed federal law precluded a state tort
action "to the extent [the] theory of liability
[was] the lap[-]only seat belt," but
recognized plaintiffs had sufficiently
pleaded other "theories of liability as to ...
the decedent's death. . .
When the hearing began, . . . [t]he judge
acknowledged "I have ruled . . . you can't
have liability just based on [defendant's
decision to install] a lap[]belt" and, "to the
extent you... can find that language in [the
third amended complaint] . . . I don't think
[plaintiffs are] going to be able to proceed
on that." But the federal preemption claim
notwithstanding, the trial judge noted, "that
doesn't mean that you couldn't state a cause
of action" for "negligen[ce] in how you
hooked it up or negligen[ce] in how you
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design the seat that was going to
accommodate it, or any other tort theory."
However, at the request of plaintiffs'
counsel, the court sustained the demurrer
without leave to amend "as to all of
plaintiffs' claims arising out of the death of
Thanh Williamson... ." Counsel explained
that, after "the last hearing . . . I thought
long and hard after reading all the briefs...
, considering the court's order and being the
person that would try this case on behalf of
plaintiffs," about "[w]hat evidence can I put
on and what evidence will be barred based
on the ruling. . . ." He answered this
question, declaring "with the court's ruling
as it presently stands, I don't think I could
put on a case on behalf of my clients. I
really don't. If you strike all these [wrong
seatbelt option] allegations, I am left with
nothing...."
Subsequently, the parties stipulated to a
dismissal of plaintiffs' remaining claims for
personal injuries to Dexter and Alexa
Williamson with prejudice. Based thereon,
the trial court entered judgment for
defendants.
DISCUSSION
1. Federal Preemption
"The supremacy clause of article VI of the
United States Constitution grants Congress
the power to preempt state law. State law
that conflicts with a federal statute is
'without effect."' "Federal regulations have
no less pre-emptive effect than federal
statutes." Since "[state] regulation can be as
effectively exerted through an award of
damages as through some form of
preventive relief," the principles of law
governing federal preemption "apply with
equal force whether the state law takes the
form of a legislative enactment or an award
of damages through private suit.
Federal preemption can arise in the
following circumstances. "First, Congress
can define explicitly the extent to which its
enactments pre-empt state law .... Second,
in the absence of explicit statutory language,
state law is pre-empted where it regulates
conduct in a field that Congress intended the
Federal Government to occupy exclusively..
. . Finally, state law is pre-empted to the
extent that it actually conflicts with federal
law," either because it is impossible for a
private party to comply with both state and
federal requirements, or where state law
"stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress." It is
the latter form of federal conflict preemption
that is at issue in this case.
2. The Safety Act
Congress enacted the Safety Act in 1966 "to
reduce traffic accidents and deaths and
injuries resulting from traffic accidents," in
part, by "prescrib[ing] motor vehicle safety
standards for motor vehicles and motor
vehicle equipment ... ." To accomplish this
purpose, Congress directed the United States
Department of Transportation (DOT) to
"prescribe motor vehicle safety standards"
taking into consideration "relevant available
motor vehicle safety information, .... whether
a proposed standard is reasonable,
practicable, and appropriate for the ... type
of motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment
for which it is prescribed[,] and . . . the
extent to which the standard will carry out
[the declared purposes] of this [Act]." DOT
subsequently delegated the authority to
promulgate these rules to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA).
One of the standards promulgated under the
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Safety Act is FMVSS 208. It "specifies
performance requirements for the protection
of vehicle occupants in crashes."
Originally FMVSS 208 declared that, other
than the driver's side and outboard front
passenger seats, a manufacturer could install
either "a Type 1 [lap-only] or Type 2
[lap/shoulder] seat belt assembly... in each
passenger car seat position."...
After receiving a second petition, NHTSA
reconsidered the issue and in 1988
announced a rule change extending the
lap/shoulder seatbelt requirement to rear
outboard seating positions of most vehicles,
including multipurpose passenger vehicles..
At the same time NHTSA considered, but
rejected, a proposal to require lap/shoulder
belts at rear inboard seating positions. Citing
the potential need for manufacturers to make
structural changes to some vehicles, the
increased costs of installing lap/shoulder
seatbelts, and the limited use of that seating
position, NHTSA concluded the "small
safety benefits" resulting from extending the
lap/shoulder seatbelt requirement to rear
center seating positions did not outweigh the
resulting "technical difficulties" and
"substantially greater costs."...
3. FMVSS 208's Application to This Case
The question presented here is whether
FMVSS 208 preempts the present lawsuit
because a common law action seeking to
hold defendants liable for installing a lap-
only seatbelt at a rear inboard passenger seat
conflicts with the safety standard.
The Safety Act contains a preemption
clause, declaring, "When a motor vehicle
safety standard is in effect under this
chapter, a State or a political subdivision of
a State may prescribe or continue in effect a
standard applicable to the same aspect of
performance of a motor vehicle or motor
vehicle equipment only if the standard is
identical to the standard prescribed under
this chapter." But this statute also contains a
savings clause that states "[c]ompliance with
a motor vehicle safety standard prescribed
under this chapter does not exempt a person
from liability at common law."
In Ketchum v. Hyundai Motor Co., a front-
seat passenger was injured in a crash while
wearing a two-point automatic shoulder belt
without a lapbelt. The defendant argued the
lawsuit was preempted because the then
applicable version of FMVSS 208
authorized this type of passenger crash
protection. Describing FMVSS 208 as a
"minimum standard[] for motor vehicle
safety," and citing the Safety Act's savings
clause, the Court of Appeal rejected the
preemption claim. "In the preemption
clause, Congress precludes the states from
establishing or continuing any motor vehicle
'safety standard applicable to the same
aspect of performance.' . . . The savings
clause provides that compliance with a
'safety standard' issued under the Safety Act
does not exempt a person from 'liability
under common law.' Congress clearly
distinguished between motor vehicle safety
standards, which are preempted, and
common law standards for liability, which
are not. This language unambiguously
expresses the intent of Congress to preserve
common law liability actions."
But in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
the Supreme Court rejected this approach.
There the plaintiff suffered injury in a front-
end collision. Although the vehicle was
equipped with both shoulder and lap
seatbelts, she sued the defendants alleging
the car was defective because it lacked an
airbag. The defendants argued the then
applicable version of FMVSS 208, which
made installation of an airbag optional,
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preempted the lawsuit.
Initially, Geier rejected the defendants'
express preemption claim by reconciling the
preemption and savings clause provisions:
"[A] reading of the express pre-emption
provision that excludes common-law tort
actions gives actual meaning to the saving
clause's literal language, while leaving
adequate room for state tort law to operate-
for example, where federal law creates only
a floor, i.e., a minimum safety standard."
Geier also announced two further holdings
relevant to this case. First, it concluded
"[n]othing in the language of the saving
clause suggests an intent to save state-law
tort actions that conflict with federal
regulations" and thus it "does not bar the
ordinary working of conflict pre-emption
principles."
Second, Geier held "a common-law 'no
airbag' action like the one before us actually
conflicts with FMVSS 208." In reaching this
conclusion, Geier reviewed FMVSS 208's
history and DOT's explanation for its
decision not to require airbags in all
vehicles. The court rejected the "view[ that]
FMVSS 208 sets a minimum airbag
standard .... The ... []DOT's[] comments,
which accompanied the promulgation of
FMVSS 208, make clear that the standard
deliberately provided the manufacturer with
a range of choices among different passive
restraint devices," that "would bring about a
mix of different devices introduced
gradually over time; and FMVSS 208 would
thereby lower costs, overcome technical
safety problems, encourage technological
development, and win widespread consumer
acceptance-all of which would promote
FMVSS 208's safety objectives."
Geier thus found the regulation "'embodies
the Secretary[ of Transportation]'s policy
judgment that safety would best be
promoted if manufacturers installed
alternative protection systems in their fleets
rather than one particular system in every
car.' Petitioners' tort suit claims that the
manufacturers . . . 'had a duty to design,
manufacture, distribute and sell a motor
vehicle with an effective and safe passive
restraint system, including, but not limited
to, airbags.' In effect, petitioners' tort action
depends upon its claim that manufacturers
had a duty to install an airbag when they
manufactured the [car]. Such a state law-
i.e., a rule of state tort law imposing such a
duty-by its terms would have required
manufacturers of all similar cars to install
airbags rather than other passive restraint
systems, such as automatic belts or passive
interiors. It thereby would have presented an
obstacle to the variety and mix of devices
that the federal regulation sought.
Because the rule of law for which petitioners
contend would have stood 'as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the
important means-related federal objectives
that we have just discussed, it is pre-
empted."
While Geier is distinguishable because it
dealt with passive restraints, not seatbelts, its
analysis of FMVSS 208 rejected Ketchum's
approach in determining the preemptive
effect of that safety standard. Furthermore,
subsequent appellate decisions involving tort
actions challenging the use of lap-only
seatbelts have followed Geier and held these
lawsuits are preempted under FMVSS 208.
In Hurley v. Motor Coach Industries, Inc.,
the court ruled a bus driver's action against
the vehicle's manufacturer for installing a
lap-only seatbelt was preempted. "Geier
noted the controversy over the efficacy and
utilization of airbags and seat belts and
concluded that FMVSS 208 'deliberately
sought variety' by leaving the choice of
passenger protection system up to
manufacturers." In Griffith v. General
Motors Corp., the court held FMVSS 208
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preempted a design defect claim asserted by
a plaintiff injured in an accident while
seated in the front center seat of a truck
wearing a lap-only seatbelt.
More apropos to this case, three other
appellate decisions have applied Geier's
approach to hold defective design lawsuits
challenging an automobile manufacturer's
use of a lap-only seatbelt at the inboard
position of a passenger vehicle's rear seat
were preempted by FMVSS 208.
These decisions considered and rejected
many of the arguments raised by plaintiffs in
this appeal. For example, citing the statutory
definition of a motor vehicle safety standard
and language appearing in the NHTSA's
explanations of its rule-making decisions,
plaintiffs describe FMVSS 208's regulations
governing the installation of seatbelts as
minimum standards. Carden rejected a
similar claim: "A review of the regulatory
and rule making history of FMVSS 208
supports the conclusion that the NHTSA's
decision to allow car manufacturers the
option to install either lap-only or
lap/shoulder seat belts in the rear center
seating position of passenger vehicles was
deliberate, and the agency identified specific
policy reasons for its decision .... [W]hen
FMVSS 208 was initially promulgated, the
DOT required either lap-only or
lap/shoulder seat belts in each seating
position in passenger vehicles. As
technology advanced and seatbelt use
became more widespread, seatbelt
requirements evolved. In 1989, noting the
decreased cost and increased use of seatbelts
in rear seating positions, the NHTSA
amended FMVSS 208 to require the use of
lap/shoulder seat belts in rear outboard
seating. The commentary preceding the final
rules indicates that the NHTSA considered
comments suggesting that lap/shoulder seat
belts be required in the rear center seating
position as well, but decided to leave
manufacturers the option to select between
lap-only and lap/shoulder belts. In excluding
the rear center seat from this requirement,
the agency explained that 'there [were] more
technical difficulties associated with any
requirement for lap/shoulder belts at center
rear seating positions, and that lap/shoulder
belts at center rear seating positions would
yield small safety benefits and substantially
greater costs, given the lower center seat
occupancy rate and the more difficult
engineering task.' Based on this language, it
is clear that the agency's decision was
deliberate and based on managing
technological constraints and cost
efficiency."
Plaintiffs also assert that "[u]nlike Geier,
this case does not involve airbags, passive
restraint devices, or the unique policy
judgments made by NHTSA when it
promulgated the ... version of FMVSS 208
governing passive restraints." Griffith
rejected the argument that Geier was limited
to lawsuits involving a manufacturer's
choice between passive restraint options.
"[T]he Supreme Court... framed the issue
as one of intent. In implementing the
Congressional mandate to reduce the
number of vehicular deaths, did DOT intend
to establish only certain minimum safety
standards, beyond which a state would be
free to require more, or did it deliberately
design a regulatory scheme which provides
specific passenger restraint options, no one
of which would state law be free to
foreclose? In Geier, the Court found that the
rule-making history of FMVSS 208 makes
clear that DOT saw it not merely as a
minimum standard, but as a comprehensive
regulatory scheme. DOT intended and
expected FMVSS 208 to produce a mix of
restraint devices, both passive and manual,
in cars and trucks. DOT's own
contemporaneous explanation of FMVSS
208 was that it believed this mix would
maximize the likelihood that people would
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actually use the passenger restraint systems
installed in their cars and trucks."
A third argument plaintiffs assert is that this
case is governed by the United States
Supreme Court's later decision in Sprietsma
v. Mercury Marine. Sprietsma arose from
the death of a woman after she fell off a boat
and was struck by the blades of the boat's
outboard motor. Her husband sued the
motor's manufacturer, alleging the product
was unreasonably dangerous because it
lacked a propeller guard. In state court, the
defendant succeeded in having the lawsuit
dismissed on the ground it was preempted
under the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971
because the United States Coast Guard,
which had the authority to issue regulations
under the Act, had studied the issue and
chosen not to adopt a regulation requiring
the installation of propeller guards.
The United States Supreme Court reversed.
In response to the defendant's claim of
implied preemption arising from the Coast
Guard's inaction, it noted, "The Coast
Guard's decision not to impose a propeller
guard requirement presents a sharp contrast
to the decision of the Secretary of
Transportation that was given pre-emptive
effect in Geier.. " Thus "[i]t is quite
wrong to view that decision as the functional
equivalent of a regulation prohibiting all
States and their political subdivisions from
adopting such a regulation. The decision...
to 'take no regulatory action,' left the law
applicable to propeller guards exactly the
same as it had been before the subcommittee
began its investigation. . . . Indeed, history
teaches us that a Coast Guard decision not to
regulate a particular aspect of boating safety
is fully consistent with an intent to preserve
state regulatory authority pending the
adoption of specific federal standards."
As explained in Carden v. General Motors
Corp., "Sprietsma involved a complete
absence of regulatory action, which was not
the case here. As discussed above, the
NHTSA identified particular policy reasons
for its decision to allow manufacturers the
option of selecting between the two seat belt
designs, and included this option as a part of
a comprehensive regulatory scheme. Thus,
Sprietsma does not control."
Plaintiffs also claim Sprietsma stands for the
proposition that NHTSA's "analysis of
technical feasibility, costs, and relative
safety benefits" does not "reflect any
authoritative message of federal policy
against lap/shoulder belts in rear-center
seats." This argument misstates the Supreme
Court's opinion in Sprietsma. After quoting
the Coast Guard's explanation for rejecting a
propeller guard requirement and discussing
the reasons given by that agency, the court
concluded "although the Coast Guard's
decision ... was undoubtedly intentional
and carefully considered, it does not convey
an 'authoritative' message of a federal
policy against propeller guards." Thus,
Sprietsma does not bar a federal regulation
from having a preemptive effect simply
because the agency employs a "cost-benefit
analysis" to reach its decision. In fact, by
statute, DOT and NHTSA are required to
consider factors such as feasibility and cost
in issuing motor vehicle safety standards.
Plaintiffs also rely on Chevere v. Hyundai
Motor Co. Chevere involved an action
where a passenger, wearing an automatic
seatbelt but not the available manual lapbelt,
died in what the appellate division described
as "an 'ordinary, easily survivable'
intersection collision at no more than
moderate speed. . ." in which "the adequacy
of the restraint system in plaintiffs vehicle
was a crucial factor in the assessment of
liability against the ... defendants." The
court rejected the defendants' preemption
defense, declaring "Geier does not
automatically exempt automobile
manufacturers from liability whenever a
federal regulation provides them with
options as to the type of restraint system to
be employed. Nothing in that decision bars
allegations of strict products liability, breach
of warranty and negligence in a state action.
Geier precludes actions alleging a general
failure to equip a vehicle properly, but does
not preclude common-law claims against a
manufacturer who has unreasonably opted to
meet only minimum performance
requirements."
Chevere is questionable because the
foregoing statement is conclusory and lacks
any supporting analysis for its interpretation
of Geier. In any event, Chevere is
distinguishable. The only legal authority the
New York court cited to support its holding
is a pre-Geier decision, King v. Ford Motor
Co. King rejected the defendants'
preemption argument because the
"plaintiffs' position was not that the design
choice made by defendants for protecting
against frontal collisions-an automatic
shoulder belt and knee bolster-was
inherently defective but that the specific
design was defective due to failure to use
load limiters and/or change the location of
the knee bolster and/or change the location
of the belt anchor."
King was premised on a theory the specific
vehicle involved in the accident had a
structural design flaw, not that the defendant
had chosen the wrong passenger restraint
option. The limited factual summary in
Chevere suggests it may well have involved
a similar theory of recovery. Furthermore,
this approach is consistent with Geier-
There, the Supreme Court recognized "[ilt is
possible that some special design-related
circumstance concerning a particular kind of
car might require airbags, rather than
automatic belts, and that a suit seeking to
impose that requirement could escape pre-
emption-say, because it would affect so
few cars that its rule of law would not create
a legal 'obstacle' to [FMVSS] 208's mixed-
fleet, gradual objective. But that is not what
petitioners claimed. They have argued
generally that, to be safe, a car must have an
airbag."
Plaintiffs allege defendants defectively
designed the minivan, in part, by equipping
"[t]he center seating position of the middle
bench seat . . . with an inferior and unsafe
lap-only belt that did not provide adequate
protection in frontal collisions because it did
not restrain the upper torso of decedent
Thanh Williamson.. . ." In effect, they seek
to hold defendants liable for choosing the
lap-only seatbelt option for a rear inboard
seat position. If successful, plaintiffs' claim
would bar motor vehicle manufacturers from
employing one of the passenger restraint
options authorized by FMVSS 208 because
it would effectively require them to install
only lap/shoulder seatbelts at inboard
seating positions to avoid liability under
California law. Such a result would "stand
as an obstacle to the implementation of the
comprehensive safety scheme promulgated
in [FMVSS] 208" and is therefore
preempted.
The United States Supreme Court's decision
in Geier is binding on us, but, as noted,
Geier is distinguishable because it dealt with
passive restraints. The post-Geier cases
considering FMVSS 208's preemptive effect
on an automobile manufacturer's choice of
passenger restraint systems are not
controlling precedent in California.
However, these cases have almost uniformly
found FMVSS 208 preempts common law
actions alleging a manufacturer chose the
wrong seatbelt option and we find their
analysis to be persuasive. Therefore, we
conclude that to the extent plaintiffs contend
defendants are liable for failing to install a
lap/shoulder seatbelt in the minivan's
middle row inboard seat, their claim is
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barred by the version of FMVSS 208 in
effect when defendants manufactured the
minivan.
4. Plaintiffs' Remaining Theories of
Recovery
Plaintiffs note the third amended complaint
alleged other design defect claims not
covered by FMVSS 208, including a lap-
only belt "anchored at an unsafe angle,"
several "seating positions" "unreasonably
susceptible to ramping and submarining of
passengers" because of "[tihe angle,
geometry, and composition of the seat
bottom," "seat backs" incapable of
"sufficiently withstand[ing] foreseeable
forces in a frontal collision," and the
vehicle's lack of "sufficient energy-
absorbing materials and structures to absorb
reasonable amounts of force from a frontal
collision. " In addition, citing the
principle that "a product flawlessly designed
and produced may nevertheless possess such
risks to the user without a suitable warning
that it becomes 'defective' simply by the
absence of a warning," plaintiffs contend
their failure to warn theory is not preempted
by FMVSS 208. Thus, they argue, "even if
this court finds that the lap/shoulder belt
theory is preempted, the judgment should
still be reversed and the case remanded for
further proceedings on the other remaining
theories of liability."
Plaintiffs waived these claims. They
stipulated to dismiss with prejudice all
injury claims relating to plaintiffs Delbert
and Alexa Williamson. As for Thanh
Williamson's death, plaintiffs acknowledged
both in the third amended complaint and at
the hearing on the demurrer that without the
ability to challenge defendants' failure to
install a lap/shoulder seatbelt they could not
proceed on the remaining theories of
liability....
At the hearing on the demurrer, the trial
judge expressed his opinion the inability to
hold defendants "liable for choosing a two-
point seatbelt instead of a three-point
seatbelt" did not "mean that [they] couldn't
state a cause of action based" on "any other
tort theory." Defense counsel even agreed
with this observation, stating, "We are not
arguing that they are preempted from
alleging that the seat[]back in the vehicle is
defective. We're not arguing that they're
preempted from saying the seat cushion is
defective or the vehicle structure is
defective." But in response, plaintiffs'
attorney declared "with the court's ruling as
it presently stands, I don't think I could put
on a case on behalf of my clients,"
explaining "the [seat]belt is integral" to the
case, and "[i]f you strike all these [defective
seatbelt] allegations, I am left with nothing."
In light of the concessions contained in the
third amended complaint and counsel's
comments, plaintiffs' alternative theories of
recovery are also barred by federal
preemption. Therefore, the trial court
properly sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend as to the allegations of
Thanh Williamson's injuries and death.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents'
request that we take judicial notice of
portions of the Federal Register relating to
FMVSS 208 is granted. Respondents are
entitled to recover their costs on appeal.
"Mazda Passenger Seatbelt Suit Gets
U.S. Supreme Court Review"
Bloomberg
May 23, 2010
Greg Stohr
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider
opening automakers to more consumer
lawsuits, agreeing to decide whether an
accident victim's family can sue Mazda
Motor Corp. over the type of seatbelts
installed in a 1993 MPV minivan [in
Williamson v. Mazda Motor ofAmerica].
The case will let the justices revisit the
scope of a 2000 decision that said federal
law insulates automakers from claims under
state product-liability law that they should
have moved more quickly to install air bags.
The decision to take up the Mazda case is
unusual because every lower court to
consider the issue had concluded that
seatbelt-design suits were similarly barred.
The justices stepped in at the behest of U.S.
Solicitor General Elena Kagan, whom
President Barack Obama has since
nominated for the court.
Kagan told the justices that lower courts
"repeatedly have over-read" the 2000 ruling
to mean that federal safety regulations for
seatbelts preclude consumer lawsuits that
aim to hold automakers to a higher standard.
She said the lower courts' approach is
inconsistent with the views Of the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration, or
NHTSA, which sets motor vehicle safety
standards.
The dispute centers on the use of two-point
seatbelts-lap belts without a shoulder
strap-at a time when federal regulations
allowed them in some minivan seats. Under
NHTSA rules put into place in 1989, three-
point belts were required only for so-called
outboard seats-those next to a window,
rather than alongside an aisle or in the center
of a row.
Current regulations, in effect since 2007,
require new cars to have three-point
seatbelts in all forward-facing seats.
Detached Jeep
Thanh Williamson died in Kane County,
Utah, in August 2002 when she was riding
in an aisle seat equipped with a lap belt in
the second row of an MPV. The van struck a
Jeep Wrangler that had become detached
from a motor home that was towing it.
The collision caused Williamson's body to
jackknife around her seatbelt, causing severe
abdominal injuries and internal bleeding,
according to the lawsuit.
Mazda contends that NHTSA wanted
carmakers to have flexibility as to which
type of belt to install and that the
Williamson suit would interfere with that
policy.
The 1989 rule "was part of a comprehensive
regulatory scheme, advancing deliberately
chosen policy, and not just a minimum
safety standard," argued Mazda, which is
based in Hiroshima, Japan.
The Supreme Court used similar reasoning
in the air bag case, saying the agency was
trying to gradually phase in a mix of passive
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restraint systems. Ruling 5-4, the court said
that, because consumer suits would conflict
with those objectives, they are "preempted"
by federal law.
Different Goals
Williamson's husband, Delbert Williamson,
argues that NHTSA's aims were different
with seatbelts.
"The agency recognized that lap/shoulder
seatbelts were inherently safer and its
regulations were intended to achieve the
earliest possible implementation of a
requirement for rear-seat lap/shoulder belts,"
the appeal argued.
A California state appeals court barred the
suit from going forward.
The justices will hear the case in their 20 10-
11 term, which starts in October. Kagan has
said she would disqualify herself from any
case in which she served as counsel of
record, as she did in the government brief
filed in the Mazda case.
The Supreme Court last year, ruling on
preemption in a different context, said that
consumers can sue drugmakers for failing to
provide adequate safety warnings.
The case is Williamson v. Mazda Motor of
America, 08-1314.
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"High Court to Hear Vehicle
Safety Preemption Case"
Law360
May 24, 2010
Ryan Davis
In a case involving Mazda Motor of
America Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court has
agreed to rule on whether state law claims
brought against an automaker over a fatal
crash are preempted by federal vehicle
standards.
The high court on Monday granted a petition
for a writ of certiorari filed by the family of
Thanh Williamson, who was wearing a lap-
only seat belt in 2002 when her 1993 Mazda
minivan was involved in a crash with
another vehicle, killing her.
When the minivan was made, federal law
allowed vehicles to have lap-only seat belts,
but the family sued Mazda under California
state law, alleging the vehicle should have
had a lap/shoulder seat belt and that Mazda
failed to warn of the risk of lap-only belts.
Federal law has since been changed to
require lap/shoulder belts in most vehicles.
In its decision, the California Court of
Appeal Fourth Appellate District said the
lawsuit was preempted by a Federal Motor
Vehicle Safety Standard under the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act that
authorized automakers to install lap-only
seat belts.
The court ruled that if the plaintiffs' claims
were successful, it would bar automakers
from using one of the two options available
under the federal standard and require them
to install only lap/shoulder belts to avoid
liability in California.
In their petition, counsel for the Williamsons
argued that state tort law should never be
displaced by a federal agency's decision not
to impose a particular safety standard unless
there is clear evidence of a conflict between
state and federal policies.
Martin Buchanan, an attorney for Niddrie
Fish & Buchanan LLP representing the
Williamsons, said he was very pleased the
high court took up the case. He noted that
the case was dismissed without the family
having its day in court, so he hopes the
Supreme Court's eventual ruling will give
them that opportunity.
Mark Berry, an attorney for Bowman and
Brooke LLP representing Mazda, said he
was disappointed with the justices' decision
to hear the case but was confident of success
at the high court.
"I don't think the case was cert-worthy," he
said. "On the merits, ultimately we'll
prevail. It's just established law. There was
nothing out of the mainstream of preemption
law in the Williamson decision."
In October, the high court asked Solicitor
General Elena Kagan to offer an opinion on
the case. In an amicus brief filed in April,
Kagan urged the justices to grant cert,
arguing that the lower court in this case, as
well as other courts, misinterpreted the
intent of the federal safety standard at issue.
The standard is a "minimum standard," but
"the states are not foreclosed from
concluding, through a duty of care applied in
common-law tort actions, that one option is
superior to the others," the brief said.
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It noted that the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration disagrees with the
lower court's ruling in this case and that the
government believes that standards that
allow options in vehicle standards do not
compel a finding of preemption.
The Williamsons' petition presented two
questions, but the high court granted
certiorari only on the first, which dealt with
the claim that the vehicle should have had a
lap/shoulder belt, and not the second, which
dealt with the failure-to-warn claim.
Counsel for the Williamsons is Niddrie Fish
& Buchanan LLP, Girardi & Keese Law and
the Law Offices of David J. Bennion.
Mazda is represented in this matter by
Bowman and Brooke LLP.
The case is Williamson et al. v. Mazda
Motor of America Inc. et aL, case number
08-1314, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
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"High Court Seeks SG Input in
Mazda Preemption Case"
Law360
October 5, 2009
Shannon Henson
The U.S. Supreme Court has asked the
solicitor general to weigh in on whether
federal law preempts a lawsuit brought
against Mazda Motor of America Inc. after a
woman wearing a lap-only seat belt was
killed in a collision.
In an order Monday, the high court asked
the solicitor general to offer an opinion on
the preemption case Williamson et aL v.
Mazda Motor of America Inc. et al., which
was decided by a California appellate court
in October 2008. The California Supreme
Court denied discretionary review in
February.
Martin Buchanan, an attorney with Niddrie
Fish & Buchanan LLP and counsel for the
decedent's husband, Delbert Williamson,
and daughter, Alexa Williamson, said
Monday that he was pleased the Supreme
Court had taken an interest in the case.
"This case presents an opportunity for the
Supreme Court to clarify that state tort law
may operate concurrently with federal
minimum standards to achieve the mutual
goal of greater vehicle safety," Buchanan
said.
Meanwhile, Mark V. Berry, counsel for
Mazda and a lawyer with Bowman and
Brooke LLP, said the California courts
relied on long-established preemption
principles in deciding the case. "Ultimately
we expect that the court will not see any
reason to grant a hearing," he said.
In its decision, the California Court of
Appeal Fourth Appellate District said that
the lawsuit brought in the wake of the death
of Thanh Williamson was preempted by the
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard of
the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act.
Thanh Williamson was seated in the middle
row of a 1993 Mazda minivan when it
crashed into a Jeep Wrangler in August
2002. When the minivan was made, the law
authorized lap-only seat belts except in
forward-facing rear outboard seating
positions.
In their petition, counsel for the Williamsons
argued that state tort law should never be
displaced by a federal agency's decision not
to impose a particular safety standard unless
there is clear evidence of a conflict between
state and federal policies.
The petition also argued that the cases cited
by the California appellate court couldn't be
reconciled with the Supreme Court's Wyeth
v. Levine decision in March.
The Supreme Court said in that 6-3 decision
that a pharmaceutical company wasn't
shielded from state product liability lawsuits
just because the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration approved the drug's label.
The high court also rejected Wyeth
Pharmaceutical Inc.'s argument that state
law claims were preempted by federal law
because it was impossible for the company
to comply with both.
The Williamson petition said, "Similarly,
petitioners' failure-to-warn claim is not
preempted by NHTSA's approval of lap-
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only seat belts as the minimum federal
safety standard for some vehicle seating
positions. As in Wyeth, Congress has clearly
expressed its intention to allow state
common law to operate in conjunction with
federal 'minimum' standards to achieve
greater vehicle safety."
However, Mazda said in its brief that there
is no conflict with Wyeth v. Levine because
the plaintiffs waived the failure to warn
claims in the case. Also, Wyeth concerned a
federal regulation with a factual and
regulatory history wholly distinct in
character.
"The lower court, and the various other
courts deciding similar cases, had the benefit
of the complex (Federal Motor Vehicle
Safety Standard) regulatory scheme
concerning rear center seat belt options.
That scheme is radically different than the
one presented in Wyeth," the brief said.
Counsel for the Williamsons is Niddrie Fish
& Buchanan LLP, Girardi & Keese Law and
the Law Offices of David J. Bennion.
Mazda is represented in this matter by
Bowman and Brooke LLP.
The case is Delbert Williamson et al. v.
Mazda Motor of America Inc. et aL, case
number 08-1314, in the U.S. Supreme Court.
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"Court Rebuffs Suits on
Lack of Air Bags"
The Washington Post
May 23, 2000
Caroline E. Mayer
The U.S. Supreme Court handed auto
manufacturers a major victory yesterday [in
Geier et al. v. American Honda Motor Co.,
Inc., et al.], ruling that federal air-bag
regulations protect them from lawsuits filed
in state courts by consumers who were
injured in crashes involving cars that
weren't equipped with the safety devices.
In a 5 to 4 ruling, the court said that even
though air bags were not required in all U.S.
cars until 1998 models, the existence of
earlier federal rules phasing them in over
several years protects auto companies from
any product-liability suits brought in state
courts.
Justice Stephen G. Breyer, writing for the
majority, said the prospect of state product-
liability suits could have forced auto
companies to speed up the installation of air
bags, which "would have stood as an
obstacle to the gradual passive restraint
phase-in that the federal regulation
deliberately imposed."
Justice John Paul Stevens, writing the
dissent, disagreed. He said the regulation
"would not be frustrated one whit by
allowing state courts to determine whether
in 1987 the life-saving advantages of air
bags had become sufficiently obvious that
their omission might constitute a design
defect in some new cars."
The decision-one of the most closely
watched business disputes before the high
court this year---ends a lawsuit brought by
D.C. resident Alexis Geier. She suffered
serious head injuries in 1992 when her 1987
Honda Accord went out of control on a
curve and struck a tree. Geier, then 17, was
wearing a seat belt. Geier and her parents
sued Honda, saying the car's design was
defective because it did not have an air bag.
The court's ruling is expected to have a wide
impact on pending and future liability suits
against car manufacturers and other
companies now regulated by the federal
government, including those that make
medical devices, pharmaceuticals, boats,
pesticides and a wide array of consumer
products.
"We don't look at this as an air-bag case, but
as a principle of implied federal preemption
of state tort law," said Robin Conrad, senior
vice president of the National Chamber
Litigation Center. The center, the legal arm
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, was one
of several business groups filing legal briefs
supporting Honda and automakers in the
Geier suit.
Although some lawyers said the court
decision was quite narrow, limited only to
the federal air-bag rule, Conrad said "we're
going to cite this case in a lot of instances."
The court's ruling is expected halt any
pending or future claims involving the
absence of air bags in cars made before
1998. It's estimated that more than 100
million cars on the road lack the air bags
now required in the driver and front
passenger seats.
Auto industry experts also predict that the
decision will be used by carmakers to fight
consumer suits raising different safety
issues.
"This invites auto manufacturers to raise
federal preemption as a defense in a legion
of other product-liability cases, including
those questioning the design of fuel systems,
roof strength and back seats-all pending
cases," said Clarence Ditlow, executive
director of the Center for Auto Safety, a
public interest group. "This tilts" these cases
"in favor of the auto companies," he added.
"This is a real huge disappointment for
consumers," said Andrew Popper, an
American University law professor
specializing in product liability. "The one
thing you'd think consumers have is the
ability to go to state court when they've
been harmed and when they have a powerful
argument that there was a reasonable
alternative design and manufacturers simply
chose not to implement it."
The Geier family could not be reached for
comment. The family's attorney, James
Taglieri, said he was "comfortable that the
court limited its decision."
"In no way shape or form will it impact
negligently designed or installed air-bag
systems or a host of other designs or
components of motor vehicles," he said.
Carmakers, however, read the opinion
differently. Gloria Berquist, spokeswoman
for the Alliance of Automobile
Manufacturers, said it "reaffirms that
automakers were abiding by federal law, and
federal law preempts state law."
"You can't have states doing different things
that would create chaos," she said.
The dispute focused on federal air-bag rules,
adopted in 1984, that required automakers to
equip some, but not all, 1987 cars with
passive restraints. The rule only required
that carmakers put the safety systems in at
least 10 percent of their cars. It did not
specifically require air bags, allowing
manufacturers to also install automatic seat
belts.
The rule, which required safety devices in
more cars in later years, was a deliberate
attempt to let carmakers slowly experiment
with a variety of safety systems to make sure
they were effective and to win consumer
support for them.
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"Mazda Preemption Case Could
Expand Automaker Liability"
Law360
June 10, 2010
Brendan Pierson
When the U.S. Supreme Court decides a
case against Mazda Motor of America Inc.
over a death allegedly caused by the lack of
a shoulder strap in a minivan, it could put
automakers on the hook for a wide range of
state law claims that courts have long
deemed preempted by federal regulation,
experts say.
Although the high court could choose to
address only the narrow shoulder-strap
issue, attorneys say that it's likely to use the
case to clarify the scope of its 2000 decision
in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co.
Inc.-a case concerning air bags that has
generally been read by courts as protecting
car companies from state law claims as long
as they comply with federal regulations.
"I do think whatever the court decides, it
will have implications beyond the lap/
shoulder belt preemption issue," said Martin
N. Buchanan, a partner at Niddrie Fish &
Buchanan who represents the petitioners in
the Mazda case.
Even if the court takes a narrow approach to
the case, Buchanan said, it will probably
have to look at previous cases that have
applied the Geier standard to lap/ shoulder
belt claims, and would necessarily end up
clarifying its reasoning in Geier-
Kelly Savage Day, an attorney at Sedgwick
Detert Moran & Arnold, said that the high
court-which agreed in May to take the
case-would probably take the opportunity
to clarify Geier.
"The very fact that the United States
Supreme Court is taking this case when
there's no underlying conflict suggests that
the court is considering narrowing Geier,"
she said, noting that the court's 2009
decision in Wyeth v. Levine had overturned
an earlier preemption standard, and that its
request for input from the solicitor general
on another case involving Wyeth
Pharmaceuticals drug Reglan in May
suggested it was still looking at the issue of
preemption in a broad light.
Also noteworthy was the solicitor general's
brief urging the high court to take the case
and narrow Geier. The standard, the brief
said, was a "minimum standard," but "the
states are not foreclosed from concluding,
through a duty of care applied in common-
law tort actions, that one option is superior
to the others,"
The solicitor general's brief to the court
further noted that the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration disagreed with
the lower court's ruling in the case.
If the Supreme Court does take the broader
approach and narrows the application of
Geier, the outcome could have significant
effects on auto liability litigation, increasing
the volume of liability against automakers,
and shortening the defense's odds of
success, lawyers say.
"You [the high court] open the door," said
Jeff Birkhold, a partner at Warner Norcross
& Judd LLP. "Then it wouldn't be a defense
if you comply with federal regulation."
"We could see a lot more products liability
claims against automobile manufacturers-
even if the manufacturers have done
everything required by federal law," Savage
Day said. "I also think you'll see automobile
manufacturers adding additional safety
features to vehicles to avoid potential
lawsuits, even when these features aren't
necessary, lead to less choice and drive up
the costs of owning a vehicle for the average
American consumer."
The court could, of course, opt to take a
narrower approach, an outcome Mazda's
lawyer, Bowman and Brooke partner Mal
Wheeler, believes is likely.
Wheeler said the court would probably take
the narrowest possible approach, sticking to
the question of whether the specific claim
over seat belts was preempted by the
particular regulation at issue in the case-
which is no longer in effect.
"It could be a very, very narrow decision
that clarifies the law only with respect to an
outdated regulation for older minivans," he
said.
The court probably won't address the
government's request that it clarify the
scope of Geier, since it would have to look
at numerous cases that have applied the
Geier standard, Wheeler said.
"I think the government was really reaching
beyond what needs to be decided," he said.
"They have no record on any of those cases.
They don't know what the facts are."
Wheeler said the court likely took the case
in deference to the solicitor general's brief,
rather than out of a desire to make a
significant change to the law. But, he said,
even if the Geier decision were tackled head
on, how big the impact would be is unclear
since many cases against car companies
don't touch on the federal preemption issue.
"It's clear that the auto industry is rarely
raising preemption," Wheeler said. "It's
really a handful [of cases]."
Vince Galvin of Bowman and Brooke, who
represents Toyota in the current multidistrict
litigation over unintended acceleration in its
cars, acknowledged that preemption was
unlikely to be an issue in that case.
"I can't think of any state law that would be
preempted by any federal regulation" related
to unintended acceleration, he said.
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